The Eucharist as a Specification of the 'Sacraments of the Natural Law' in Aquinas (Texts)

The Eucharist as a Specification of the 'Sacraments of the Natural Law' in Aquinas (Texts)

 

The Eucharist as a Specification of the 'Sacraments of the Natural Law' in Aquinas

Paper presented at Ave Maria University

Aquinas Conference, Feb. 2, 2024

Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo

St. Gregory the Great Seminary (Diocese of Lincoln)

iteadthomaminstitute@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:
St. Thomas’ use of the term ‘sacrament’ in the IIIa Pars is not strictly univocal, but is generic. The term describes not only the Seven Sacraments of the New Law, but also the ‘sacraments’ of the Old Law of Moses, and even the ‘sacraments of the law of nature’—a term he borrows from Hugh of St. Victor. Before the institution of the Seven Sacraments, even before the ritual prescriptions of the Old Law before Christ, the natural law itself has always inclined men to give worship to the one God and to submit to Him. Because of their hylemorphic nature, humans must show their submission to God in a corporeal way, by way of signs, so that through what they do exteriorly they may become intellectually aware of the spiritual reality that is being expressed. For Aquinas this means that the practice of religion must involve the use of some sort of natural sacramental economy. One prominent cultic precept of the natural law is that all men universally must offer sacrifice to God. The natural law prescribes this in communi without specifying what sort of object/victim must be offered, or how, or when. It only inclines us to offer a sensible thing to God as a sign of subjection and honor. Yet positive law, especially divine positive law, determines this general inclination and narrows it down to specific types of sacrifices. As is well known, the ceremonies of the New Law are a perfection of those contained in the Old Law. What is in need of greater appreciation is that the sacrifices of the Old and New Laws are determinations of that which is already prescribed universally to all men by the natural law. Throughout the Old Testament there are many instances of the Old Law specifying the natural precept to offer sacrifice. A fortiori, the Sacrifice of the Mass is a further specification and perfection of the natural law precept to offer sacrifices. By weaving together St. Thomas’ scattered texts on the issue, this paper endeavors to explain how the Eucharist is not an arbitrary imposition of the will of God upon the nascent Church, but a perfection of an inclination that God already rooted in our human nature. Rather than being something radically new in the history of salvation, the Eucharist is the perfection and fulfilment of the ‘sacraments of the natural law’, an eminent example of grace perfecting nature.

TEXTS:

1) ST II-II.85.1c: [N}reason dictates to man that he must be subject to some superior being, on account of the defects which he senses within himself, and in regard to which he needs to be helped and directed by someone superior. And whatever this [being] may be, this is what is called ‘God’ by all. Now just as in natural things the inferior are naturally subject to the superior, so too natural reason dictates to man according to a natural inclination that he should show subjection and honor according to his own mode to that which is above man.

2) ST III.61.1c: The first of these is taken from the condition of human nature, to which it is proper to be led through corporeal and sensible things towards spiritual and intelligible things.... Thus, therefore, through the institution of the sacraments man is instructed through sensible things in a manner fitting to his nature.

3) ST I-II.95.2c: [I]t must be noted that something can be derived from the natural law in two ways: as a conclusion from principles, or as a sort of determination of commonalities. The first way is similar to the way in which, in the sciences, demonstrative conclusions are produced from principles. But the second way is similar to the way which, in the arts, general forms are determined to something specific: like the craftsman, who needs to determine the general form of a house to this or that shape. Therefore, some things are derived from the general principles of the natural law by way of conclusions; for instance, that “one ought not to kill” may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that “one ought not to harm anyone.” But some things [are derived] by way of determination; for instance, the law of nature has it that the sinner should be punished; but that he be punished with this particular punishment is a determination of the law of nature. Each of these, therefore, is found in positive human law. But those things that belong to the first way are contained in human law not as being mere positive law, but have also some of the force of natural law; whereas those things which belong to the second way have the force of human law alone.

4) ST I-II.103.1c: [W]hoever worships God must worship Him through certain determinate things that pertain to external worship. Now, the determination of divine worship pertains to ceremonies, just as the determination of those things whereby we are ordered towards our neighbor pertains to the judicial precepts.... And therefore, just as among men in general there were certain judicial [precepts], yet not instituted by the authority of divine law, but ordered by the reason of men, so also there were certain ceremonies, not determined by the authority of any law, but only according to the will and devotion of the men worshipping God.... Therefore before the Law there were certain ceremonies, yet not ceremonies of the Law, because they were not instituted by any legislation.

5) ST III.61.3 ad 2: It was also necessary that even in the Old Law there be determined certain sacraments of the faith that they had in the Messiah who was to come: these sacraments are compared to those sacraments that existed before the Law, as the determinate to the indeterminate; for before the Law it was not fixed determinately what sacraments were to be used, as it was through the Law. This was necessary both on account of the clouding of the natural law, and so that there would be a more determinate signification of the faith.

6) ST III.60.5, arg. 3: [I]n the state of the law of nature determinate things were not required in the sacraments, but were assumed through a vow, as appears in Genesis 28, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to God tithes and peace-offerings.

7) ST III.61.3 ad 2: Consequently in the old Law there was also a need for certain fixed sacraments significative of man’s faith in the future coming of Christ: which sacraments are compared to those that preceded the Law, as something determinate to that which is indeterminate: insofar as before the Law it had not been established (praefixum) what sacraments men were to use: whereas this was prescribed by the Law; and this was necessary both on account of the overclouding of the natural law, and for the clearer signification of faith.

8) ST III.60.5, arg. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. 19), diverse sacraments suit different times.... And therefore, just as under the state of the law of nature men, to whom no law was given exteriorly, were moved by inward instinct alone to worship God, so also the sensible things to be used for the worship of God were determined for them by inward instinct. But later it became necessary for a law to be given exteriorly, both on account of the darkening of the Law of nature due to the sins of men and also for the sake of a more express signification of the grace of Christ, whereby the human race is sanctified. And therefore it became necessary to determine things which men were to use in the sacraments.

9) SCG 3.120: Among other things which pertain to latria, sacrifice seems to be unique, for genuflections, prostrations, and other such manifestations of honor may also be shown to men, although with a different intention than to God. But everyone agrees that sacrifice should not be offered to anyone unless he is thought to be God or unless one pretends to think so. Now, an external sacrifice is representative of a true, interior sacrifice, whereby the human mind offers itself to God. And our mind offers itself to God as to the principle of its creation, as to the author of its actions, as to the end of its beatitude. These things are found only in the highest principle of things, for it was shown above that the creating cause of the rational soul is the highest God alone; also He alone can incline the will of man to whatever He wishes, as was shown above; it is also clear from the above that the ultimate happiness of man consists solely in the enjoyment of Him. Therefore, man ought to offer sacrifice and the worship of latria to the highest God alone, and not to any other spiritual substance whatsoever.

10) SCG 3.119: Because it is connatural to humans to receive knowledge through the senses, and it is most difficult to transcend sensible things, God has provided for human beings that even among sensible things there should be made for them a commemoration of things divine, so that thereby the attention (lit, ‘intention’) of human beings may be called back towards divine things. And for this reason sensible sacrifices have been instituted, which humans offer to God, not as though God needed them, but to represent to humans the fact that they ought to offer themselves and all they have to God, as to their end, Creator, Ruler, and Lord of all.

11) ST II-II.85.1c: [T]he mode befitting to man is that he should use sensible signs in order to express anything, because he receives knowledge from sensibles. And therefore it proceeds from natural reason that man should use certain sensible things, offering them to God as a sign of the due subjection and honor, according to a similitude to those who offer certain things to their lord in recognition of his dominion. Now this pertains to the ratio of sacrifice. And therefore the offering of a sacrifice pertains to natural law.

12) ST II-II.85.1 ad 1: [S]ome things taken generally (in communi) are of natural law, but their determination is of positive law; for instance, it belongs to the natural law that evildoers should be punished, but that they should be punished with this or that punishment belongs is a matter of divine or human institution. Similarly also the offering of a sacrifice in communi belongs to the natural law, and therefore everyone agrees on this. But the determination of sacrifices comes from human or divine institution, and therefore people differ on this point.

13) In Hebr. 7, lect. 1: The ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament are determinations of the precepts of the natural law and of the moral precepts; therefore, in regard to what they had from the natural law, they were observed before the Law without any precept. For the fact that something is offered to God in recognition of His creation and dominion is natural; but that He should be offered goats and heifers is a ceremonial precept.... And this was done particularly because the main reason for rendering worship to God is to signify that whatever a man has, he received from God and that he depends on Him for his entire perfection.

14) ST II-II.85.4c: Those who are under the New or Old laws are bound to do this differently from those who are not under the law.  For those who are under the law are bound to offer determinate sacrifices according to the precepts of the law. But those who were not under the law were bound to do certain things exteriorly in God’s honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, and were not [bound to do] determinately these or those things.

Garrigou-Lagrange on St Dominic and All Holy Founders (De Gratia, p. 20)

Garrigou-Lagrange on St Dominic and All Holy Founders (De Gratia, p. 20)

 

Quaeritur: Are "Will" and "Free Will" Synonymous in St. Thomas?

Quaeritur: Are "Will" and "Free Will" Synonymous in St. Thomas?

Quaeritur:  What is the difference between "will" and "free will"?   Looking at the Latin text in the Summa I notice that where Thomas is translated as “free will” the original Latin uses the term liberum arbitrium in various cases and declensions. In contrast, when Thomas speaks of the faculty of the will, he uses the word voluntas in various cases and declensions. So it seems that there is some distinction in what is meant by “will” in the two translations. Stelten's Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin translates arbitrium as "free choice, free will, decision and opinion," whereas voluntas is translated as "will, wish, inclination, desire, will and testament." So it does seem that the former is related to decision-making or choices, where the latter is related to the spiritual faculty of the will.  Would you please help clarify and illustrate?

Respondeo: Great question!  Voluntas is not the same as liberum arbitrium. They are two different acts of the same power. Liberum arbitrium can correctly be translated as "free choice," volulntas is simply willing things in general, even if when do not specifically choose them.  Whenever we deliberate or choose between two different options, we are implicitly willing something more basic that we are not choosing.  For instance, when I deliberate whether I want to eat a burger or a pizza for lunch, I'm trying to make a choice between them, but implicit in that choice I am willing (without choosing) to nourish myself and satiate my hunger.  Similarly, when I come up to a fork in the road, I have to decide which path will take me to my destination, or which one will be a better route; yet in this process I am implicitly willing (without choosing) my destination.  Every choice involves a deeper act of willing that is not a choice, at least not at the moment.  In St. Thomas' own terms, choice is always about the means, and never about the end.  More generally, no one can choose happiness as their ultimate end.  We automatically will it.  All our choices are about the means to get there.  Once a soul enters heaven, there will be no more choices; but they will eternally love (will) God, His happiness, and the soul's own happiness.

Cf. Summa theologiae, Ia, qq. 83, a. 4:

I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above. Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above, that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

St. Thomas' Christology: Synthesis of De Deo Uno et Trino and De Homine

St. Thomas' Christology: Synthesis of De Deo Uno et Trino and De Homine

If you are a Thomistic philosopher without formal theological training, odds are you have not had a chance to study St. Thomas' IIIa Pars at any depth.  At best, as part of our Thomistic philosophical studies we philosophers have to read good chunks of the Summa theologiae, primarily select philosophically-themed questions, such as the text on the Five Ways and other questions on the One God (Ia, qq. 2-26), the questions on man (Ia, qq. 75 and following), good chuncks of the Ia-IIae on beatitude, human acts, on habits and virtues, and on law.  But rarely do we go out of those traditional loci Thomistici.  We hardly ever venture into the IIIa Pars, which is so clearly theological (although I would of course argue that the whole Summa is theological, through and through).    

But we philosophers should definitely read the IIIa Pars carefully.  In St. Thomas' Christological section of the IIIa Pars (qq. 1-59, esp. 1-26) we find so many of his philosophical doctrines coming into play in a marvellous way. This section is a true eye-opener for the philosopher: we can see the theological ‘mileage’ that St. Thomas gets out of his philosophical concepts. It is truly amazing how his philosophy of mind—which he discussed for its own sake in the Ia Pars—is now being applied perfectly to Christ's humanity in a way that it takes on new life.  

Further, this application of philosophical doctrines to Christ leads us to realize that in the Ia Pars he must have had Christ’s humanity in the back of his mind all along. The same can be said of his discussion of the virtues in the IIa pars (in particular the virtue of religion, with its discussion on prayer, and sacrifice). St. Thomas applies these questions so beautifully to his Christology, and therefore when writing the IIa Pars he must have anticipated what he was going to do here in the IIIa Pars.  I imagine he must have had all of these Christological applications in the back of his mind in those earlier sections because from the beginning it is evident that he had a very thoroughly detailed architectonic plan of what he wanted to do, so he must have thought of how the earlier sections applied to later sections from the beginning. 

Thus, the unity and harmony of the science of Sacred Theology, and of the mysteries of the faith that theology seeks to elucidate, really comes to light in this Christological section. Whereas before, in the Ia Pars he spoke of God in Himself, and then of man in himself (continuing on in the IIa Pars), here in the IIIa Pars he harmoniously applies both of those doctrinal treatises to the mystery of the God-man. Hence, Garrigou-Lagrange comments: 

Because the simpler things come before the composite… in the preceding parts of the Summa... what pertains to God and to man are discussed separately, whereas the present treatise is concerned with Him who is both God and man.¹

¹ Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, Christ the Savior, prologue. http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/christ1.htm#00

 

St. Thomas on Peter Lombard's Error of Positing Two Hypostases/Supposits in Christ

St. Thomas on Peter Lombard's Error of Positing Two Hypostases/Supposits in Christ

In the Tertia Pars of the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas seems to be particularly concerned about the Nestorian-like error of some of his contemporaries and recent predecessors---among them Peter Lomabard---who held that there was one Person in Christ, but two hypostases or supposits. 

He introduces us to this error in ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 6 explicitly: 

“But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita... And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate... And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6). But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius...”  

He addresses this issue several times afterwards, and considers the logical consequences of holding that in Christ there are two hypostases/supposits (even if only one person).  For example, ST IIIa, q. 16, a. 7, he tells us that: 

“if [in Christ] there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that ‘to be God’ was predicated of the man, and, conversely... then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God, and that God was made Man, i.e. joined to man.”

Let us backtrack a bit.  In the Prima Pars, St. Thomas addresses the question of how there are "persons" in God, and there he unpacks for us and defends Boethius' definition of person, as "an individual substance of a rational nature" (De Duabus Naturis).  There St. Thomas says that within the genus "substance" we find hypostases or supposits, which are individual substances.  And in turn, within the genus of hypostasis/supposit, we find persons, which are nothing but rational hypostases.  So from general to particular we have: substances > hypostases/supposits > persons.  In St. Thomas' words:

"Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is 'person'.

Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances." (Summa theologiae Ia, q. 29, a. 1).

So a person is "an individual substance of a rational nature" according to Boethius' classical definition. And an individual substance is a hypostasis or supposit.  This is precisely what suppositum or hypostasis signifies: an individual substance. Therefore, a person is nothing but a rational hypostasis/suppositum.  So if we were to admit that there is a human, temporal, and created hypostasis or suppositum in Christ, then we would be saying that besides the Divine Person, there is in Him a human person as well.

Note especially that for St. Thomas, hypostasis and suppositum are synonyms.  The former term has a Greek etymology, and the latter is a native Latin term.  But they mean the same thing.  Moreover, hypostasis/suppositum is not synonymous with "person"; all persons are hypostases, but not vice-versa.  Whenever a hypostasis is rational, then we have a person.  Therefore, in St. Thomas' mind, to posit two hypostases in Christ, one Divine and another human (yet both rational), would be tantamount to positing two persons in Christ, which is clearly heretical.

He makes reference to this theory again, in q. 17, a. 1, and the way he does is very illuminating. This time he explains it in terms of the pronouns unus ([some]'one', in the masculine), unum ('one' [thing], in the neuter), and duo ('two' [things], in the neuter). According to the theory Aquinas is combatting, Christ, being one person and two supposits, is unus (“some-one,” signifying the complete ‘who’), but duo (“two things”). This is not the same as saying that he has two natures, humanity and Divinity, because natures thus construed are just abstractions, and not concrete, real things; saying he is duo, or “two things,” amounts to ascribing two supposits to Him, two concrete natures. But this is erroneous. St. Thomas corrects this theory, saying that in Christ there is not only one Person (unus, in the masculine), but also one supposit, ‘one thing’ (unum, in the neuter), despite this one thing having two natures. Therefore, Christ is not: (a) a divine thing plus (b) a distinct being that possesses human nature; but rather, He is one being that is both human and Divine in nature.  Christ is one thing and some-one (unus et unum, masculine and neuter), with one existence, though possessing two natures, humanity and Divinity. Thus, St. Thomas saves Christ’s unity of being (which is the subject of the following article).

But how is it possible for Catholic theologians, like Peter Lomabard, who were writing and teaching so many centuries after the Patristic era---where all these issues had already been settled---to fall into such a grave error?  Although this error of positing two hypostases/supposits/persons in Christ was already condemned in the early councils of the Church, such as those of Chalcedon and Ephesus, through the terminological imprecisions of the early Scholastics---an unwarranted distinction between person and hypostasis/supposit---, these errors crept back into the theological scene. St. Thomas’ contemporaries were not aware of these councils as much as he was.  If Lombard and his ilk understood what they are saying, they would be forced also to posit two persons in Christ when they place two supposita or two hypostases in Him.   Corey Barnes sheds light into the historical circumstances:

“Aquinas’ later presentations of Christology share knowledge of patristic and conciliar sources unparalleled in the thirteenth century. Among other things, these sources granted Thomas a privileged awareness of early Christological controversies and led him to suspect that some medieval approaches to Christology veered toward Nestorianism. Combating this unintended but nonetheless pernicious tendency required eliminating the imprecisions through which error could enter. The root Nestorian error, according to ST III, q. 2, a. 6, lies in positing an accidental union in Christ, against which Thomas affirms a substantial union, though Nestorius also erred in allowing two hypostases in Christ. Terminological imprecision had, in Aquinas’s own age, led some to allow a duality of hypostases or supposits in Christ. Thomas arrests this drift toward Nestorianism by specifying the relationship between supposits, hypostases, and persons and through the principle actiones sunt suppositorum.”¹

¹ Corey L. Barnes, “Aristotle in the Summa Theologiae’s Christology” in Gilles P. Emery, Matthew Levering, Aristotle in Aquinas’ Theology (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 193.

An Introduction to Analogy in St. Thomas' Theology

An Introduction to Analogy in St. Thomas' Theology

One common problem among experienced by beginners in theology, especially those who have a more analytical mind but who have no previous theological training, is that they do not understand or know how to handle analogy.  Since they know from q. 1 of the Prima Pars that theology is a science, which uses logic and even the scholastic method, they expect terms to mean the same thing every time St. Thomas uses it.  In the Summa, however, St. Thomas expects his readers to have previously undertaken a comprehensive course of logica and of philosophy in general, where analogy is studied in depth and applied throughout.  So when a reader comes to the Summa expecting univocity, perhaps because they associate it with logical rigor, they are disappointed and it can become a serious obstacle to understanding the text.

So let me explain analogy briefly for those of you who are not familiar with it (for those of you who are well versed in St. Thomas' logic and metapysics, and are interested in reading more on my take on analogy in Aquinas, I refer you to this old post). 

St. Thomas teaches that we can use a term either univocally or equivocally. We use a term equivocally when we use it many times with different meanings. For example, when I say that the tree has bark I mean something quite different form when I say that my dog likes to bark. In these examples, "bark" is being used in a purely equivocal way. On the other hand, we use terms univocally when they have the same meaning: I am writing these words on a computer and you are reading them on a computer. Here "computer" has the same meaning in both instances, and thus it is being used univocally. Now there is a third way to use terms, which is called analogy, but which is really a subset of equivocal terms. For example, I can say that my dog is "healthy" but also that his food is "healthy" and that his urine seems "healthy." Of course the dog's being healthy means that his physiological funcitons are all in normal order; but the food's being healthy does not mean that at all: it means that the food is capable of producing or continuing the dog's being healthy. And the urine's being healthy is not at all healthy in the way his food is healthy: it is healthy in the sense that it is a sign of the dog's being healthy. So in these examples the term "healhty" is being used with different meanings (equivocally), but yet these meanings are so closely related that they constitute a special kind of equivocal term. 

St. Thomas uses analogous terms throughout his discussion of God, and so does all of theology, for that matter. When we say that this steak that I'm eating is "good," and when I say that God is "good," by the term "good" I mean different things. God is not tasty, and the steak is not goodness itself. Goodness is an analogous term. In fact, pretty much all divine attributes are analogous terms: they mean different things when attributed to God and when attributed to creatures. Thus, you as a student of theology and of St. Thomas in particular you need to be always aware of the fact that analogy is ubiquitous. 

In Summa theologiae Ia, q. 13, a. 5, we read:

Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.	On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Praeterea, Deus plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.	Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.	I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.	Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.	Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (Article [1]). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

To stress the point further, the use of analogy is so ubiquitous that we find it throughout theology, and not just in St. Thomas' discussion of divine attributes (which is perhaps the context in which philosophers use analogy the most).  

Analogy extends much further and is found in the discussion on the Trinity as well.  One example is St. Thomas' discussion on the "Son" as an "image" of the "Father." Those three terms are analogous: "Father," "Son," and "image" are being attributed to God, and therefore they have different (though related) meanings in God from the way they are meant when attributed to creatures.

The first point is regarding God as cause/principle. In order to understand St. Thomas' remarks on this topic, we need first to make an important distinction. And this distinction is not that between philosophy and theology. Philosophy indeed identifies God as the first cause. And so does theology. In doing so, philosophy and theology are speaking of the relationship between God and what is outside of God (ad extra). But theology also delves into God's inner life, what is to be found within God (ad intra). And within God, we find processions, where one person, the Father, is the first principle of the others. This procession ad intra is distinctly different from the causality of God ad extra. We can properly describe God's action ad extra as 'causation' or 'causality', but for the reasons St. Thomas gives, God's inner processions are best described as proceeding from a principle, rather than from a cause.

So, the take home message for beginners in theology: get used to analogy in theology!  It's everywhere!

Quaeritur: Doesn't the Necessity of Baptism Imply a Miopic View of Salvation?

Quaeritur: Doesn't the Necessity of Baptism Imply a Miopic View of Salvation?

Quaeritur: The dogma that there is no salvation without baptism bothers me.  Can't God work outside our little theological box?  It seems miopic and close minded to think that God is bound by the Sacraments that He Himself instituted.  And it is especially arrogant for you theologians to think that your little theological boxes can contain God's infinite mercy.

Respondeo: Your criticism of theology is (1) self-referentially inconsistent, and (2) not sufficiently aware of what Catholic theology actually says regarding this matter. 

(1) You clearly think theology does not have the full story about God and salvation.  And in doing so you are theologizing.  In fact, any criticism of the very project of theology is ipso facto a theological act.  So you can't belittle all theology without at the same time creating your own theology, therefore criticizing your own act of theologizing.  That is, in critizicing all theology you are critizicing your own (theological) criticism of theology.  So first of all please stop and think about how your insufficiently reflected-upon theology could in fact possibly be less adequate than the theology that you belittle, given how little you have thought about it, and compared to two thousand years of theological discussion. 

(2) Moreover, you are clearly underestimating Catholic theology.  Actually, the principles of our theological "box" are the articles of faith, which were revealed to us by God Himself.  And in that box we know there is not only sacramental baptism, but also baptism of desire and baptism of blood.  And also that God is not bound by His sacramental economy, but that He chose to institute this economy as the ordinary means of salvation for all humankind.  And not only that, but also the very limitations of our theological knowledge and of intellectual knowledge in general are a vast topic of discussion in traditional Catholic theology.  And all of this is either explicitly or implicitly contained in God's revelation, and theologians for centuries have discucssed this.  Theology --any theology--cannot help being miopic in a certain sense, because while we are in via, short of seeing the Divine Essence, we cannot really understand God's truth fully.  But its being limited does not give us the right to belittle this sacred science, which ultimately is nothing other than a humbling of human intelligence before God's gift of revealing Himself to us. 

Quaeritur: How are Trinitarian Processions Compatible with Divine Immutability and Eternity?

Quaeritur: How are Trinitarian Processions Compatible with Divine Immutability and Eternity?

Quaeritur: In Summa theologiae Ia, q.27, Aquinas explains in great detail what is going on inside the Trinity. The two internal processions: the Father generates the Son. The Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit. All of these terms seem to imply movement—emanating from, coming forth, a breathing out, etc., yet we learned earlier that God is immutable. There is no movement in God as that would imply potentiality, and in God there is no potential, He is pure act. How can movement and immutability seemingly coexist?

There also seems to be an ordering or succession of the divine persons—God the Father, the First Principle, unbegotten. God the Son, begotten, generated from God the Father. God the Holy Spirit, spirated from God the Father and God the Son. But in God there is one divine essence, not shared by the three persons, but subsisting in each one. And in God essence and existence are one and the same thing. How can we reconcile the one essence and existence of the divine persons with their apparent succession?

Respondeo: Excellent questions.  God is indeed immutable Pure Act, and therefore in Him there cannot be any sort of motion whatsoever.  It is also not quite correct to say that there is "succession" in God, because that would imply motion.  Rather, the Divine Processions are eternal processions: the Father eternally begets the Son, and the Father and Son eternally spirate the Holy Ghost.  The consequence is a priority and posteriority among the persons in God: but not a temporal priority, since the Father does not exist "before" the Son, nor do they exist "before" the Holy Ghost.  Rather, there is an order among the persons with regard to their procession.  The Father proceeds from no one: He is innascible, unbegotten, unspirated.  The Son proceeds from the Father by way of generation, and together with the Father (the Father through Him) spirates the Holy Ghost.

Moreover, none of this brings division into the Divine Simplicity, because these processions are all identical to the Divine Essence.  St. Thomas, in an objection, argues thus:

Obj. 2: "Everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession."  

To this, he responds: 

Ad 2: "Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God (Question [14], Article [2]), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity." (ST Ia, q. 27, a. 1, ob. 2, ad 2).

Χριστὸς ἀνέστη / Christos Anesti / Christ is Risen (Paschal Troparion, Byzantine Liturgy)

Χριστὸς ἀνέστη / Christos Anesti / Christ is Risen (Paschal Troparion, Byzantine Liturgy)

God is Dead

God is Dead

The Dead Christ, by Andrea Mantegna c.1480

Holy Saturday is that day of the year that I cannot help but think of the deep theological irony involved in Nietzsche's infamos phrase.  "God is dead" is something we faithful Catholics can utter today with profound devotion.

Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, truly underwent human death.  On that day, God was dead.  Quite literally so.  And we commemorate that day every year on Holy Saturday, so at least liturgically we can say today, with Nietzsche: God is dead.  (Nietzsche of course didn't mean it that way, but it is ironic that his words help us, on a day like today, to profess our faith and meditate on its depths.)

You may be thinking: "Wait, God did not die; it was just Jesus who died."  The theological principle of the communicatio idiomatum, the "communication of idioms" (cf. my wife's post) states that the attributes of each of Jesus' two natures can be attributed to the person.  So we attribute to the Person of the Word, whom we call "God," both human and divine attributes.   Among these human attributes we include His mortality, and the fact of His death.  It is true that the Divine Nature did not die: the Divine Nature is immortal, and in this sense each of the three Divine Persons is immortal through their Divine Nature.  But the Second Person, the Person of the Word, "God," also possesses a human nature, which was mortal while on this earth.  And through this human nature, the Person of the Word did truly die.  And this fact is what we especially remember today.

Or maybe you're thinking: "Jesus did not die; only his body died."  If you are thinking along these lines, you are probably thinking of the basic truth of the faith that the Second Person of the Trinity is eternal, and never ceases to be, even during the three days from Good Friday to Easter Sunday.  And it is true that he never ceases to be.  In fact, even the constituent parts of His human nature (body and soul), never ceased to be, even though they were separated.  That is to say, throughout the triduum the Second Person of the Trinity continued His divine existence, and continued to be hypostatically united not only to his human soul, which "descended into hell," but also to his body, which lay in the tomb (cf., Summa theologiae IIIa, q. 50).  But still, it is true to say that He died, or that He underwent death, given that death does not mean ceasing to be, but rather it means the separation of soul and body.  He truly suffered this separation of body and soul, which we call human death.

Ultimately, the underlying principle here is: acta sunt suppositorum, acts are done by persons (supposits). We do not say that my body drives my car; we say: I, the person, drive the car, even if it's my through my body that I do it. So Christ's actions and passions may be done through his body, but it is He who does them through His body. So it is not wrong to say His body died, so long as we don't mean to deny that the person died.  At any rate it is more proper to say that the Person ("God," "Jesus," "the Word") died.

That's what's so awe inspiring about today: the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity truly underwent human death --a separation of his body and soul-- for our salvation.

Quaeritur: Why the Lack of Feminine Language in Reference to the Trinity?

Quaeritur: Why the Lack of Feminine Language in Reference to the Trinity?

Quaeritur: I am reading St. Thomas' treatise on the Trinity (Summa theologiae, Ia Pars, qq. 27-43).  I am trying to understand more about the Trinity, how the Persons relate to one another, and how we can properly communicate about it. One thing that feels amiss to me is the lack of the feminine when I encounter the Trinity. God is obviously neither male nor female, but when I see the term "generation" as it relates to the Father and Son, a maternal force more readily comes to mind. In our creatural experiences women are the generators. I might suggest allowing some of the feminine attributes of God to be encountered here. It is also not uncommon for the Father’s love for us to be described in a maternal way. “As a mother comforts her child, so will I [God] comfort you; and you will be comforted over Jerusalem.” (Isa. 66:13). Some others are Mt. 23:3 and Is. 49:15.

Respondeo: Regarding the feminine aspects of 'generation', St. Thomas is simply being faithful to Scripture (and Tradition) by using masculine terms. Jesus revealed himself as the as the only-begotten (rather than "birthed" or "conceived") Son of the Father: all of these are masculine references. Despite the Divine Nature being asexual, and despite there being some apt maternal metaphors for God and His relationship towards us (as you rightly point out), God did reveal Himself to us principally in unequivocally masculine terms, and so it makes sense that we respect that revelation by echoing it in our theology.

Quaeritur: Logical Vocabulary in St. Thomas' Christology

Quaeritur: Logical Vocabulary in St. Thomas' Christology

Quaeritur: In St. Thomas' Christology, I have found some logical terminology that I do not understand, especially the terms "to predicate" and "reduplication."  Would you please define the following terms for me?  Thank you.

Respondeo: 

Predication: To "predicate A of B" is literally to make term A be the predicate of term B in a sentence or proposition. So to predicate A of B equals to saying that "B is A." For example, to predicate God of Christ is to say that "Christ is God." 

Reduplication occurs when a proposition has a qualification that specifies in which regard the predicate belongs to the subject.  So for example, I am both a father and a professor, and you might want to say that I am "stern" but maybe you want to add that I am so only as a professor and not as a father. So it would be reduplication to say "Professor Romero is stern as a professor." You are 'reduplicating' the term professor. And that reduplication is not a mere redundancy: it is necessary in order to specify in what regard the predicate belongs to the subject: "Prof. Romero qua professor is stern." This is often necessary in Christology in order to specify in what regard we predicate things of Christ. So for example, we can say of Christ the following: "That man is mortal as man" or "God incarnate is immortal qua God." Even if you don't repeat the subject in the predicate, it is considered reduplication if the subject implies the term: "Christ qua man is mortal." 

Reduplication is also common in philosophy; for example, when we say that the object of metaphysics is "being qua being." 

I hope this helps.

Quaeritur: Is the Hypostatic Union an Accidental Union of Natures?

Quaeritur: Is the Hypostatic Union an Accidental Union of Natures?

Quaeritur: I have a question regarding the union of the Divine and human natures in the one Person of Christ. Is the union of the two natures in the one Person of Christ merely accidental or is it an essential union between the natures?  Is the union a quiddity onto itself?  How are we to conceive the nature of the union that occurs within the Person of the Incarnate Word?  I tried to word the question as best as I could.  Thank you, and God bless.

Respondeo: The hypostatic union is not an accidental union of natures, but is rather the closest union possible, that between a person/hypostasis/subject and his natures.  The hypostatic union is not a union that occurs between the natures themselves, but in the Person or Hypostasis of the Word.  So the human nature is united to the Person in the same way that the Divine Nature is united to the Person.  There is no direct essential union of the two natures among themselves, nor is there a third nature that unites them.  It is the person that is the "pivotal point" as it were, of the union.  So the two natures are united in the person, and so their union is not accidental, but, as St. Thomas says, it is a union "in subsistence":

A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence. (ST IIIa, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2).

Ad secundum dicendum quod persona dicitur incommunicabilis inquantum non potest de pluribus suppositis praedicari. Nihil tamen prohibet plura de persona praedicari. Unde non est contra rationem personae sic communicari ut subsistat in pluribus naturis. Quia etiam in personam creatam possunt plures naturae concurrere accidentaliter, sicut in persona unius hominis invenitur quantitas et qualitas. Hoc autem est proprium divinae personae, propter eius infinitatem, ut fiat in ea concursus naturarum, non quidem accidentaliter, sed secundum subsistentiam.

The hypostatic union does produce an effect in the human nature which is accidental, yet profound: the human nature participates accidentally in the divine nature, becomes divinized by the fact that the Divine Nature is there present also (without confusing the two natures).  This is distinct from the fact that the human person is assumed by a Divine Person.  I'm speaking of the divinization that we also undergo, despite not having been assumed by a Divine Person.  So just as our own human nature receives a participation of the Divine Nature through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in us, all the more so, the human nature of Jesus is divinized by the presence of the Divine Nature (aside of from is becoming the flesh of the Logos).  

I hope this helps (or at least that it doesn't confuse you further).  

Pohle-Preuss Dogmatic Theology (12 vols.) in PDF

Pohle-Preuss Dogmatic Theology (12 vols.) in PDF

For your convenience, here are links to download all twelve of Joseph Pohle's Dogmatic Theology (1911–1920, edited by Arthur Preuss): 

God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes
The Divine Trinity: A Dogmatic Treatise 
God: The Author of Nature and the Supernatural 
Christology: A Dogmatic Treatise on the Incarnation 
Soteriology: A Dogmatic Treatise on the Redemption 
Mariology: A Dogmatic Treatise on the Blessed Virgin Mary 
Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise 
The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise, vol. 1 
The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise, vol. 2 
The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise, vol. 3 
The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise, vol. 4 
Eschatology, or the Catholic Doctrine of the Last Things: A Dogmatic Treatise