Quaeritur: On the Eternal Destiny of Aborted Babies

Quaeritur: On the Eternal Destiny of Aborted Babies

Quaeritur: I have entered into a (friendly) debate on abortion and someone asked me what the Catholic Church teaches about the eternal destiny of the souls of aborted babies. I'm a recent convert, so I wanted some help before I reply. Grazie!

Respondeo:  Most Catholics today sadly just canonize the souls of aborted babies, assuming that since they never sinned, they automatically go to Heaven. But they either forget original sin and the necessity of Baptism, or gloss over these problems by citing God's mercy as the demonstrative proof that they are in fact in Heaven, regardless of what God may have revealed on the matter. But in fact, there is a sharp discrepancy between these new theological tendencies (promoted by the nouvelle theologie) and what the sources of Revelation have to say on the matter. 

The sources of Revelation all point to the concept of the 'Limbo of Children' (limbus puerorum)---to be distinguished from the 'Limbo of the Fathers' (limbus patrum), which is where Christ descended after his death. Limbo itself is not a dogma (i.e., not de fide, but only sententia certa or even a doctrina catholica); but it it is derived from other revealed doctrines that are de fide definita, such as the impossibility of salvation for those who die in original sin. 

First of all, it is a defined dogma that souls of those who die in the state of original sin but without having committed actual sins (this includes generally those who die without Baptism and before the age of reason) cannot enter Heaven. However, they do not suffer the bodily pains of hell either. 

Pope Gregory X, in the 2nd Council of Lyons, declared: 

“Now, the souls of those who depart in mortal sin, or only with original sin, immediately descend into hell, but to be punished differently” (Denzinger 464 [858]). 

This doctrine was infallibly defined and ratified by Eugenius IV, in the Concil of Florence (cf. Denzinger 693 [1306].)  This dogma, that souls with original sin only are punished differently from those which die in mortal sin, is the basis for the constant teaching of the theologians on Limbo. You can read a pretty thorough theological defense of Limbo that cites the authority of the theological sources, including the Magisterium and the consensus of approved theologians throughout the centuries, here.

Now, this is not to say that Limbo is a third eternal destiny, in addition to Heaven and Hell, as is often erroneously supposed. This hypothesis, that Limbo is a distinct state besides Heaven and Hell, was actually condemned: at the end of time, only two states will remain: Heaven and Hell. (Oddly, I've heard and read fallacious arguments that try to refute the existence of Limbo by citing the condemnation, thinking that what is condemned is Limbo itself. But in reality what is condemned is the claim that Limbo is a third state distinct from Heaven and Hell; see Pius VI, Auctorem Fidei; Denzinger 1526 [2626].). No, Limbo is in fact part of Hell. It involves the eternal loss of the Beatific Vision, which is the essence of Hell, even if it does not involve the horrible physical sufferings that we usually associate with Hell and which are only an accidental aspect of the latter.

St Thomas Aquinas specifically distinguishes in hell the punishment or 'pain' of sense (poena sensus) from the punishment of separation or loss (poena damni), which is not really 'pain' at all: souls with actual mortal sins suffer both, but souls with original sin only, are only subject to the latter: they do not see God face-to-face, but they do enjoy a natural sort of happiness where their natural powers (intellect, will, etc.) and body are fulfilled to their natural capacities. And this is known to the faithful by the term 'Limbo' (from the Latin, limbus, border), and was popularized in Catholic imagination by Dante, who wonderfully describes Limbo as the 'first circle' of hell.  (See Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 87, a. 4; IIIae Supp., q. 97, a. 5.)

That's the traditional teaching, but as you can see, it is considered to be a bit harsh for modern sensitivities and so there has been a push within contemporary theology, especially within the nouvelle theologie to replace it with a more 'merciful' view (sound familiar?). Some contemporary theologians theorize that just as there can be a 'baptism of desire' on the part of adult catechumens who die without Baptism, and we thus hope for their salvation, so there could be a sort of 'vicarious' baptism of desire for those babies who die without Baptism but whom the Church desires to baptize. 

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, which is steeped in the nouvelle theologie, somewhat dodges the issue (and fails to teach the traditional doctrine of Limbo) in paragraph 1261. In the immediately preceding paragraphs it is noticeably 'soft' on the necessity of Baptism for salvation (as compared to the Catechisms, encyclicals, doctors, theologians, etc. of the previous millenia). And in this context it goes on to state that the Church entrusts the souls of those who die in original sin only to the mercy of God:

1261 As regards children who have died without Baptism, the Church can only entrust them to the mercy of God, as she does in her funeral rites for them. Indeed, the great mercy of God who desires that all men should be saved, and Jesus' tenderness toward children which caused him to say: "Let the children come to me, do not hinder them" (Mk 10 14; cf. 1 Tim 2:4), allow us to hope that there is a way of salvation for children who have died without Baptism. All the more urgent is the Church's call not to prevent little children coming to Christ through the gift of holy Baptism.

These hypotheses are problematic. At heart they seem motivated by a characteristically modern (and partly erroneous) idea of divine justice and of the gratuitousness of salvation; and in the case of some theologians, even perhaps an implicit denial of the reality of original sin. Modern minds find it inconceivable that God would deprive an 'innocent' baby of Heaven. After all--they claim--these babies have done nothing wrong, so why would God deprive them of what they were made for? Wouldn't it be unfair for God to damn them in Hell? 

But, you see, lurking behind the scenes here are two very erroneous assumptions: (a) original sin doesn't really take away these souls' innocence; and (b) God owes it to them to save them, because presumably salvation is what a soul deserves by nature, by default, so long as it does not lose this right by sinning. But of course, these presuppositions are false and heretical. (Most theologians would not dare to state them explicitly; but naïvely the general population does buy into them.) Despite our sensibilities to the contrary, Catholic dogma tells us that these souls are not innocent, but bear the stain of sin and are thus unworthy of the glory of Heaven. Morevoer, God does not owe Heaven to anyone anyway; salvation is a free gift and no one really deserves it (or merit it de condigno). And, what's more, rather than there being some sort of 'unfairness' by assigning to them this eternal lot, God is in fact being merciful towards these souls. God is not punishing them for something they didn't do, but is mercifully granting them an eternal and superabundant natural happiness that they do not deserve. Divine justice, original sin, the gratuity of salvation: we may not like these doctrines, but it's what God revealed. If we really believed in them, we would not find shocking the doctrine of limbo that is widely taught to us by the Catholic tradition throughout the ages, and we wouldn't need to replace it with some vain 'hope' devised to fit our un-Catholic sensibilities.

Quaeritur: Do Angels Undergo Motion?

Quaeritur: Do Angels Undergo Motion?

Quaeritur: If by motion we understand the passing from potency to act, what does the motion of the angels consist in?  It is probably not locomotion, which is circumscribed within space.  I know that in angels there is a distinction between potency and act (because otherwise they would be Pure Act, that is, God, or pure potency, prime matter, which is an ens rationis, if I’m not mistaken).  But what would the actualization of their potencies consist in?  Can an angel learn?  On the other hand, with respect to local motion, as far as I understand there seem to be testimonies in Scripture and in the writings of the saints where angels seem to be have a certain trajectory in space when they interact with corporeal beings.  How is this possible?

Respondeo: First of all, as you say, in angels there is in fact a composition of potency and act.  They are not pure act, as is God, or pure potency, as is prime matter (see St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, Ch. 4).  A separate issue is whether they can move from potency to act.

Further, motion can occur per se within three genera or categories: quality, quantity, and place.  Properly speaking, only mobile being (i.e., material being) is the subject of motion.  But motion can also be understood analogically in reference to incorporeal beings where there is a composition of potency and act.  This applies to both angels and souls. 

However, angels, being incorporeal, do not have quantiative parts, so they can only undergo motion qualitatively (as you say, if they learn), or in place, by assuming different places.  But all this is true only analogically, as compared to the way we ascribe motion to bodies.

St. Thomas, in fact, explicitly ascribes place, and hence motion, to angels, but does so ‘equivocally’:

Summa theologiae Ia, q. 56, a. 1:

Whether an angel can be moved locally?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit moveri localiter. Ut enim probat philosophus in VI Physic., nullum impartibile movetur, quia dum aliquid est in termino a quo, non movetur; nec etiam dum est in termino ad quem, sed tunc mutatum est, unde relinquitur quod omne quod movetur, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem. Sed Angelus est impartibilis. Ergo Angelus non potest moveri localiter.	Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.
Praeterea, motus est actus imperfecti, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Angelus beatus non est imperfectus. Ergo Angelus beatus non movetur localiter.	Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
Praeterea, motus non est nisi propter indigentiam. Sed sanctorum Angelorum nulla est indigentia. Ergo sancti Angeli localiter non moventur.	Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
Sed contra, eiusdem rationis est Angelum beatum moveri, et animam beatam moveri. Sed necesse est dicere animam beatam localiter moveri, cum sit articulus fidei quod Christus secundum animam, descendit ad Inferos. Ergo Angelus beatus movetur localiter.	On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally.
Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus beatus potest moveri localiter. Sed sicut esse in loco aequivoce convenit corpori et Angelo, ita etiam et moveri secundum locum. Corpus enim est in loco, inquantum continetur sub loco, et commensuratur loco. Unde oportet quod etiam motus corporis secundum locum, commensuretur loco, et sit secundum exigentiam eius. Et inde est quod secundum continuitatem magnitudinis est continuitas motus; et secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius et posterius in motu locali corporis, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed Angelus non est in loco ut commensuratus et contentus, sed magis ut continens. Unde motus Angeli in loco, non oportet quod commensuretur loco, nec quod sit secundum exigentiam eius, ut habeat continuitatem ex loco; sed est motus non continuus. Quia enim Angelus non est in loco nisi secundum contactum virtutis, ut dictum est, necesse est quod motus Angeli in loco nihil aliud sit quam diversi contactus diversorum locorum successive et non simul, quia Angelus non potest simul esse in pluribus locis, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem contactus non est necessarium esse continuos. Potest tamen in huiusmodi contactibus continuitas quaedam inveniri. Quia, ut dictum est, nihil prohibet Angelo assignare locum divisibilem, per contactum suae virtutis; sicut corpori assignatur locus divisibilis, per contactum suae magnitudinis. Unde sicut corpus successive, et non simul, dimittit locum in quo prius erat, et ex hoc causatur continuitas in motu locali eius; ita etiam Angelus potest dimittere successive locum divisibilem in quo prius erat, et sic motus eius erit continuus. Et potest etiam totum locum simul dimittere, et toti alteri loco simul se applicare, et sic motus eius non erit continuus.	I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (Question [52], Article [1]), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (Question [52], Article [2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Question [52], Article [1]), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio dupliciter deficit in proposito. Primo quidem, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de indivisibili secundum quantitatem, cui respondet locus de necessitate indivisibilis. Quod non potest dici de Angelo.	Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
Secundo, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de motu continuo. Si enim motus non esset continuus, posset dici quod aliquid movetur dum est in termino a quo, et dum est in termino ad quem, quia ipsa successio diversorum ubi circa eandem rem, motus diceretur; unde in quolibet illorum ubi res esset, illa posset dici moveri. Sed continuitas motus hoc impedit, quia nullum continuum est in termino suo, ut patet, quia linea non est in puncto. Et ideo oportet quod illud quod movetur, non sit totaliter in altero terminorum, dum movetur; sed partim in uno, et partim in altero. Secundum ergo quod motus Angeli non est continuus, demonstratio Aristotelis non procedit in proposito. Sed secundum quod motus Angeli ponitur continuus, sic concedi potest quod Angelus, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem (ut tamen partialitas non referatur ad substantiam Angeli, sed ad locum), quia in principio sui motus continui, Angelus est in toto loco divisibili a quo incipit moveri; sed dum est in ipso moveri, est in parte primi loci quem deserit, et in parte secundi loci quem occupat. Et hoc quidem quod possit occupare partes duorum locorum, competit Angelo ex hoc quod potest occupare locum divisibilem per applicationem suae virtutis sicut corpus per applicationem magnitudinis. Unde sequitur de corpore mobili secundum locum, quod sit divisibile secundum magnitudinem de Angelo autem, quod virtus eius possit applicari alicui divisibili.	Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible.
Ad secundum dicendum quod motus existentis in potentia, est actus imperfecti. Sed motus qui est secundum applicationem virtutis, est existentis in actu, quia virtus rei est secundum quod actu est.	Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
Ad tertium dicendum quod motus existentis in potentia, est propter indigentiam suam, sed motus existentis in actu, non est propter indigentiam suam, sed propter indigentiam alterius. Et hoc modo Angelus, propter indigentiam nostram, localiter movetur, secundum illud Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis.	Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."

Quaeritur: Premotion in Aquinas and His Commentators

Quaeritur: Premotion in Aquinas and His Commentators

Quaeritur: I am interested in the topic of pre-motion within the thought of St. Thomas and his commentators, specifically Garrigou-Lagrange.  I was wondering if you could point me in the right direction for some information on this within the corpus of Thomas himself and in his commentators.  A friend of mine was giving me some brief explanations of this topic and I was interested, but have not been able to make a lot of progress.

Respondeo: Below are a couple of texts in Aquinas that clearly teach premotion (without calling it such---the term is Báñez's).  But, in addition, I wholeheartedly recommend Garrigou's own Predestination, which is really the best work out there on the topic.  After that, I would recommend tackling Báñez's commentary on the Prima Pars.  Both are available from ITOPL.  Báñez's commentary, of course, remains untranslated, but Garrigou's book is available in English translation.

Quaestiones disputatae de malo 6.1 ad 3 (my translation):

God immutably moves our will on account of the efficacy of His moving power, which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the will that is moved, which relates indifferently to diverse things, necessity is not introduced; just as in all things divine providence operates infallibly; and yet from contingent causes effects are contingently produced, insofar as God moves all things proportionately, each being according to its mode.

Deus movet quidem voluntatem immutabiliter propter efficaciam virtutis moventis, quae deficere non potest; sed propter naturam voluntatis motae, quae indifferenter se habet ad diversa, non inducitur necessitas, sed manet libertas; sicut etiam in omnibus providentia divina infallibiliter operatur; et tamen a causis contingentibus proveniunt effectus contingenter, in quantum Deus omnia movet proportionabiliter, unumquodque secundum suum modum.

ST I.83.1: Whether man has free-will? (My translation, emphasis added).

[Argument 3]. Further, that is free which is cause of itself, as is said in the first book of the Metaphysics [ch. 2]. What is moved by another, therefore, is not free. But God moves the will, for it is said in Proverbs 21[:1], "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it," and in Philippians 2[:13], "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish."

To the 3rd, it must be said that the free will is a cause of its motion, because man through his free will moves himself to acting. But it does not necessarily belong to freedom that it be its own first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause that moves both natural and voluntary causes. And just as, by moving natural causes, he does not take away the fact that their acts are natural; so by moving voluntary causes, he does not take away the fact that their actions are voluntary, but rather makes this very thing [i.e., being voluntary] in them, for he operates in each thing according to what is proper to it.

Praeterea, liberum est quod sui causa est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Quod ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, dicitur enim Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud; et Philipp. II, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.

Tom Bethel, "The Cell Declares His Handiwork"

Tom Bethel, "The Cell Declares His Handiwork"

Link to article on New Oxford Review.

Quaeritur: Novel Notions of the Image of God in Man?

Quaeritur: Novel Notions of the Image of God in Man?

Quaeritur: I was at a youth group meeting last month and something came up that I did not really understand. I was hoping that if you have a spare moment you might be able to help me. The subject we are discussing in the youth group for the whole year is Pope John Paul II's Theology of the Body,which seems like a good thing to be studying. We were reviewing what we had learned so far and one of the questions that was asked was confusing to me: Human beings are created "in the image of God." This refers to a) soul only, or b) soul and body.

      Now, the answer that was given was b), a soul and a body. These two CCC paragraphs were cited in the answer as well:

364 The human body shares in the dignity of "the image of God": it is a human body precisely because it is animated by a spiritual soul, and it is the whole human person that is intended to become, in the body of Christ, a temple of the Spirit:²³²

Man, though made of body and soul, is a unity. Through his very bodily condition he sums up in himself the elements of the material world. Through him they are thus brought to their highest perfection and can raise their voice in praise freely given to the Creator. For this reason man may not despise his bodily life. Rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and to hold it in honor since God has created it and will raise it up on the last day.²³³

1004  In expectation of that day, the believer's body and soul already participate in the dignity of belonging to Christ. This dignity entails the demand that he should treat with respect his own body, but also the body of every other person, especially the suffering: The body [is meant] for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. And God raised the Lord and will also raise us up by his power. Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? . . . You are not your own; . . . So glorify God in your body.⁵⁶³

It is obvious that the human body is different from any other animal's body, but how could it possibly be made in God's image when He has no body? It seems to me that the catechism is saying that because humans have a soul their bodies are also made in God's image, which just doesn't make sense. All animals are animated by something spiritual, whether or not it is formally called a soul; when any animal dies the body stays but something leaves, the life-giving element that cannot be seen. Is it because humans have a rational soul that their bodies are in the image of God? If all animals are body-soul composites then there must be a distinguishing feature of the human soul for that to be the case.      

The catechism says something else about how humans are made for God (I suppose the animals and plants are made for man?) and this makes both the human body and soul made in God's image. Could this be because God's essence and existence are identical, that is to say that His only reason for existing is Himself and the only way He can exist is in Himself? I had just always thought that being made in God's image meant having an intellect and free will and had nothing to do with the body, so this was quite a curveball.

Thank you for your time!

Respondeo: You are right.  And you saw it because you have a metaphysical mind.  God is not a body, so our image and likeness of God consists in our incorporeal soul, and in particular in our having intellect and will, not in our bodies.  Our bodies are not made in the image and likeness of God, but are only 'vestiges' or 'traces' of the Blessed Trinity.   Aquinas explains it succinctly in Summa theologiae I.93.6c:  

While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above (1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (28, 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

You could say that the body participates in the image and likeness of God, insofar as it is informed by a rational soul that itself is made in the image and likeness of God, but because the body is corporeal, it is not essentially the image and likeness of God.

Although this explanation is not a dogma, it is, nonetheless, the traditional doctrine of the Church, especially as explained by the Fathers of the Church.  John Paul II, the CCC, and most Catholic "personalists" today are proposing a novel understanding of the concept of the image of God in man: they think that our being the image and likeness of God consists not so much in our having an intellect and a will, but in our being social, that is, in our being "a community of persons."   And our social nature is bodily, so they conclude that the image and likeness of God is also found in the body.  This view is metaphysically problematic, at least insofar as they do not make the distinction between (a) image and likeness, and (b) vestige/trace, thus making it seem that the soul and the body are the image and likeness of God in the same sense.  

N.B.: Remember that the Theology of the Body and the CCC are not binding acts of the Magisterium, so you don't have to take them as the authoritative statement of Catholic doctrine.  For the official teachings of the Church, see Denzinger's Sources of Catholic Dogma, which contains the definitive statements of the Magisterium, as well as Jurgens' Faith of the Early Fathers, which contains the main teachings of the Church Fathers on which they reach a morally unanimous consensus.  You should also study the consensus of the Doctors of the Church, whose teaching you will find in the manuals of the approved theologians (mainly those prior to the Second Vatican Council, when the Magisterium stopped censuring theologians), such as those by Ludwig Ott and Adophe Tanquerey (among many others, but these two have the advantage of being available in English translation).  You can also find many other valuable sources in ITOPL.

   

Why the Eternity of the World Cannot be Demonstrated: A Demonstration

Why the Eternity of the World Cannot be Demonstrated: A Demonstration

I. From ST I.46.1c, the Dominican Fathers' translation (www.summatheologiae.org), with Don Paco's revisions:

I answer that, Nothing except God existed from eternity. And this is not impossible to hold: for it has been shown above (ST 19.4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary to the extent that it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaphysics V.6). Now it was shown above (ST 19.3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary for God to will anything except Himself. It is not, therefore, necessary for God to will the world to have always existed.  But the world exists as long as God wills it to exist, since the existence of the world depends on the will of God as on its cause. It is not, therefore, necessary for the world to exist always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.

II. Latin Original (from www.corpusthomisticum.org):

Respondeo dicendum nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc quidem ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quod voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causae dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ostensum est autem supra quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum. Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed eatenus mundus est, quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari potest.

III. The Argument in Syllogistic Format:

Major: Only that which is necessarily the case can be demonstrated.

Minor: The eternity of the world is not necessarily the case.

Conclusion: Therefore, the eternity of the world cannot be demonstrated.

[Proof of the Major: It follows from the notion of demonstration as an argument that is based on necessity.  Cf. Posterior Analytics I.4.] 

Proof of the Minor: Only that which God necessarily wills is necessarily the case.  But God does not necessarily will that the world be eternal--he can (and Revelation tells us he does) will the world to have a temporal beginning.  Therefore.

Quaeritur: Please Explain the Previous Post

Quaeritur: Please Explain the Previous Post

Quaeritur: May I ask good sir that you explain the previous post for us slow people?

Respondeo: Let's see if I can rework Garrigou's reasoning syllogistically. I will structure each of his three criticisms (as numbered in the previous post) as a reductio ad absurdum, using the following format:

P1: Either a or b.

P2: If b, then c.

P3: If c, then d.

P4: But d is false.

Conc.: Therefore, b is false and a is true.

FIRST ARGUMENT:

Premise 1: Either (a) God is the primary cause of our free actions (Thomistic position), or (b) he is not the primary cause of our free actions (Molinist Position).

Premise 2: If (b) God is not the primary cause of our free actions, then (c) these actions are caused independently of him.

Premise 3: If (c) these free actions are caused independently of him, then (d) God is not the universal primary cause of all things.

Premise 4: But God is the universal primary cause of all things (d is false).

Conclusion: Therefore, God is the universal primary cause of our free actions (b is false; a is true).

SECOND ARGUMENT:

Premise 1: Either (a) God's knowledge of our free actions causally determines our free actions (Thomistic position), or (b) God's knowledge of our free actions is causally determined by our free actions (Molinist Position).

Premise 2: If (b) God's knowledge of our free actions is causally determined by our free actions, then (c) God is passive with respect to these actions.

Premise 3: If (c) God is passive (or potential) with respect to these actions, then (d) He is not pure Act, Ipsum Esse, the Uncaused Cause, the Unmoved Mover.

Premise 4: But God is Pure Act, Ipsum Esse, the Uncaused Cause, the Unmoved Mover (d is false).

Conclusion: Therefore, God's knowledge of our free actions causally determines our free actions (b is false; a is true).

THIRD ARGUMENT:

Premise 1: God knows future free choices infallibly either (a) because He infallibly decrees them from all eternity (Thomistic position), or (b) because, without decreeing them, He can foresee (via Molina's so-called scientia media) what will happen given any circumstance (Molinist position).

Premise 2: If (b) because, without decreeing them, He can predict what will happen given any circumstance, then (c) human acts are infallibly determined by their circumstances; that is, given a certain set of circumstances, a human being can only act in one determined way (is not free to make different choices).

Premise 3: If (c) human acts are infallibly determined by their circumstances; that is, given a certain set of circumstances, a human being can only act in one determined way (is not free to make different choices), then (d) there is no freedom of the will, but rather a circumstantial type of fatalism (or "determinism of the circumstances").

Premise 4: But there is freedom of the will (d is false).

Conclusion: Therefore, God knows future free choices infallibly because He infallibly decrees them from all eternity (a is true; b is false).

Garrigou-Lagrange: Three Reasons Why Molinism is Wrong

Garrigou-Lagrange: Three Reasons Why Molinism is Wrong

From Garrigou-Lagrange, OP - God: His Existence and His Nature,* Vol. 2, Appendix IV, p. 465:

*Available from ITOPL.

Garrigou-Lagrange on Evolution (aka 'Transformism')

Garrigou-Lagrange on Evolution (aka 'Transformism')

From Garrigou-Lagrange's The Trinity and God the creator, Ch.37.

Transformism and the Origin of Life

State of the question. The question of the origin of life and of the different species of living things is one of the most important of those that pertain to the creation of corporeal things. The modern theory of transformism was scarcely mentioned among the ancient philosophers, although St. Thomas sometimes spoke of the hypothesis of the appearance of new species.[1261] This problem is in some way connected with the old question of universals: whether the universals are fundamentally in individual beings according to their unchangeable nature.

Transformism may be either absolute or moderate.

Absolute transformism holds that matter is uncaused, that it exists of itself from eternity, and that from it by successive transformations have issued different living beings, that is, vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life. (Huxley and Darwin.)

Moderate transformism holds that matter is not uncaused but is created by God, that it is not eternal, that the first living beings were created by God, and that God intervened in a special way to produce sensitive life, in the formation of the human body and in the creation of the spiritual soul. This moderate transformism refers to the production of various species of plants and animals which derive by successive transformations from the first living beings. Some of those who hold a moderate transformism think that all plants and animals come from different species created by God; others think that all plants came from one species and all animals came from one species of animal. Those who support the theory of transformism are not agreed on the definition of species; what one calls species another may call a variation.

Absolute transformism. This theory manifestly contradicts faith and reason inasmuch as it denies all intervention by God. It is directly opposed to the dogma of creation ("In the beginning God created heaven and earth"), since it teaches that matter has no cause and is eternal. This theory is opposed to all the proofs for the existence of God, and it implies that more is produced by less, the more perfect by the imperfect. This is at the same time against the principle of contradiction or identity, against the principle of the reason of being, the principle of efficient causality, and the principle of finality. It implies an ascending evolution, in which something more perfect appears without any reason, without any efficient cause, without an end, and without order. This theory destroys all intelligibility of things, as we have explained at length on another occasion.[1262] Such an evolution of species would be entirely fortuitous, without any preconceived idea or finality, and no reason is supplied for the wonderful subordination and coordination of things in nature.

In even the most ancient species, as we know from fossils, the organs are adapted to an end, coordinated with one another, and subordinated to the preservation of the individual and the species. All this cannot be attributed to chance; it presupposes an intelligent cause. Chance is a cause , a cause that is accidentally connected with a cause , and therefore an accidental cause cannot be the first cause of the order in things, for then order would come from the privation of order, and intelligibility would come from unintelligibility. What would be more absurd than to say that the intellects of the great doctors and the charity of the saints derived from a blind and material fate? The greater cannot be produced by the lesser. Hence absolute transformism substitutes the most patent absurdity for the mystery of creation.

This refutation of absolute transformism is confirmed by experience, which shows that every living thing comes from another living being and that there is no spontaneous generation. Pasteur and Tyndall demonstrated that no living beings are generated where all ova and seed have been destroyed. Such bacteria as are said to be generated in the atmosphere do not come from inanimate matter but from ova existing in the atmosphere. Huxley himself admitted Pasteur's conclusions.

St. Thomas held that certain animal life was generated by putrefaction under the influence of the sun. His explanation was as follows: "A heavenly body, since it is a moving thing that is moved, has the nature of an instrument which acts with the power of the principal agent; and therefore it can cause life by virtue of its mover, which is a living substance."[1263] St. Thomas never admitted that the more perfect being can be produced by the less perfect.

Moderate transformism. This theory does not oppose the teaching of faith. The words of Genesis ("And God said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind") show that there was some difference among the species that God created, but they do not assert that all species were immediately created by God. St. Thomas himself said: "If certain new species should appear, these have existed previously in certain active forces; in this way what is generated by animal putrefaction is produced by the power of the stars and the elements," that is, "by the power of the mover (of the stars), which is a living substance."[1264] Thus St. Thomas maintains inviolate the principle of causality, according to which the more perfect cannot be produced by a less perfect being as a fully sufficient cause.

Lastly, it is difficult to say where true variation begins and where species leaves off in the ontological sense. Generally interfecundation is held to be the sign of membership in the same species. If it is pointed out that the horse and the ass generate the mule, it should be remembered that the mule is sterile, that is, it does not propagate a species. Here we have confirmation of the principle that operation follows being, and the mode of operation follows the mode of being; from this it follows that every animal generates offspring similar to itself in species. Ontological species therefore are immutable. But it is difficult to say when two animals belong to the same species properly so called or to two similar species. We do not have a clear enough understanding of the specific difference between living sensible beings; their specific forms are deeply immersed in matter and hardly intelligible to us. We know them only in a descriptive manner, empirically.[1265]

But when we come to man, we clearly understand his specific difference because it is not immersed in matter. Man's reason or rationality is a form of intellectuality, and intelligence is distinctly intelligible to itself because it is essentially ordered to the cognition of intelligible being itself and the reasons for the being of things.

It is clear, then, that the human soul cannot be educed from the potency of matter; on the other hand the specific form of plants and animals is educed from matter by way of generation.[1266]

--------------------------------

Notes:

1261 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 73, a. 1 ad 3; q. 115, a. 2. "Whether there are any seminal reasons in corporeal matter."

1262 Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione I, 233-76.

1263 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 70, a. 3 ad 3.

1264 Ibid., q. 73, a. 1 ad 3; q. 115, a. 2

1265 cf. Dict. apol., art. "Transformism."

1266 Summa Theol., Ia, q. 118, a. 1, 2.

Garrigou's De Deo Trino et Creatore as well as many others of his works 

are available on PDF format through ITOPL!