Why Philosophy is the Handmaid of Theology

Why Philosophy is the Handmaid of Theology

From St. Thomas' Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate I.2.3 

(Leonine edition of work available on PDF thru ITOPL):

Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers

Response. I answer that it must be said that gifts of grace are added to those of nature in such a way that they do not destroy the latter, but rather perfect them; wherefore also the light of faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds, does not destroy the natural light of cognition, which is in us by natuise. For although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible that those things which God has manifested to us by faith should be contrary to those which are evident to us by natural knowledge. In this case one would necessarily be false: and since both kinds of truth are from God, God would be the author of error, a thing which is impossible. Rather, since in imperfect things there is found some imitation of the perfect, though the image is deficient, in those things known by natural reason there are certain similitudes of the truths revealed by faith. Now, as sacred doctrine is founded upon the light of faith, so philosophy depends upon the light of natural reason; wherefore it is impossible that philosophical truths are contrary to those that are of faith; but they are deficient as compared to them. Nevertheless they incorporate some similitudes of those higher truths, and some things that are preparatory for them, just as nature is the preamble to grace.

If, however, anything is found in the teachings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does not properly belong to philosophy, but is due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of reason. Therefore also it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind, either by showing it to be altogether impossible, or not to be necessary. For just as those things which are of faith cannot be demonstratively proved, so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be false, but they can be shown not to be necessary.

Thus, in sacred doctrine we are able to make a threefold use of philosophy:

1. First, to demonstrate those truths that are preambles of faith and that have a necessary place in the science of faith. Such are the truths about God that can be proved by natural reason—that God exists, that God is one; such truths about God or about His creatures, subject to philosophical proof, faith presupposes.

2. Secondly, to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine in his book, De Trinitate, employed any comparisons taken from the teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity.

3. In the third place, to resist those who speak against the faith, either by showing that their statements are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.

Nevertheless, in the use of philosophy in sacred Scripture, there can be a twofold error:

In one way, by using doctrines contrary to faith, which are not truths of philosophy, but rather error, or abuse of philosophy, as Origen did.

In another way, by using them in such manner as to include under the measure of philosophy truths of faith, as if one should be willing to believe nothing except what could be held by philosophic reasoning; when, on the contrary, philosophy should be subject to the measure of faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:5), “Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.”

Videtur quod in his quae sunt fidei non liceat philosophicis rationibus uti...

Responsio. Dicendum quod dona gratiarum hoc modo naturae adduntur quod eam non tollunt, sed magis perficiunt; unde et lumen fidei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis rationis divinitus nobis inditum. Et quamvis lumen naturale mentis humanae sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum quae manifestantur per fidem, tamen impossibile est quod ea, quae per fidem traduntur nobis divinitus, sint contraria his quae sunt per naturam nobis indita. Oporteret enim alterum esse falsum; et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile. Sed magis cum in imperfectis inveniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, in ipsis, quae per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam similitudines eorum quae per fidem sunt tradita.

Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur supra lumen naturale rationis; unde impossibile est quod ea, quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria his quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis. Continent tamen aliquas eorum similitudines et quaedam ad ea praeambula, sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam. Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis. Et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophiae huiusmodi errorem refellere vel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel ostendendo non esse necessarium. Sicut enim ea quae sunt fidei non possunt demonstrative probari, ita quaedam contraria eis non possunt demonstrative ostendi esse falsa, sed potest ostendi ea non esse necessaria.

Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti. Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit. Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem. Tertio ad resistendum his quae contra fidem dicuntur sive ostendendo ea esse falsa sive ostendendo ea non esse necessaria.

Tamen utentes philosophia in sacra doctrina possunt dupliciter errare. Uno modo in hoc quod utantur his quae sunt contra fidem, quae non sunt philosophiae, sed corruptio vel abusus eius, sicut Origenes fecit. Alio modo, ut ea quae sunt fidei includantur sub metis philosophiae, ut scilicet si aliquis credere nolit nisi quod per philosophiam haberi potest, cum e converso philosophia sit ad metas fidei redigenda, secundum illud apostoli 2 Cor. 10: in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.

Obtain PDF's of Aquinas' works (Leonine) thru:

Ite ad Thomam Out-of-Print Library (ITOPL).

Ex Martyrologio

Ex Martyrologio

Assísii, in Umbria, natális sancti Francísci, Levítæ et Confessóris; qui trium Ordinum, scílicet Fratrum Minórum, Páuperum Dominárum, ac Fratrum et Sorórum de Pæniténtia Fundátor éxstitit.  Ipsíus autem vitam, sanctitáte ac miráculis plenam, sanctus Bonaventúra conscrípsit.

At Assisi in Umbria, the birthday of St. Francis, cleric and confessor, founder of three orders: the Friars Minor, the Poor Clares, and the Brothers and Sisters of Penance.  His life, filled with holy deeds and miracles, were written by St. Bonaventure.

The Object and End of a Human Act: Finis Operis and Finis Operantis

The Object and End of a Human Act: Finis Operis and Finis Operantis

The scholastic tradition, especially manuals on ethics and moral theology, very rarely receive credit these days for developing Thomistic thought in a positive way.  As a matter of fact, they are vilified for taking approaches that are different from that of St. Thomas--not only for emphasizing sin and vice more than virtue, grace, etc., for following the scholastic method (now out of fashion) too rigidly, for focusing on cases (casuistry) more than on principles, and for a host of other now-unpopular elements in these manuals that the nouvelle theologie is now all-too-happy to condemn (cf. Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics), but also for the unmentionable sin of teaching the traditional morality (especially sexual morality) of the Church, which is supposedly no longer tenable for any 'respectable' contemporary theologian.  But, of course, the mission here at Ite ad Thomam is precisely to give these works due credit and, as far as possible, revive traditional scholastic Thomism.  So here's a little research I did on a particular issue which demonstrates that some doctrines that Thomistic moral theologians and ethicists take for granted coming from the Angelic Doctor are actually of later origin.  In particular, I did some research on the monumental moral doctrine that which identifies the object of the human act with the finis operis and the end of a human act with the finis operantis.  

The finis operis (end of the work) is the natural end of an act; for example, the finis operis of bulding is to make a building, and the finis operis of cooking is to cook food.  The finis operantis (end of the agent), however, is that to which the agent orders the natural end of the act; for example, the finis operantis of building could be to profit from the sale of the building, and the finis operantis of cooking could be to entertain guests.

Traditionally, the object of a human act (cf. I-II.18) is understood as the finis operis of that act, and the end of a human act (cf. I-II.18) is understood as the finis operantis of the act.  This interpretation is practically unanimous in most of the Thomistic manuals and commentaries on the Summa (some of the more recent examples are, Garrigou-Lagrange, De beatitudine; Noldin, Summa Theologiae Moralis; Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis).  And in fact, there are many indications in Summa Theologiae I-II.18 and elsewhere (cf. text 3 below) that this is the correct interpretation.  The ipsissima verba of the Angelic Doctor, however, never explicitly makes such an identification.  As the word search results below show, there are five distinct places in Aquinas' corpus where he uses the distinction between finis operis and finis operantis.  In none of these texts does Aquinas identify the finis operis with the object of a human act, or the finis operantis with the end of the act.  Clearly, then, we owe this interpretive move to the Thomistic commentary tradition; in particular, it is traceable at least as far back as Bañez (but not as far back as the St. Thomas himself).


Source: www.corpusthomisticum.org

PLACE 1. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 1 co. Utrum Deo competat agere propter finem

Respondeo dicendum, quod agere aliquid propter finem est dupliciter: vel propter finem operis, vel propter finem operantis. Finis operis est hoc ad quod opus ordinatum est ab agente, et hoc dicitur ratio operis; finis autem operantis est quem principaliter operans intendit: unde finis operis potest esse in alio; sed finis operantis semper est in ipso; sicut patet in aedificatore, qui lapides congregat ad componendum eos, quod ista compositio, in qua consistit forma domus, est finis operis; sed utilitas quae provenit ex hoc operanti, est finis ex parte agentis. Cum autem omne opus divinum in finem quemdam ordinatum sit, constat quod ex parte operis Deus propter finem agit. Sed quia finis operis semper reducitur in finem operantis, ideo oportet quod etiam ex parte operantis, finis actionis ejus consideretur, qui est bonum ipsius in ipso. Sciendum est ergo, quod agere hoc modo, est dupliciter: vel propter desiderium finis; vel propter amorem finis: desiderium enim est rei non habitae; sed amor est rei quae habetur, ut Augustinus dicit; et ideo omni creaturae convenit agere propter desiderium finis, quia unicuique creaturae acquiritur bonum ab alio quod ex se non habet; sed Deo competit agere propter amorem finis, cujus bonitati nihil addi potest. Ipse enim bonitatem suam perfecte amat, et ex hoc vult quod bonitas sua multiplicetur per modum qui possibilis est, ex sui scilicet similitudine, ex quo provenit utilitas creaturae, inquantum similitudinem divinae bonitatis recipit: et ideo dicitur in littera, quod Deus fecit creaturam propter bonitatem suam, considerando finem operantis; et propter utilitatem creaturae, considerando finem operis; et propter hoc etiam dicit Augustinus, quod inquantum Deus est bonus, sumus: et Dionysius dicit, quod divinus amor non dimisit eum sine germine esse.



PLACE 2. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 4 co. Utrum anima rationalis debeat uniri corpori

Respondeo dicendum, quod causa finalis ipsius conjunctionis animae et corporis assignatur in littera a Magistro sufficienter. Finis enim potest sumi vel ex parte agentis, vel ex parte ipsius operis. Ex parte agentis, scilicet Dei, finis est bonitas ejus, secundum quod cadit in voluntate ipsius volentis bonitatem suam in res diffundere: et haec est prima ratio quam Magister assignat. Ex parte autem operis, finis intentus est pertingere in assimilationem divinae beatitudinis. Hoc autem est secundum esse ejus, prout ipsa conjunctio animae et corporis est quaedam similitudo divinae beatitudinis, qua conjungitur spiritus Deo: et haec est secunda ratio quam assignat. Et etiam secundum operationem, prout scilicet anima per operationes quas in corpore exercet, ad divinam beatitudinem accedit merendo: et haec est tertia ratio.



PLACE 3. Super Sent., 4 d. 16 q. 3 a. 1 qc. 2 ad 3: Utrum circumstantia sit proprietas moralis actus sive ejus conditio

Ulterius. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur circumstantiae in hoc versu: quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando....

Praeterea, non est idem circumstantia rei et quod dat rei speciem, quia illud est rei intraneum. Sed moralia recipiunt speciem a fine; unde Ambrosius:intentio operi tuo nomen imponit. Ergo cur, quod finem importat, non debet dici circumstantia.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod est duplex finis, scilicet ultimus et propinquus. Ultimus quidem non potest poni circumstantia, quia omnes circumstantiae sumuntur in proportione ad ipsum. Propinquus etiam est duplex. Quidam qui est finis operis, secundum quod philosophus dicit in 2 Eth., quod quaedam conjuncta sunt malo fini; et iste finis dat speciem actui; unde vel non est circumstantia, si consideretur tantum genus moris; vel referendo ad ipsam substantiam actus, includitur in hac circumstantia quid. Alius vero est finis agentis, qui quandoque ex malo actu bonum intendit, vel e converso; et hic finis dicitur haec circumstantia cur. Ab hoc autem actus non recipit speciem propriam, sed quasi communem, secundum quod actus imperati induunt speciem virtutis vel vitii imperantis supra speciem quam habent ex habitu eliciente.


Place 4. Summa Theologiae IIª-IIae, q. 137 pr.: Videtur quod perseverantia non sit virtus...
Praeterea, virtus est qua recte vivitur, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit. Sed sicut ipse dicit in libro de perseverantia, nullus potest dici perseverantiam habere quandiu vivit, nisi perseveret usque ad mortem. Ergo perseverantia non est virtus.

Ad secundum dicendum quod eodem nomine quandoque nominatur et virtus, et actus virtutis, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., fides est credere quod non vides. Potest tamen contingere quod aliquis habet habitum virtutis qui tamen non exercet actum, sicut aliquis pauper habet habitum magnificentiae, cum tamen actum non exerceat. Quandoque vero aliquis habens habitum incipit quidem exercere actum, sed non perficit, puta si aedificator incipiat aedificare et non compleat domum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod nomen perseverantiae quandoque sumitur pro habitu quo quis eligit perseverare, quandoque autem pro actu quo quis perseverat. Et quandoque quidem habens habitum perseverantiae eligit quidem perseverare, et incipit exequi aliquandiu persistendo; non tamen complet actum, quia non persistit usque in finem. Est autem duplex finis, unus quidem qui est finis operis; alius autem qui est finis humanae vitae. Per se autem ad perseverantiam pertinet ut aliquis perseveret usque ad terminum virtuosi operis, sicut quod miles perseveret usque ad finem certaminis, et magnificus usque ad consummationem operis. Sunt autem quaedam virtutes quarum actus per totam vitam debet durare, sicut fidei, spei et caritatis, quia respiciunt ultimum finem totius vitae humanae. Et ideo respectu harum virtutum, quae sunt principales, non consummatur actus perseverantiae usque ad finem vitae. Et secundum hoc, Augustinus accipit perseverantiam pro actu perseverantiae consummato.


PLACE 5. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 141 a. 6 ad 1.: utrum regula temperantiae sit sumenda secundum necessitatem praesentis vitae

Videtur quod regula temperantiae non sit sumenda secundum necessitatem praesentis vitae. Superius enim non regulatur ab inferiori. Sed temperantia, cum sit virtus animae, est superior quam necessitas corporalis. Ergo regula temperantiae non debet sumi secundum necessitatem corporalem.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, necessitas huius vitae habet rationem regulae inquantum est finis. Considerandum est autem quod quandoque aliud est finis operantis, et aliud finis operis, sicut patet quod aedificationis finis est domus, sed aedificatoris finis quandoque est lucrum. Sic igitur temperantiae ipsius finis et regula est beatitudo, sed eius rei qua utitur, finis et regula est necessitas humanae vitae, infra quam est id quod in usum vitae venit.

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Evangelium (Textus Graece)

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Evangelium (Textus Graece)

Θεραπεία παραλυτικοῦ

Θ´ ΚΑΙ ἐμβὰς εἰς πλοῖον διεπέρασε καὶ ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν πόλιν. 2 Καὶ ἰδοὺ προσέφερον αὐτῷ παραλυτικὸν ἐπὶ κλίνης βεβλημένον· καὶ ἰδὼν ὁ ᾿Ιησοῦς τὴν πίστιν αὐτῶν εἶπε τῷ παραλυτικῷ· θάρσει, τέκνον· ἀφέωνταί σοι αἱ ἁμαρτίαι σου. 3 καὶ ἰδού τινες τῶν γραμματέων εἶπον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς· οὗτος βλασφημεῖ. 4 καὶ ἰδὼν ὁ ᾿Ιησοῦς τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτῶν εἶπεν· ἵνα τί ὑμεῖς ἐνθυμεῖσθε πονηρὰ ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν; 5 τί γάρ ἐστιν εὐκοπώτερον, εἰπεῖν, ἀφέωνταί σου αἱ ἁμαρτίαι, ἢ εἰπεῖν, ἔγειρε καὶ περιπάτει; 6 ἵνα δὲ εἰδῆτε ὅτι ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας – τότε λέγει τῷ παραλυτικῷ· ἐγερθεὶς ἆρόν σου τὴν κλίνην καὶ ὕπαγε εἰς τὸν οἶκόν σου. 7 καὶ ἐγερθεὶς ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ. 8 ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ ὄχλοι ἐθαύμασαν καὶ ἐδόξασαν τὸν Θεὸν τὸν δόντα ἐξουσίαν τοιαύτην τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Dominica XVIII post Pentecosten: Commentarium super evangelium

Dominica XVIII post Pentecosten: Commentarium super evangelium

Third Nocturn
Absolutio: A vínculis peccatórum nostrórum absólvat nos omnípotens et miséricors Dóminus. R.  Amen.	Absolution:  May the Lord Almighty and merciful break the bonds of our sins and set us free. R.  Amen.
V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.	V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 7: Evangélica léctio sit nobis salus et protéctio. R.  Amen.	Benediction 7:  May the Gospel's holy lection be our safeguard and protection. R.  Amen.
Lesson vii
Léctio sancti Evangélii secúndum Matthæum	The Lesson is taken from the Holy Gospel according to Matthew
Chap. 9, 1-8
In illo témpore : Ascéndens Jesus in navículam transfretávit et venit in civitátem suam.  Et réliqua.	At that time : Jesus entered into a ship, and passed over, and came into his own city.  And so on, and that which followeth.
Homilía sancti Petri Chrysólogi	A Homily by St. Peter Chrysologus
Sermo 50
Christum in humánis áctibus divína gessísse mystéria, et in rebus visibílibus invisibília exercuísse negótia, léctio hodiérna monstrávit.  Ascéndit, inquit, in navículam, et transfretávit, et venit in civitátem suam.  Nonne ipse est, qui, fugátis flúctibus, maris profúnda nudávit, ut Israëlíticus pópulus inter stupéntes undas sicco vestígio velut móntium cóncava pertransíret?  Nonne hic est, qui Petri pédibus marínos vórtices inclinávit, ut iter líquidum humánis gréssibus sólidum præbéret obséquium.	This day's reading hath shewn us an instance of how Christ, in those things which he did as Man, worked deep works of God, and by things which were seen wrought things which were not seen.  The Evangelist saith : Jesus entered into a ship, and passed over, and came into his own city.  Was not this he who had once parted the waves hither and thither, and made the dry ground appear at the bottom of the sea, so that his people Israel passed dry-shod between masses of water standing still, as through an hollow glen in a mountain?  Was not this he who made the depths of the sea solid under the feet of Peter, so that the watery path offered a firm way for human footsteps?
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis. R.  Deo grátias.	V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us. R.  Thanks be to God.
Respond vii as in the Proper
V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.	V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 8: Divínum auxílium máneat semper nobíscum. R.  Amen.	Benediction 8: May help divine be with us all, for ever abiding. R.  Amen.
Lesson viii
Et quid est, quod ipse sibi sic maris dénegat servitútem, ut brevíssimi lacus tránsitum sub mercéde náutica transfretáret?  Ascéndit, inquit, in navículam, et transfretávit.  Et quid mirum, fratres?  Christus venit suscípere infirmitátes nostras, et suas nobis conférre virtútes ; humána quærere, præstáre divína ; accípere injúrias, réddere dignitátes ; ferre tædia, reférre sanitátes : quia médicus, qui non fert infirmitátes, curáre nescit ; et qui non fúerit cum infírmo infirmátus, infírmo non potest conférre sanitátem.	Wherefore then denied he unto himself a like service from the sea, but crossed over that narrow lake at the cost of a voyage on shipboard?  He entered into a ship, and passed over.  What wonder, my brethren?  Christ came to take our weakness upon him, that he might make us partakers of his strength : to seek the things of men, that he might give to men the things of God ; to receive insults, that he might bestow honours ; to bear weariness, that he might grant rest ; for the physician that is himself beset by no frailties, knoweth not how to treat the frailties of others, nor he that is not weak with the weak, how to make the weak strong.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis. R.  Deo grátias.	V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us. R.  Thanks be to God.
R.  Duo Séraphim clamábant alter ad álterum : *Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus Dóminus Deus Sábaoth :* Plena est omnis terra glória ejus. V.  Tres sunt qui testimónium dant in cælo : Pater, Verbum, et Spíritus Sanctus : et hi tres unum sunt. R.  Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus Dóminus Deus Sábaoth. V.  Glória Patri, et Fílio, et Spirítui Sancto. R.  Plena est omnis terra glória ejus.	R.  The two Seraphim did cry the One to the Other : * Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts : * The whole earth is full of his glory. V.  For there are Three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost : and these Three are One. R.  Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts. V.  Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost. R.  The whole earth is full of his glory.
V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.	V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 9: Ad societátem cívium supernórum perdúcat nos Rex Angelórum. R.  Amen.	Benediction 9: May the King of Angels give us fellowship with all the citizens of heaven. R.  Amen.
Lesson ix
Christus ergo, si in suis mansísset virtútibus, commúne cum homínibus nil habéret ; et nisi implésset carnis órdinem, carnis in illo esset otiósa suscéptio.  Ascéndit, inquit, in navículam, et transfretávit, et venit in civitátem suam.  Creátor rerum orbis Dóminus, posteáquam se propter nos nostra angustávit in carne, cœpit habére humánam pátriam, cœpit civitátis Judáicæ esse civis, paréntes habére cœpit paréntum ómnium ipse parens ; ut invitáret amor, attráheret cáritas, vincíret afféctio, suadéret humánitas, quos fúgerat dominátio, metus dispérserat, fécerat vis potestátis extórres.	Therefore, if Christ had abode still in his strength, he had in no wise been a fellow of men ; if in him Flesh had not run the way of flesh, then had it been idle for him to have taken Flesh at all.  He entered into a ship, and passed over, and came into his own city.  The Lord, the Maker of the world, and of all things that are therein, having been pleased for our sakes to prison himself in our flesh, began to have an human home, and to be a citizen of a Jewish city ; himself the Father of all, to have parents ; and all, that his love might invite, his charity draw, his tenderness bind, his gentleness persuade them whom his Kingship had scared, his awfulness scattered, and his power terrified out of his dominion.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis. R.  Deo grátias.	V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us. R.  Thanks be to God.

Dominica XVIII post Pentecosten: Cantus Proprii

Dominica XVIII post Pentecosten: Cantus Proprii

Link to sanctamissa.org page.
Link to christusrex.org page.

Gratia est semen gloriae

Gratia est semen gloriae

From Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Ch. 1:

All tradition declares that the life of grace on earth is in reality the seed of glory. St. Thomas delights also in saying: "For grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us." Bossuet often expresses himself in the same terms.

This explains why St. Thomas likes to say: "The good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe." The slightest degree of sanctifying grace contained in the soul of an infant after baptism is more precious than the natural good of the entire universe, all angelic natures taken together included therein; for the least degree of sanctifying grace belongs to an enormously superior order, to the order of the inner life of God, which is superior to all miracles and to all the outward signs of divine revelation.  The same supernatural life, the same sanctifying grace, is in the just on earth and in the saints in heaven. This is likewise true of infused charity...

Ex Martyrologio

Ex Martyrologio

In Béthlehem Judæ deposítio sancti Hierónymi Presbyteri, Confessóris et Ecclésiæ Doctóris, qui, ómnium stúdia litterárum adéptus ac probatórum Monachórum imitátor factus, multa hæresum monstra gládio suæ doctrínæ confódit; demum, cum ad decrépitam usque vixísset ætátem, in pace quiévit, sepultúsque est ad Præsépe Dómini.  Ejus corpus, póstea Romam delátum, in Basílica sanctæ Maríæ Majóris cónditum fuit.

In Bethlehem of Juda, the death of St. Jerome, priest and doctor of the Church.  Excelling in all kinds of learning, he imitated the life of the most approved monks, and disposed of many monstrous heresies with the sword of his doctrine.  Having at length reached a very advanced age, he rested in peace and was buried near the manger of our Lord.  His body was afterwards transferred to Rome, and placed in the basilica of St. Mary Major.

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Cantus Proprii

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Cantus Proprii

Nexus ad SanctaMissa.org.

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Homilía S. Joánnis Chrysóstomi

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Homilía S. Joánnis Chrysóstomi

Source: www.breviary.net

Lesson vii
Léctio sancti Evangélii secúndum Matthæum	The Lesson is taken from the Holy Gospel according to Matthew
Chap. 22, 34-46
In illo témpore : Accessérunt ad Jesum pharisæi, et interrogávit eum unus ex eis legis doctor tentans eum : Magíster, quod est mandátum magnum in lege?  Et réliqua.	At that time : The Pharisees came unto Jesus, and one of them, which was a lawyer, asked him a question, tempting him, saying : Master, which is the great commandment in the Law?  And so on, and that which followeth.
Homilía sancti Joánnis Chrysóstomi	A Homily by St. John Chrysostom
Homilia 72 in Matthæum
Sadducæis confúsis, pharisæi rursus aggrediúntur ; cumque quiéscere oportéret, decertáre voluérunt : et legis perítiam profiténtem præmíttunt, non díscere, sed tentáre cupiéntes ; ac ita intérrogant : Quodnam primum mandátum in lege sit.  Nam cum primum illud sit, Díliges Dóminum Deum tuum : putántes causas sibi allatúrum ad mandátum hoc corrigéndum, áliquid addéndo, quóniam Deum se faciebat, hoc modo intérrogant.  Quid ígitur Christus?  Ut osténdat idcírco ad hæc eos devenísse, quia nulla in eis esset cáritas, sed invídiæ livóre tabéscerent : Díliges, inquit, Dóminum Deum tuum : hoc primum et magnum mandátum est.  Secúndum autem símile huic : Díliges próximum tuum sicut teípsum.	When the Pharisees had heard that Christ had put the Sadducees to silence, they gathered themselves together for a fresh attack ; just when it behoved them to be quiet, they willed to contend ; and so they put forward one of themselves who professed skill in the law, not wishing to learn, but to lay a snare.  This person therefore proposed the question : Which is the great commandment in the law?  The first and great commandment is : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, but they expected that he would make some exception or addition to this in his own case, since he made himself God.  With this expectation they asked him the question ; but what said Christ?  To shew that they had adopted this course, because they were loveless, and sick with envy, he answered : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.  This is the first and great commandment.  And the second is like unto it : Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis. R.  Deo grátias.	V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us. R.  Thanks be to God.
Respond vii as in the Proper
V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.	V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 8: Divínum auxílium máneat semper nobíscum. R.  Amen.	Benediction 8: May help divine be with us all, for ever abiding. R.  Amen.
Lesson viii
Quam ob rem símile est huic?  Quóniam hoc illud indúcit, et ab illo rursus munítur.  Quicúmque enim male agit, ódio habet lucem, et non venit ad lucem.  Et rursus : Dixit insípiens in corde suo, Non est Deus.  Deínde séquitur : Corrúpti sunt, et abominábiles facti sunt in stúdiis suis.  Et íterum : Radix ómnium malórum avarítia est ; quam quidam appeténtes, erravérunt a fide.  Et, Qui díligit me, mandáta mea servábit : quorum caput et radix est : Díliges Dóminum Deum tuum, et próximum tuum sicut teípsum.	Why is this second commandment like unto the first?  Because the first is the second's source and sanction.  For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light.  And again : The fool hath said in his heart : There is no God.  And there followeth : They are corrupt, and become abominable in their works.  And yet again : The love of money is the root of all evil ; which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith.  And yet once more : If ye love me, keep my commandments―of which commandments the head and root is : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God ; and thy neighbour as thyself.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis. R.  Deo grátias.	V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us. R.  Thanks be to God.
R.  Duo Séraphim clamábant alter ad álterum : *Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus Dóminus Deus Sábaoth :* Plena est omnis terra glória ejus. V.  Tres sunt qui testimónium dant in cælo : Pater, Verbum, et Spíritus Sanctus : et hi tres unum sunt. R.  Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus Dóminus Deus Sábaoth. V.  Glória Patri, et Fílio, et Spirítui Sancto. R.  Plena est omnis terra glória ejus.	R.  The two Seraphim did cry the One to the Other: * Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts : *The whole earth is full of his glory. V.  For there are Three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost : and these Three are One. R.  Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts. V.  Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost. R.  The whole earth is full of his glory.
V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.	V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 9: Ad societátem cívium supernórum perdúcat nos Rex Angelórum. R.  Amen.	Benediction 9: May the King of Angels give us fellowship with all the citizens of heaven. R.  Amen.
Lesson ix
Si ergo dilígere Deum, dilígere próximum est : (nam si díligis me, o Petre, inquit, pasce oves meas) si étiam diléctio próximi facit ut mandáta custódias : mérito ait in his totam legem et prophétas pendére.  Et quemádmodum in superióribus, cum de resurrectióne interrogarétur, plus dócuit quam tentántes petébant ; sic in hoc loco de primo interrogátus mandáto, secúndum étiam non valde quam primum inférius, sponte áttulit ; secúndum enim est primo símile.  Ita occúlte insinuávit, ódio illos ad quæréndum incitári.  Cáritas enim, inquit, non æmulátur.	If, therefore, to love God is to love our neighbour also, (as it appeareth where it is written : Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?  And he said unto him : Lord, thou knowest all things ; thou knowest that I love thee.  Jesus saith unto him : Feed my sheep)―and if love is the fulfilling of the law, justly doth the Lord say that on these two commandments hang all the law and the Prophets.  And even as when, before this, being intérrogated about the Resurrection, he answered them more than they asked, so, now, being intérrogated concerning the first and great commandment, he answereth them, of his own accord, touching that second one also, which is little lower than the first, for the second is like unto it.  Herein he would have them understand that it was hatred stirred them up to question him.  For Charity, saith the Apostle, envieth not.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis. R.  Deo grátias.	V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us. R.  Thanks be to God.

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Evangelium (Textus Graece)

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Evangelium (Textus Graece)

Mt. 22: 34-46
Περὶ τῆς μεγαλυτέρας ἐντολῆς

34 Οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι ἀκούσαντες ὅτι ἐφίμωσε τοὺς Σαδδουκαίους, συνήχθησαν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, 35 καὶ ἐπηρώτησεν εἷς ἐξ αὐτῶν, νομικός, πειράζων αὐτὸν καὶ λέγων· 36 διδάσκαλε, ποία ἐντολὴ μεγάλη ἐν τῷ νόμῳ; 37 ὁ δὲ ᾿Ιησοῦς ἔφη αὐτῷ· ἀγαπήσεις Κύριον τὸν Θεόν σου ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ σου. 38 αὕτη ἐστὶ πρώτη καὶ μεγάλη ἐντολή. 39 δευτέρα δὲ ὁμοία αὐτῇ· ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν. 40 ἐν ταύταις ταῖς δυσὶν ἐντολαῖς ὅλος ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται κρέμανται.

Περὶ τοῦ Μεσσίου

41 Συνηγμένων δὲ τῶν Φαρισαίων ἐπηρώτησεν αὐτοὺς ὁ ᾿Ιησοῦς 42 λέγων· τί ὑμῖν δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τίνος υἱός ἐστι; λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· τοῦ Δαυῒδ. 43 λέγει αὐτοῖς· πῶς οὖν Δαυῒδ ἐν Πνεύματι Κύριον αὐτὸν καλεῖ λέγων, 44 εἶπεν ὁ Κύριος τῷ Κυρίῳ μου, κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου; 45 εἰ οὖν Δαυῒδ καλεῖ αὐτὸν Κύριον, πῶς υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστι;

46 καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο αὐτῷ ἀποκριθῆναι λόγον, οὐδὲ ἐτόλμησέ τις ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπερωτῆσαι αὐτὸν οὐκέτι.

The Relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas (link)

The Relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas (link)

Sacred Theology is a Science

Sacred Theology is a Science

From St. Thomas's Summa Theologiae, I.1.2c and ad 2:

Objection 2. Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

Reply to Objection 2. Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.

Praeterea, scientia non est singularium. Sed sacra doctrina tractat de singularibus, puta de gestis Abrahae, Isaac et Iacob, et similibus. Ergo sacra doctrina non est scientia.

Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.

Ad secundum dicendum quod singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principaliter tractetur, sed introducuntur tum in exemplum vitae, sicut in scientiis moralibus; tum etiam ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit, super quam fundatur sacra Scriptura seu doctrina.

From Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, Ch. 6: The Nature of Theological Work:

Article One: The Proper Object Of Theology

Theology is a science made possible by the light of revelation. Theology, therefore, presupposes faith in revealed truths. Hence the proper object of theology is the inner life of God as knowable by revelation and faith. By this object theology rises above metaphysics, which sees in God the first and supreme being, the author of nature, whereas theology attains God as God (sub ratione Deitatis). [246].

How does theology differ from faith? The object of theology, in the theologian who is still viator, is not the Deity clearly seen, [247] as in the beatific vision, but the Deity known obscurely by faith. [248] Theology, then, is distinguished from faith, which is its root, because theology is the science of the truths of faith, which truths it explains, defends, and compares. Comparing these truths with one another, theology sees their mutual relations, and the consequences which they virtually contain. But to use this method for attaining its proper object, the inner life of God as God, theology must presuppose metaphysics which sees God as the Supreme Being. That this is the object of metaphysics is clear, we may note, from revelation itself. When God says to Moses: "I am who am," [249] we recognize in those words the equivalent statement: God alone is subsistent existence. [250].

Theology, therefore, though here below it proceeds from principles which are believed, not seen as evident in themselves, is nevertheless a branch of knowledge, a science in the proper sense of the word. The characteristic of science is to show "the reason why this thing has just these properties." Theology does just that. It determines the nature and properties of sanctifying grace, of infused virtue, of faith, of hope, of charity. St. Thomas, in defining theology, uses the Aristotelian definition of science which he had explained in his commentary on the Later Analytics. [251] To know scientifically, he says, is to know this thing as what it is and why it cannot be otherwise. Theology then is a science, not merely in the broad sense of certain knowledge, but also in the strict sense of conclusions known by principles. [252].

Such is theology here below. But when the theologian is no longer viator, when he has received the beatific vision, then, without medium, in the Word, he will behold the inner life of God, the divine essence. Then he will know, with fullest light, what before he knew by faith. And beyond that, extra Verbum, he will see the conclusions derivable from faith. In heaven, theology will be perfect, its principles evident. But here below, theology is in an imperfect state. It has not, so to speak, become adult.

Hence theology, as attainable here below, while it is a science, and is a sub-alternate science, resting on the mind of God and the blessed in heaven, is nevertheless, when compared with all merely human knowledge, a wisdom specifically higher than metaphysics, though not as high as the infused faith which is its source. Theology then, generated by the theological labor, is by its root essentially supernatural. [253] If, consequently, the theologian loses faith (by grave sin against that virtue): there remains in him only the corpse of theology, a body without soul, since he no longer adheres, formally and infallibly, to revealed truths, the sources of the theological habit. And this is true, even if, following his own will and judgment, he still holds materially one or the other of these truths.

So much on the nature of theology. We must now consider the different steps, the different procedures, to be followed by the theologian, if he would avoid opposed and exaggerated extremes.

ARTICLE I. - L'objet propre de la théologie.

Nous supposons ici - ce qu'expose saint Thomas dans la q. I de la Somme théologique - que la théologie est à proprement parler une science qui procède sous la lumière de la Révélation divine, qui suppose donc la foi infuse aux vérités révélées, et qui a pour objet propre Dieu considéré en sa vie intime, comme auteur de la grâce, Dieu tel que la révélation et la foi nous le font connaître, et non pas seulement Dieu auteur de la nature, accessible aux forces naturelles de notre raison. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de Dieu sub ratione entis et primi entis, auquel parvient la métaphysique, science de l'être en tant qu'être, mais de Dieu sub ratione Deitatis, comme il est dit Ia, q. I, a. 6 :

Sacra doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo, secun dum quod est altissima causa : quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile (quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom., I, 19 : Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis), sed etiam quantum ad id, quod notum est sibi soli de seipso et aliis per revelationem communicatum.

La théologie, chez le théologien encore viator, ne porte pas sur la Déité clare visa, comme la vision béatifique, mais sur la Déité obscure per fidem cognita; et elle se distingue pourtant de la foi, qui est comme sa racine, parce qu'elle est une science des vérités de la foi qu'elle doit expliquer et défendre par la méthode d'analogie. Elle cherche à découvrir leur subordination en un corps de doctrine et à déduire les vérités qu'elles contiennent virtuellement.

En ce travail la théologie ne peut se servir de la méthode d'analogie dans l'explication des vérités relatives à la vie intime de Dieu, ad ipsam Deitatem ut sic, sans recourir à ce que la métaphysique nous dit de Dieu comme premier être, sub ration entis. Du reste cela même est révélé, en particulier lorsque Dieu dit à Moïse : Ego sum qui sum, vérité qui est l'équivalent de cette formule : Solus Deus est ipsum Esse subsistens.

Bien qu'ici-bas la théologie procède de principes non évidents, des principes de foi, elle est pourtant une science au sens propre de ce mot, car elle déter mine « la cause pour laquelle telle chose a telles pro priétés et non pas telles autres » ; c'est ainsi qu'elle détermine la nature et les propriétés de la grâce sanctifiante, des vertus infuses en général, de la foi, de l'espérance, de la charité, etc. Saint Thomas en somme applique à la théologie la définition aristoté licienne de la science, qu'il a expliquée dans son commentaire des Posteriora Analytica, 1. I, lect. 4: Scire est cognoscere causam propter quam res est et non potest aliter se habere. La science se dit au sens large de toute connaissance certaine ; elle se dit au sens propre de la connaissance des conclusions par les principes. Cf. R. Gagnebet, O. P., La nature de la théologie spéculative, dans Rev. thom., 1938, n. 1 et 2 (extrait, p. 78), et 1939, p. 108-147.

Lorsque le théologien ne sera plus viator, lorsqu'il aura reçu la vision béatifique, il verra immédiatement in Verbo, la vie intime de Dieu, la Déité ou essence divine ; il atteindra en pleine lumière les vérités qu'il connaissait d'abord par la foi, et il pourra encore voir extra Verbum les conclusions qui peuvent s'en déduire. Au ciel la théologie existera à l'état parfait avec l'évidence des principes, in via elle existe à l'état imparfait, elle n'a pas encore l'âge adulte pour ainsi parler.

Il suit de là pour saint Thomas et son école que la théologie est une science subalternée à celle de Dieu et des bienheureux, qu'elle est aussi une sagesse, spécifiquement supérieure à la métaphysique, mais inférieure à la foi infuse ; elle est un habitus acquis par le travail, mais dont la racine est essentiellement surnaturelle, radix ejus est ipsa fides infusa. De la sorte, si le théologien vient à perdre la foi infuse par une faute grave contre cette vertu théologale, il ne reste plus en lui que le cadavre de la théologie, un corps sans âme, car il n'adhère plus formellement et infailliblement aux vérités révélées, principes de la théologie, il adhère tout au plus matériellement à celles de ces vérités qu'il veut garder ex proprio judicio et propria voluntate.

Si telle est selon saint Thomas et l'ensemble de ses interprètes la nature de la théologie, quels sont les divers procédés qui concourent au travail théologique et le constituent. Il importe de les bien distinguer les uns des autres, pour éviter les exagérations en sens opposés.

Notes:

246 This paragraph summarizes the first question in the Summa. See Ia, q. 1, a. 6.

247 Clare visa248 Obscure per fidem cognita249 Ego sum qui sum250 Deus solus est ipsum esse subsistens251 Bk. 1, lect. 4; Scire est cognoscere causam propter quam res est et non potest aliter se habere

252 Cf. R. Gagnebet, O. P.: "La nature de la theologie speculative" in Rev. thom.: 1938, nos. 1 and 2, p. 78; 1939, pp. 108-47

253 Radix ejus est ipsa fides infusa

The Division and Order of Philosophical Sciences

The Division and Order of Philosophical Sciences

Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics Book I, lecture 1, nos. 1-2 (On the Objective Division of Sciences):

1. As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it is the business of the wise man to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the most powerful perfection of reason whose characteristic is to know order. Even if the sensitive powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to know the order of one thing to another is exclusively the work of intellect or reason. Now a twofold order is found in things. One kind is that of parts of a totality, that is, a group, among themselves, as the parts of a house are mutually ordered to each other. The second order is that of things to an end. This order is of greater importance than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics, the order of the parts of an army among themselves exists because of the order of the whole army to the commander. Now order is related to reason in a fourfold way. There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds, such is the order of things in nature. There is a second order that reason establishes in its own act of consideration, for example, when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of concepts as well, because words express the meanings of the concepts. There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operations of the will. There is a fourth order that reason in planning establishes in the external things which it causes, such as a chest and a house.

2. Because the operation of reason is perfected by habit, according to the different modes of order that reason considers in particular, a differentiation of sciences arises. The function of 1) natural philosophy is to consider the order of things that human reason considers but does not establish--understand that with natural philosophy here we also include metaphysics. The order that reason makes in its own act of consideration pertains to 2) rational philosophy [or logic], which properly considers the order of the parts of verbal expression with one another and the order of principles to one another and to their conclusions. The order of voluntary actions pertains to the consideration of 3) moral philosophy. The order that reason in planning establishes in external things arranged by human reason pertains to the 4) mechanical arts. Accordingly it is proper to moral philosophy, to which our attention is at present directed, to consider human operations insofar as they are ordered to one another and to an end.

Sicut philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis. Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem partium alicuius totius seu alicuius multitudinis adinvicem, sicut partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic ordo est principalior, quam primus. Nam, ut philosophus dicit in XI metaphysicae, ordo partium exercitus adinvicem, est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur. Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae; tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo.

Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae. Nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones; ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, pertinet ad artes mechanicas. Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae adinvicem et ad finem.

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, Book VI, lecture 7 (On the Order of Learning the Sciences):

So the proper order of learning will be the following. First, boys should be instructed in logical matters, because logic teaches the method of the whole of philosophy. Second, they are to be instructed in mathematics, which does not require experience and does not transcend the imagination. Third, they should be trained in the natural sciences which, thought not transcending sense and imagination, nevertheless require experience. Fourth, they are to be instructed in the moral sciences, which require experience and a soul free from passion, as is said in the first book [of Aristotle’s Ethics]. Fifth, they should be taught matters concerning wisdom and divine science, which go beyond the imagination and require a vigorous mind.

Erit ergo hic congruus ordo addiscendi, ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae. Secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturalibus, quae, etsi non excedant sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam; quarto autem in moralibus, quae requirunt et experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. Quinto autem in sapientialibus et divinis quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum.

From Aquinas' Commentary on the Book of Causes, Lecture 1 (On the Order of Learning the Sciences):

The principal aim of the philosophers was that, through all their investigations of things, they might come to know the first causes. That is why they placed the science concerned with first causes last, and allotted the final period of their lives to its consideration. They began first of all with logic, which teaches the method of the sciences. Second, they went on to mathematics, which even boys are capable of learning. Third, they advanced to the philosophy of nature, which requires time because of the needed experience. Fourth, they proceeded to moral philosophy, of which a young person cannot be a suitable student. And finally they applied themselves to the divine science, whose object is the first causes of things.

Et inde est quod philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut, per omnia quae in rebus considerabant, ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent: primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium causas.

Whether God's Existence is Self-Evident

Whether God's Existence is Self-Evident

From St. Anselm, Proslogion, Chs. 3-4:

"[T]he fool has said in his heart, there is no God" (Ps 13:1; 52:1)....

Even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist;. and this being you are, O Lord, our God.

"[D]ixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus" (Ps 13:1; 52:1)....

Convincitur ... etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, quia hoc, cum audit, intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est.

Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.

Quod utique sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod maius est quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: id ipsum quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitari nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster.

From St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I.2.1c:

Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (Posterior Analytics I.3) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (De Hebdomadibus), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (ST I.3.4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.

Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest, maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.

Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.

From Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, Ch. 7:

St. Thomas does not admit that an a priori proof of God's existence can be given. [269] He grants indeed that the proposition, God exists, is in itself evident, and would therefore be self-evident to us if we had a priori face-to-face knowledge of God; then we would see that His essence includes existence, not merely as an object of abstract thought, but as a reality objectively present. [270] But in point of fact we have no such a priori knowledge of God. [271] We must begin with a nominal definition of God, conceiving Him only confusedly, as the first source of all that is real and good in the world. From this abstract knowledge, so far removed from direct intuition of God's essence, we cannot deduce a priori His existence as a concrete fact.

It is true we can know a priori the truth of this proposition: If God exists in fact, then He exists of Himself. But in order to know that He exists in fact, we must begin with existences which we know by sense experience, and then proceed to see if these concrete existences necessitate the actual objective existence of a First Cause, corresponding to our abstract concept, our nominal definition of God. [272].

This position, the position of moderate realism, is intermediary, between the agnosticism of Hume on the one hand, and, on the other, that excessive realism, which in varying degree we find in Parmenides, Plato, and the Neoplatonists, and which in a certain sense reappears in St. Anselm, and later, much accentuated, in Spinoza, in Malebranche and the Ontologists, who believe that they have an intuition and not merely an abstract concept of God's nature.

Saint Thomas n'admet pas qu'on puisse prouver a priori l'existence de Dieu, Ia, q. II, a. I, bien que la proposition Deus est soit per se nota quoad se, ou évidente par elle-même en soi et pour celui qui saurait ce qu'est Dieu : l'Être même subsistant dont l'essence implique l'existence actuelle ou de fait : existentiam non solum signalant aut conceptam, sed exercitam in re extra animam. Mais, dit-il, nous ne savons pas a priori ce qu'est Dieu, nescimus de Deo quid est; nous n'avons d'abord qu'une définition nominale de Dieu, conçu confusément comme cause première du monde, de tout ce qu'il y a de réel et de bon en lui. De cette notion abstraite de Dieu, fort différente de l'intuition immédiate de l'essence divine, nous ne pouvons pas déduire a priori son existence concrète ou de fait.

Nous voyons sans doute a priori, que Dieu existe par soi, s'il existe de fait. Mais pour affirmer qu'il existe de fait (existentia exercita), il faut partir de l'existence de fait des réalités contingentes que notre expérience constate, et voir si elles exigent nécessai rement une cause première qui corresponde réelle ment en dehors de notre esprit à notre notion abstraite ou définition nominale de Dieu. Cf. Ia, q. II, a. I, ad 2um ; et a. 2, ad 2um.

Cette position est celle du réalisme modéré, inter médiaire entre le nominalisme qui conduit à l'agnos ticisme (on le verra chez Hume), et le réalisme excessif de l'intelligence, qui se trouve à des degrés divers chez Parménide, Platon, les néoplatoniciens, qui reparaît en un sens dans l'argument de saint Anselme, plus tard sous une forme très accentuée chez Spinoza, et aussi chez Malebranche et les onto logistes, qui croient avoir une intuition immédiate confuse, et non pas seulement une idée abstraite, de la nature de Dieu.

Notes:

269 ST I.2.1.

270 Existentiam non solum signatam aut conceptam, sed exercitam in re extra animam.

271 Nescimus de Deo quid est.

272 ST I.2.1 ad 2; 2 ad 2.