Quaeritur: Are "Will" and "Free Will" Synonymous in St. Thomas?

Quaeritur: Are "Will" and "Free Will" Synonymous in St. Thomas?

Quaeritur:  What is the difference between "will" and "free will"?   Looking at the Latin text in the Summa I notice that where Thomas is translated as “free will” the original Latin uses the term liberum arbitrium in various cases and declensions. In contrast, when Thomas speaks of the faculty of the will, he uses the word voluntas in various cases and declensions. So it seems that there is some distinction in what is meant by “will” in the two translations. Stelten's Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin translates arbitrium as "free choice, free will, decision and opinion," whereas voluntas is translated as "will, wish, inclination, desire, will and testament." So it does seem that the former is related to decision-making or choices, where the latter is related to the spiritual faculty of the will.  Would you please help clarify and illustrate?

Respondeo: Great question!  Voluntas is not the same as liberum arbitrium. They are two different acts of the same power. Liberum arbitrium can correctly be translated as "free choice," volulntas is simply willing things in general, even if when do not specifically choose them.  Whenever we deliberate or choose between two different options, we are implicitly willing something more basic that we are not choosing.  For instance, when I deliberate whether I want to eat a burger or a pizza for lunch, I'm trying to make a choice between them, but implicit in that choice I am willing (without choosing) to nourish myself and satiate my hunger.  Similarly, when I come up to a fork in the road, I have to decide which path will take me to my destination, or which one will be a better route; yet in this process I am implicitly willing (without choosing) my destination.  Every choice involves a deeper act of willing that is not a choice, at least not at the moment.  In St. Thomas' own terms, choice is always about the means, and never about the end.  More generally, no one can choose happiness as their ultimate end.  We automatically will it.  All our choices are about the means to get there.  Once a soul enters heaven, there will be no more choices; but they will eternally love (will) God, His happiness, and the soul's own happiness.

Cf. Summa theologiae, Ia, qq. 83, a. 4:

I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above. Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above, that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

The Uses of Reason in Theology

The Uses of Reason in Theology

The view that St. Thomas should be our model for our understanding of the relationship between faith and reason is a commonplace in Thomistic studies and in Catholic philosophy and theology in general.  But what exactly does he say about the ways in which reason suppors theology in its methodology?

Well, lately I've been delving into the topic of theological methodology from a Thomistic perspective.  Normally, when I want to research a topic thoroughly in St. Thomas, I usually begin by searching the Index Thomisticus.  

Here are three texts that I found in St. Thomas' corpus that are particularly relevant to the topic.

1) One important text was Summa contra gentiles, Book 1, ch. 4:

Caput 4	Chapter 4
Quod veritas divinorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur	THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD TO WHICH THE NATURAL REASON REACHES IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF
Duplici igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur. Hoc autem de illa primo ostendendum est quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest: ne forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse.	[1] Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, it is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief. This point must first be shown concerning the truth that is open to the inquiry of the reason; otherwise, it might perhaps seem to someone that, since such a truth can be known by the reason, it was uselessly given to men through a supernatural inspiration as an object of belief.

But these are not technically "uses of reason" in theology, but rather a "twofold truth" (duplex veritas) concerning what can be known in about divine things: one which can be attained by reason and another that exceeds reason, both of which needed to be revealed to man by God, but for different reasons. The first of these kinds of truth (which in another text he calls the praeambula fidei) are properly the object of philosophy, whereas the latter (the articuli fidei) can only be studied by theology. The first may also be studied by theology, and in this sense we have two distinct truths which theology can study: the preambles and the articles. And therefore this 'twofold truth' does imply a twofold use of reason in theology, but this is not explicitly what St. Thomas is addressing, and there seems to be an important difference here between what he is saying and what I've drawn out from what he's saying.

2) Another text I found is Summa theologiae Ia, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2:

Ad secundum dicendum quod ad aliquam rem dupliciter inducitur ratio. Uno modo, ad probandum sufficienter aliquam radicem, sicut in scientia naturali inducitur ratio sufficiens ad probandum quod motus caeli semper sit uniformis velocitatis. Alio modo inducitur ratio, non quae sufficienter probet radicem, sed quae radici iam positae ostendat congruere consequentes effectus, sicut in astrologia ponitur ratio excentricorum et epicyclorum ex hoc quod, hac positione facta, possunt salvari apparentia sensibilia circa motus caelestes, non tamen ratio haec est sufficienter probans, quia etiam forte alia positione facta salvari possent. Primo ergo modo potest induci ratio ad probandum Deum esse unum, et similia. Sed secundo modo se habet ratio quae inducitur ad manifestationem Trinitatis, quia scilicet, Trinitate posita, congruunt huiusmodi rationes; non tamen ita quod per has rationes sufficienter probetur Trinitas personarum. Et hoc patet per singula. Bonitas enim infinita Dei manifestatur etiam in productione creaturarum, quia infinitae virtutis est ex nihilo producere. Non enim oportet, si infinita bonitate se communicat, quod aliquid infinitum a Deo procedat, sed secundum modum suum recipiat divinam bonitatem. Similiter etiam quod dicitur, quod sine consortio non potest esse iucunda possessio alicuius boni, locum habet quando in una persona non invenitur perfecta bonitas; unde indiget, ad plenam iucunditatis bonitatem, bono alicuius alterius consociati sibi. Similitudo autem intellectus nostri non sufficienter probat aliquid de Deo, propter hoc quod intellectus non univoce invenitur in Deo et in nobis. Et inde est quod Augustinus, super Ioan., dicit quod per fidem venitur ad cognitionem, et non e converso.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.

This text does present a distinction between uses of reason: one demonstrative, the other 'manifestative' (as Garrigou-Lagrange calls it, stating that we use reason this way when dealing with things that non possunt nec probari nec improbari, sed cum probabilitate suadentur et sola fide cum certitudine tenentur).

So I'm assuming that we get the three "uses of reason" by combining this distinction in ST Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2 with the distinction in SCG I.4. Thus, we have: 

(a) reason as demonstrating divine things independently from revelation, 

(b) reason as demonstrating divine things on the basis of revelation as its starting point, and

(c) reason, not as demonstrating, but only 'making manifest' divine things.

3) Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 2 a. 3 co. 3 (text borrowed from The Logic Museum): 

Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti.	Thus, in sacred doctrine we are able to make a threefold use of philosophy:
Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit.	1. First, to demonstrate those truths that are preambles of faith and that have a necessary place in the science of faith. Such are the truths about God that can be proved by natural reason—that God exists, that God is one; such truths about God or about His creatures, subject to philosophical proof, faith presupposes.
Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem.	2. Secondly, to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine in his book, De Trinitate, employed any comparisons taken from the teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity.
Tertio ad resistendum his quae contra fidem dicuntur sive ostendendo ea esse falsa sive ostendendo ea non esse necessaria.	3. In the third place, to resist those who speak against the faith, either by showing that their statements are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.

Here we have a slightly different distinction. We do find some version of elements (a) and (c), but we also have a brand new element, the third and last one in the text, which consists in (d) refuting the arguments of those who argue against the faith, by showing that their arguments are either false or non demonstrative. At any rate, if we gather all these texts, it seems we get at least four different uses of reason in theology.

I am not trying to draw any conclusive synthesis here, as this is just a research starting point.  I will share more as I continue to work on this topic.  In the meantime, compare the above with Garrigou-Lagrange (Reality, Ch. 6), who identifies six "steps" in theological procedure, some of which seem to be identical (or at least reducible) to the ones mentioned above:

Article Two: Steps In Theological Procedure

These steps are pointed out by St. Thomas, first in the first question of the Summa, secondly, more explicitly, when he treats of specific subjects: eternal life, for example, predestination, the Trinity, the mysteries of the Incarnation, the Redemption, the Eucharist, and the other sacraments. We distinguish six such successive procedures.

1. The positive procedure.

2. The analytic procedure.

3. The apologetic procedure.

4. The manifestative procedure.

5. The explicative procedure.

6. The illative procedure.

     (a) of truths explicitly revealed.

     (b) of truths not explicitly revealed.

     (c) of truths virtually revealed.

Free PDFs of Doronzo and Jesuit BAC Manuals!!!

Free PDFs of Doronzo and Jesuit BAC Manuals!!!

Below are some links for you to download free ITOPL files of tremendously valuable manuals of dogmatic theology published in the 1940s and 50s.  These works (among others) represent the most advanced state of Catholic theology so far... i.e., the pinnacle of organic, traditional theological development before most theologians in the West lost their grip and decided to turn their focus elsewhere.  The Spanish Jesuit manual, published by the Madrid-based Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos (B.A.C.) is an impressive work done by different authors from the generation before Vatican II, each an expert in his field; it represents the peak of Jesuit theology before the order drank the cool-aid.  Doronzo was a professor of Dogma at Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.), and his massive dogmatic work on the Sacraments remains unsurpassed.  I must say that although I tend to prefer Dominican Thomists (such as Garrigou-Lagrange, Hugon, Ramírez, etc.), true greatness must be recognized where it is really present.  

By the way, the B.A.C. manual was translated into English a few years ago by Fr. Kenneth Baker, S.J. and is available from Amazon.  The set is not cheap (8 vols., $35 USD apiece), but it is truly worth its weight in gold.  If anyone were to give it to me for my birthday or for Christmas, I totally wouldn't mind.

Also, the Mercaba website, a Catholic resource supersite based off of Spain, has both the philosophy and theology manuals of the Spanish Jesuits (both published by B.A.C.) available in html in Spanish translation.

But of course, if we want to do serious theology, we should rather be reading the original Latin.  So here it is below, for free!  Enjoy!!!

(For future convenience, I'm providing permanent links to these and lots more on the "Downloadable PDFs" tab above, so when you need them you can just visit us and download from here.)

-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 1: Theologia Fundamentalis.
-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 2: De Deo Uno, Trino, Creante, Elevante; De peccatis.
-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 3: De Incarnatione; Mariologia; De gratia; De virtutibus.
-Patres S.J. in Hispania. Sacrae Theologiae Summa (BAC), v. 4: De Sacramentis; De novissimis.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 1: Introduction to Theology.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 2: Revelation.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 3: Channels of Revelation.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers, Bk. 4: The Church.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Theologia Dogmatica, v. 1: De Revelatione, De Locis Theologicis, De Deo Uno.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Theologia Dogmatica, v. 2: De Deo Trino, De Deo Creante et Elevante, De Gratia.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Sacramentis in genere.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Baptismo et Confirmatione.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Eucharistia, t. 1,.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Eucharistia, t. 2.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Poenitentia, t. 1.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Poenitentia, t. 2.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Poenitentia, t. 3.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Ordine, t. 1.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Ordine, t. 2.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Ordine, t. 3.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Extremaunctione, t. 1.
-Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Tractatus dogmaticus de Extremaunctione, t. 2.

New Book: John of St. Thomas, The Gifts of the Holy Spirit (Cluny Media, 2016)

New Book: John of St. Thomas, The Gifts of the Holy Spirit (Cluny Media, 2016)

John of St. Thomas, O.P., The Gifts of the Holy Spirit, with an introduction by Cajetan Cuddy, O.P. (Tacoma, WA: Cluny Media, 2016), xiv + 403pp.

To my joy and amazement, Cluny Media just recently reprinted a translation of a section of John of St. Thomas' Cursus Theologicus, dedicated to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. The translation by Dominic Hughes, O.P., was originally published in 1951 by Sheed & Ward under the title, The Gifts of the Holy Ghost.  But it had been long out of print and hard to find.  It is now available from the Cluny Media website for the affordable price of $24.95.  I have been working on a review of this book to submit it for publication in a scholarly journal.  Before I do so I would like to share with you some of my thoughts in draft form.

John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) is not only an exceptionally faithful commentator of St. Thomas' Summa; his Cursus Theologicus is also historically monumental insofar as it is in itself an original Thomistic synthesis, a theological masterpiece in its own right that goes beyond merely commenting on the text of St. Thomas.  For example, whereas St. Thomas treats of the Gifts in many different questions spread throughout the Secunda Pars (Ia-IIae, qq. 68-70; IIa-IIae, qq. 8-9, 19, 45, 52, 121, and 139), John of St. Thomas gathers together the entire discussion of the Gifts into a single Disputatio.  In a sense, the Cursus is the first of the theological manuals, that is, the predecessor to the many Thomistic treatises ad mentem Sancti Thomae of later centuries.  It is historically a turning point between the earlier commentatorial tradition and the later manualist tradition. 

Hughes’ English translation does tone down a bit the scholastic format of the Latin original.  'Articles' are translated into 'chapters', and the questions that John asks in each are rendered as statements or headings. Thus the original scholastic sense of a quest for an answer to a question is lost a bit in translation.  Also lost in translation is John’s constant and explicit reference to the logical structure of the arguments to which he is replying: expressions such as ad primam, major probatur, minor constat, contra est, are either missing, or glossed over in such a way that their logical precision is lost; for instance, ad minorem is paraphrased as "in response to the latter part of this argument."  But these tendencies seem to be almost inescapable among mid-20th century English translations of scholastic works; compare, for example, Garrigou-Lagrange's Beatitude, translated by Patrick Cummins, O.S.B., with Garrigou's original De beatitudine.  For a purist such as myself, this toning-down of the scholastic method is obviously a drawback.  But the relatively free-flowing English text of these translations is designed to appeal to a non-expert audience, and thus opens up a masterpiece from the heart of the Thomistic tradition to a wider readership.  This is surely something positive in its own way (perhaps a mixed blessing of sorts) and, realistically, it is necessitated by the financial imperative of selling more books.  If you want to be a strict 'purist', read the Latin text itself.  For, as the Italians say: "traduttore, traditore."  That said, Hughes' translation includes, over and above the original, very helpful outlines at the beginning of each of his chapters (articles), which are a great aid to the careful student of John’s text.  

            One minor aspect in the reprint that I do find entirely unnecessary and in a way regrettable is the change in title, and together with it the "minor editorial revisions to the original text, including the changing of ‘Holy Ghost’ to ‘Holy Spirit’ throughout."  Not that it is theologically erroneous to say 'Holy Spirit' instead of 'Holy Ghost'. Rather, I just think that the deliberate suppression of traditional Catholic expressions such as this one tends to promote a disconnect with tradition in subsequent generations of Catholics.  This suppression furthers yet a little more the linguistic distance between us and our ancestors in the faith.  It is not so much an issue of preserving a tiny feature of our Catholic language; rather what is at stake is promoting continuity between generations of Catholics.  English-speaking Catholics need to become more familiar with the faith, writings, and modes of expression of their forefathers, not less.  That said, the consistent replacement of the expression ‘Holy Ghost’ throughout the book was to me personally at most only a bit distracting, and did not detract from the sheer joy of holding and reading John of St. Thomas’s commentary on St. Thomas in translation.

         The reprint also includes a brand new introduction by Fr. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P., which aims to show to the average reader the relevance of John of St. Thomas’ work on the Holy Ghost.  Fr. Cuddy here offers a brief apologia of the Thomistic Commentatorial Tradition.  He argues that "truth did not die with Saint Thomas Aquinas in 1274" (p. v), and that this tradition is "a living tradition" because the men who represent it received the "essential first principles of doctrinal purity and cultural engagement from Saint Thomas" and then went on "expeditions through the cultural and intellectual jungles of their own periods" (pp. v-vi).  And John of St. Thomas, whom his contemporaries called ‘another Thomas’, excels among Thomists in that he had a "unique ability to adjudicate difficult questions amidst great confusion without deviating from the truth.  Speculative complexity did not deter or suffocate this Iberian priest" (p. vii).  The translator's introduction to the 1951 edition, also contained in the reprint, includes a rather valuable "historical introduction" to John of St. Thomas, which will prove very helpful to readers seeking to deepen their understanding of the life, work, and times of this great Thomist.

        All in all, Fr. Cajetan Cuddy and Cluny Media have done a great service to English-speaking readers of Thomism and Theology in general by making available again this gem of the Thomistic tradition in translation.  The volume is a great joy to have and to study. I sure hope to see more volumes of this kind in years to come. 

Be sure to look also at Cluny Media's other Thomistic titles, such as Brennan's Thomistic Psychology, as well as several other volumes published in their Thomistic Institute Series.

Quaeritur: Do Angels Undergo Motion?

Quaeritur: Do Angels Undergo Motion?

Quaeritur: If by motion we understand the passing from potency to act, what does the motion of the angels consist in?  It is probably not locomotion, which is circumscribed within space.  I know that in angels there is a distinction between potency and act (because otherwise they would be Pure Act, that is, God, or pure potency, prime matter, which is an ens rationis, if I’m not mistaken).  But what would the actualization of their potencies consist in?  Can an angel learn?  On the other hand, with respect to local motion, as far as I understand there seem to be testimonies in Scripture and in the writings of the saints where angels seem to be have a certain trajectory in space when they interact with corporeal beings.  How is this possible?

Respondeo: First of all, as you say, in angels there is in fact a composition of potency and act.  They are not pure act, as is God, or pure potency, as is prime matter (see St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, Ch. 4).  A separate issue is whether they can move from potency to act.

Further, motion can occur per se within three genera or categories: quality, quantity, and place.  Properly speaking, only mobile being (i.e., material being) is the subject of motion.  But motion can also be understood analogically in reference to incorporeal beings where there is a composition of potency and act.  This applies to both angels and souls. 

However, angels, being incorporeal, do not have quantiative parts, so they can only undergo motion qualitatively (as you say, if they learn), or in place, by assuming different places.  But all this is true only analogically, as compared to the way we ascribe motion to bodies.

St. Thomas, in fact, explicitly ascribes place, and hence motion, to angels, but does so ‘equivocally’:

Summa theologiae Ia, q. 56, a. 1:

Whether an angel can be moved locally?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit moveri localiter. Ut enim probat philosophus in VI Physic., nullum impartibile movetur, quia dum aliquid est in termino a quo, non movetur; nec etiam dum est in termino ad quem, sed tunc mutatum est, unde relinquitur quod omne quod movetur, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem. Sed Angelus est impartibilis. Ergo Angelus non potest moveri localiter.	Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.
Praeterea, motus est actus imperfecti, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Angelus beatus non est imperfectus. Ergo Angelus beatus non movetur localiter.	Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
Praeterea, motus non est nisi propter indigentiam. Sed sanctorum Angelorum nulla est indigentia. Ergo sancti Angeli localiter non moventur.	Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
Sed contra, eiusdem rationis est Angelum beatum moveri, et animam beatam moveri. Sed necesse est dicere animam beatam localiter moveri, cum sit articulus fidei quod Christus secundum animam, descendit ad Inferos. Ergo Angelus beatus movetur localiter.	On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally.
Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus beatus potest moveri localiter. Sed sicut esse in loco aequivoce convenit corpori et Angelo, ita etiam et moveri secundum locum. Corpus enim est in loco, inquantum continetur sub loco, et commensuratur loco. Unde oportet quod etiam motus corporis secundum locum, commensuretur loco, et sit secundum exigentiam eius. Et inde est quod secundum continuitatem magnitudinis est continuitas motus; et secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius et posterius in motu locali corporis, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed Angelus non est in loco ut commensuratus et contentus, sed magis ut continens. Unde motus Angeli in loco, non oportet quod commensuretur loco, nec quod sit secundum exigentiam eius, ut habeat continuitatem ex loco; sed est motus non continuus. Quia enim Angelus non est in loco nisi secundum contactum virtutis, ut dictum est, necesse est quod motus Angeli in loco nihil aliud sit quam diversi contactus diversorum locorum successive et non simul, quia Angelus non potest simul esse in pluribus locis, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem contactus non est necessarium esse continuos. Potest tamen in huiusmodi contactibus continuitas quaedam inveniri. Quia, ut dictum est, nihil prohibet Angelo assignare locum divisibilem, per contactum suae virtutis; sicut corpori assignatur locus divisibilis, per contactum suae magnitudinis. Unde sicut corpus successive, et non simul, dimittit locum in quo prius erat, et ex hoc causatur continuitas in motu locali eius; ita etiam Angelus potest dimittere successive locum divisibilem in quo prius erat, et sic motus eius erit continuus. Et potest etiam totum locum simul dimittere, et toti alteri loco simul se applicare, et sic motus eius non erit continuus.	I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (Question [52], Article [1]), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (Question [52], Article [2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Question [52], Article [1]), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio dupliciter deficit in proposito. Primo quidem, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de indivisibili secundum quantitatem, cui respondet locus de necessitate indivisibilis. Quod non potest dici de Angelo.	Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
Secundo, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de motu continuo. Si enim motus non esset continuus, posset dici quod aliquid movetur dum est in termino a quo, et dum est in termino ad quem, quia ipsa successio diversorum ubi circa eandem rem, motus diceretur; unde in quolibet illorum ubi res esset, illa posset dici moveri. Sed continuitas motus hoc impedit, quia nullum continuum est in termino suo, ut patet, quia linea non est in puncto. Et ideo oportet quod illud quod movetur, non sit totaliter in altero terminorum, dum movetur; sed partim in uno, et partim in altero. Secundum ergo quod motus Angeli non est continuus, demonstratio Aristotelis non procedit in proposito. Sed secundum quod motus Angeli ponitur continuus, sic concedi potest quod Angelus, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem (ut tamen partialitas non referatur ad substantiam Angeli, sed ad locum), quia in principio sui motus continui, Angelus est in toto loco divisibili a quo incipit moveri; sed dum est in ipso moveri, est in parte primi loci quem deserit, et in parte secundi loci quem occupat. Et hoc quidem quod possit occupare partes duorum locorum, competit Angelo ex hoc quod potest occupare locum divisibilem per applicationem suae virtutis sicut corpus per applicationem magnitudinis. Unde sequitur de corpore mobili secundum locum, quod sit divisibile secundum magnitudinem de Angelo autem, quod virtus eius possit applicari alicui divisibili.	Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible.
Ad secundum dicendum quod motus existentis in potentia, est actus imperfecti. Sed motus qui est secundum applicationem virtutis, est existentis in actu, quia virtus rei est secundum quod actu est.	Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
Ad tertium dicendum quod motus existentis in potentia, est propter indigentiam suam, sed motus existentis in actu, non est propter indigentiam suam, sed propter indigentiam alterius. Et hoc modo Angelus, propter indigentiam nostram, localiter movetur, secundum illud Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis.	Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."

Quaeritur: Can Circumstances Change the Species of a Human Act? (Part 2)

Quaeritur: Can Circumstances Change the Species of a Human Act? (Part 2)

(Continued from Part 1.)

Quaeritur: The more I delve into the issue of the moral determinants of a human act, the more mind-racking it seems to get.  I ask you to please answer these questions in your kindness.

- Respondeo per partes.

1)  Is the following proposition true or false? "Moral philosophers/theologians in the scholastic tradition teach that what makes a human act intrinsically evil is the object of the human act because it is the object of the human act that gives the human act its species."

- The proposition is true.

2) What does it mean that an act is intrinsically evil?  What acts are some examples of intrinsically evil acts?

- It means that the object is evil, and therefore, because the object of an act is what gives the act its species, it follows that the act is evil in its species.  Examples of acts that are evil due to their object: any act of murder, theft, lying, etc.

3) Is an intrinsically evil act identical to an act that is “bad in itself”?

- Yes.

4) Is the object of an evil human act ALWAYS "intrinsically" evil?  In other words, can the object of a human act be such that it is evil, but not intrinsically evil?  If so, we then have a human act that is intrinsically evil, but which has an object that is not intrinsically evil, but only evil extrinsically.

- Technically, when we say that an act is intrinsically evil, we mean its object is evil (as opposed to its end or circumstances).  It means the act is evil in its species, i.e., due to its object.  It wouldn't be precise to say that the object of the act is intrinsically evil.  

5) It is said that you can have a human act where the object and end that are good, but the circumstances are evil, thereby making the human act evil.  I cannot think of a case that shows this.  Rather, I am under the impression (based on your first post) that if the circumstance is evil, then it is truly not a circumstance, but a condition of the object.  Therefore, there can never be true circumstances that are evil in and of themselves.  If I am wrong, please provide me with an example.

- Yes, you can have circumstances that render evil an act that is otherwise good (that is, if it is good in its object and its end).  The act would not be intrinsically evil, just evil accidentally.  St. Thomas teaches this, but doesn't seem to give examples in Ia-IIae, q. 18. However, we can easily come up with some examples: pursuing legitimate, pleasurable activities in excess (eating, sex, sleeping, vacationing, etc.); or doing any of these, or anything else, really, at the wrong time, or in the wrong place.  In this case, the act would not be evil in its species, or essentially evil, but only accidentally so.  Still, it would be evil.

"Aquinas' Reception of Albert the Great's Account of the Virtue of Religion"

"Aquinas' Reception of Albert the Great's Account of the Virtue of Religion"

Sts. Albert and Thomas
by Alonso Antonio Villamor (1661-1729)

Today I'd like to share with you, in the video below, something I'm currently working on.  As part of my ongoing project on the philosophical account of religious worship in St. Thomas and his sources (which derives from my doctoral dissertation), I wrote the following paper titled "Aquinas' Reception of Albert the Great's Account of the Virtue of Religion." It was delivered at the 2015 Aquinas and the 'Arabs' Fall North American Workshop, which was held at Universidad Panamericana in Mexico City, October 2015.  For work-related reasons I was unable to attend the conference physically, so I presented it remotely, via video.  You can download a hard copy of the paper from Academia.edu.  It is not-yet published, so I would appreciate your feedback, so I can polish it up and send it to a journal for publication.

NB: It is not a lecture or discussion but an academic paper, which I read in its entirety for an expert audience.  Please do not expect a flashy presentation with engaging voice inflections or even a catchy PowerPoint or images at all.  The audience consisted primarily of philosophy professors and scholars, who mostly work in the field of the history of medieval philosophy; and this is the style in which we present our work in scholarly conferences. However, the paper is, I think, greatly relevant to a non-expert, traditional Catholic audience.  It will be of special interest to those who wish to acquire a more solid, profound, and coherent philosophical (and indirectly theological) understanding of the nature of Catholic liturgy, and of divine worship in general.  Given that the paper seeks to elucidate the Angelic Doctor's teachings on the matter, particularly as compared to that of another great Doctor of the Church, St. Albert the Great.

Abstract: Recent studies have focused on diverse aspects of Aquinas’ philosophical account of natural religion. Few, however, have delved into Aquinas’ use of his sources, especially his more immediate predecessors, in dealing with this topic. This paper seeks to make a contribution in this regard by showing how Albert, his teacher, addressed these questions and prepared the way for Aquinas’ more sophisticated account. The paper aims to shed light on some of the decisions that Aquinas had to make when faced with Albert’s account of latria. Aquinas seems to think that Albert’s arguments settle some issues; but surprisingly he often disagrees with Albert and offers alternative approaches. In particular, we see that for Thomas, Albert settled definitively the question on how religio or latria is to be entirely categorized under the virtue of justice, following the authority of Cicero, and not under the theological virtues, as earlier predecessors had suggested in light of Augustine’s teachings—an issue that has important ramifications for the very possibility of a philosophical account of religious worship. But we also see how, for example, in Aquinas’ mind Albert does not quite offer a satisfactory account of the range of action of the virtue of religion: whereas for Albert there are many virtuous acts that are entirely outside of the virtue of latria, for Aquinas any act of a moral virtue can become also a ‘commanded’ act of the virtue of religio. Ultimately, the paper highlights both the originality of Aquinas’ account of religion and his debt to his master Albert on this issue.

Download a hard copy of the paper and handout (among other things) from my Academia.edu page.

Hot off the Press: "Sacra doctrina as Imperfect Science quoad nos in Thomas Aquinas: New Reflections on the Basis of Recent Critical Editions" Tópicos 52 (2017), 67-87.

Hot off the Press: "Sacra doctrina as Imperfect Science quoad nos in Thomas Aquinas: New Reflections on the Basis of Recent Critical Editions" Tópicos 52 (2017), 67-87.

Here I'm sharing my most recent academic article, which was just published in Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía (Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City).  You can download the original pdf in Spanish from Academia.edu.  

On the basis of lesser-known texts of St. Thomas as found in recent critical editions, I argue that although the science of sacred theology is indeed a science, it is imperfectly so, in St. Thomas' mind, due to its first principles being neither demonstrable nor self-evident quoad nos.  However, I make a defense of the rationality of these principles and the science that builds on them, and towards the end of the article I offer an apologia for the scientific character of sacra doctrina, arguing that its methodology is not unlike that of many other human disciplines (subaltern sciences) whose scientific charater no one doubts.

This one is in Spanish, and no Engilsh translation is available (I have no plans to translate it). But below are the official English title and abstract.

Title: "La sacra doctrina como ciencia imperfecta quoad nos en Tomás de Aquino: Nuevas reflexiones a partir de algunas ediciones críticas recientes"

("Sacra doctrina as Imperfect Science quoad nos in Thomas Aquinas: New Reflections on the Basis of Recent Critical Editions")

Abstract: As is well known, in his Summa theologiae Thomas Aquinas defends from an Aristotelian perspective the scientific nature of sacra doctrina, arguing that it is a science that is subaltern to the knowledge that God has of Himself.  Thomas' interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine on science allows him to argue that the conclusions of sacra doctrina are reducible to the articles of the faith as to its first principles.  What is not well known, however, is that St. Thomas in other texts modifies his view on the way in which sacra doctrina fulfills the requirements for a science.  This has been made evident in part by certain recent critical editions, such as Boyle's edition of the Lectura Romana, and especially by Oliva's edition of the prologue to the Commentary on the Sentences.  Although the articles of the faith are evident in themselves (per se), these texts, seen chronologically, show that throughout his career Aquinas hesitates in acknowledging that from our perspective (quoad nos) the articles of the faith are neither evident nor demonstrable, but are objects of religious faith.  Throughout these texts Aquinas progressively admits that there exists an imperfection in the mode in which we know sacra doctrina in this life (in via); therefore, sacra doctrina in a certain way falls short of the perfect ratio of science, at least quoad nos.

http://goo.gl/Li9vSV