Quaeritur: Difference Between Formal and Total Abstraction

Quaeritur: Difference Between Formal and Total Abstraction

Quaeritur: What is the difference between so-called ‘total abstraction’ and ‘formal abstraction?  If total abstraction consists in abstracting the universal from the particular (e.g., abstracting from a concrete man the universal ‘man’), and formal abstraction consists in abstracting the form from the matter-form composite (e.g., I suppose that from a concrete man, we could abstract his formal ontological structure, that is, his substantial form ‘man’), which places a given being in its species, and which would be similar to the universal---or am I mistaken?  Aren’t they ultimately the same thing?

Respondeo: The difference between these lies in that total abstraction consists, as you say, in abstracting the complete nature of the individual in question (e.g., if we look at a particular tree and abstract the nature of ‘treeness’, or the tree’s proximate genus ‘plant’, or its ultimate genus ‘substance’), whereas formal abstraction consists in isolating, not the whole nature, but merely some partial aspect of the individual, prescinding from its sensible qualities that depend on matter for their definition (as for example, taking the same tree, we can abstractly conceive its geometric shape or figure).  These two types of abstraction, according to modern scholasticism, correspond to natural science and to mathematics, respectively.

Here is a nice explanation from Klubertanz’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Being (2^nd Ed.):

Hot off the Press: "Sacra doctrina as Imperfect Science quoad nos in Thomas Aquinas: New Reflections on the Basis of Recent Critical Editions" Tópicos 52 (2017), 67-87.

Hot off the Press: "Sacra doctrina as Imperfect Science quoad nos in Thomas Aquinas: New Reflections on the Basis of Recent Critical Editions" Tópicos 52 (2017), 67-87.

Here I'm sharing my most recent academic article, which was just published in Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía (Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City).  You can download the original pdf in Spanish from Academia.edu.  

On the basis of lesser-known texts of St. Thomas as found in recent critical editions, I argue that although the science of sacred theology is indeed a science, it is imperfectly so, in St. Thomas' mind, due to its first principles being neither demonstrable nor self-evident quoad nos.  However, I make a defense of the rationality of these principles and the science that builds on them, and towards the end of the article I offer an apologia for the scientific character of sacra doctrina, arguing that its methodology is not unlike that of many other human disciplines (subaltern sciences) whose scientific charater no one doubts.

This one is in Spanish, and no Engilsh translation is available (I have no plans to translate it). But below are the official English title and abstract.

Title: "La sacra doctrina como ciencia imperfecta quoad nos en Tomás de Aquino: Nuevas reflexiones a partir de algunas ediciones críticas recientes"

("Sacra doctrina as Imperfect Science quoad nos in Thomas Aquinas: New Reflections on the Basis of Recent Critical Editions")

Abstract: As is well known, in his Summa theologiae Thomas Aquinas defends from an Aristotelian perspective the scientific nature of sacra doctrina, arguing that it is a science that is subaltern to the knowledge that God has of Himself.  Thomas' interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine on science allows him to argue that the conclusions of sacra doctrina are reducible to the articles of the faith as to its first principles.  What is not well known, however, is that St. Thomas in other texts modifies his view on the way in which sacra doctrina fulfills the requirements for a science.  This has been made evident in part by certain recent critical editions, such as Boyle's edition of the Lectura Romana, and especially by Oliva's edition of the prologue to the Commentary on the Sentences.  Although the articles of the faith are evident in themselves (per se), these texts, seen chronologically, show that throughout his career Aquinas hesitates in acknowledging that from our perspective (quoad nos) the articles of the faith are neither evident nor demonstrable, but are objects of religious faith.  Throughout these texts Aquinas progressively admits that there exists an imperfection in the mode in which we know sacra doctrina in this life (in via); therefore, sacra doctrina in a certain way falls short of the perfect ratio of science, at least quoad nos.

http://goo.gl/Li9vSV

Continence and Incontinence, A Handy-Dandy Table

Continence and Incontinence, A Handy-Dandy Table

The other day in my philosophical psychology course I was teaching my students the differences and mutual relations between (a) sense appetite, (b) the practical intellect, and (c) the will or rational appetite.  I brought up Aquinas' understanding of Aristotle's concept of continence (enkrateia) and incontinence (akrasia) from his Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7, which I think illustrates well these differences and relations.  When the question came up of what exactly is the difference between the virtuous man, the continent man, the incontinent man, and the vicious man, I felt suddenly illuminated and saw myself come up with this nice, clean chart which illustrates the differences.  The ensuing discussion was quite interesting.

The three columns state whether each of the four characters (virtuous, continent, incontinent, and vicious) is inclined towards good (G) or evil (E) by the sense appetite (SA), the intellect or practical reason ('R' is for rational, and 'C' is for cognitive), and the will ('R' is for rational, and 'A' is for appetitive).  So the chart says that the virtuous man is inclined towards good both by his sense appetite and by his (practical) reason, and that he actually chooses good with his will.  The continent man is like the virtuous man, except his sense appetite does not incline him towards the good that he knows and chooses, so there is a certain tension within him: he acts against his sense appetite.  The incontinent man, like the continent man, is inclined towards evil by his sense appetite and yet is capable of knowing the good that he ought to do through practical reason, but unlike the continent man, he chooses evil.  Finally, the vicious man is inclined towards evil, rationalizes his evildoing through practical reason, and chooses evil--in at least one respect he is like the virtuous man, namely, in that there is a certain harmony among his powers, albeit a perverse one.

This may be a somewhat simplistic view of Aquinas' doctrine, but I think it captures the basics pretty well.

Edward Feser: Vallicella on hylemorphic dualism

Edward Feser: Vallicella on hylemorphic dualism

Fesser responds to objections against hylemorphism.

Link to Edward Feser: Vallicella on hylemorphic dualism.

Quaeritur: Aren't You Unfairly Criticizing Gilson?

Quaeritur: Aren't You Unfairly Criticizing Gilson?

From a comment on a previous post:

Alan: Quaeritur: You comment [regarding Bouyer's claim that Aquinas "never systematized" his philosophy separately from his theology, and that he only philosophized in a theological context]: 

"St Thomas's philosophy can be found in his Commentaries on Aristotle exactly in that way: in a non-theological context. Only there, in fact, does it follow its own properly rational principles. The philosophy contained in the Summa is formally theology, and only materially philosophical. This is something that Gilson and his followers are willingly blind to."

I did not get this impression of Gilson when reading his chapter on Faith and Reason in Le Thomisme [English translation: The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas].

He writes:

"Even in the commentaries on Aristotle, his mind always knows where it is going, and there too, it works towards the doctrine of Faith, not as an explanation, but as a completion and counterpoise of mental balance. [...] We do not find in any of his works a body of his philosophical conceptions set out for their own sake and in their rational order. There is indeed a series of writings composed by St. Thomas according to the philosophical method: these are his commentaries on Aristotle and a small number of minor works. But the smaller works give us only a fraction of his ideas and the commentaries on Aristotle, following patiently the meanderings of an obscure text, enable us to guess only imperfectly what a "Summa" of the Thomistic philosophy might have been like, if it had been systematised by St. Thomas himself with that lucidity of genius which dominates his Summa Theologica."

Don Paco: Respondeo dicendum: That text you quote from Gilson is a perfect example of what I'm criticizing in him (and in Bouyer, who is only echoing the Gilsonian position).

The traditional Dominican Thomistic view is that in Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle we do find "a body of his philosophical conceptions set out for their own sake and in their rational order."*

But Gilson rejected this (and this rejection is in fact one of the foundations of his novel form of Thomism). He thinks that Aquinas' commentaries fall short of this description because (a) they are done with theological motives, and hence they are not the work of a philosopher, but the work of a theologian (he thus seems to imply that they are formally theological); and especially because (b) in them, Aquinas is enslaved to "following patiently the meanderings of an obscure text." 

In other words, he sees the commentaries not as a full-fledged philosophical exposition of the philosophical sciences, done according to their own principles, but as a theologian's doxographical (historical) interpretation of an ancient philosopher. Aquinas, in this view, is not acting as a philosopher who, on the occasion of Aristotle's writings, presents his own philosophical positions, but rather, is acting as a theologian who is merely telling us what exactly Aristotle said, regardless of whether he thinks Aristotle is right or not (rather like a modern historian of philosophy does when giving an exposition on Plotinus, Descartes, or whomever else).  Ergo, Gilson concludes, Thomistic philosophers should not draw Aquinas' philosophy from the Commentaries, but from the Summa.  

(To indulge in a bit of caricature, courtesy of one of my former professors: "Aquinas died, and Gilson was born, and everyone in between got it wrong.  Thank God for Gilson, the Thomistic messias.")

Sed contra, Aquinas himself thinks that in Aristotle's works we find a complete corpus of philosophical sciences "set out for their own sake and in their rational order," to use Gilson's very words.  That this is so is evident from Aquinas' division of Aristotle's texts: there, he identifies the Philosopher's divisions with the divisions of the science itself which is being divided.  So, for instance, in the Physics, he will say that Aristotle first treats the principles of mobile being (Book I) and then the principles of the science (Book II), and at the same time he justifies this division, explaining why this has to be done.  (Aquinas engages extensively in this type of philosophical work of dividing sciences at the beginning of each lectio or set of lectiones.  Sadly, these divisiones textus are habitually ignored by many students of Aquinas' commentaries, and are even left out of some translations).  

That Aquinas thought that Aristotle's works represented the philosophical sciences themselves is even more evident from the prooemia to the commentaries.** In other words, Aquinas himself thinks Aristotle's words are not the mere "meanderings of an obscure text" but philosophical science itself done according to its proper philosophical order. The commentaries, then, are Aquinas' own completion and explanation of what he thought was an already-existing "summa of philosophy," as it were.

Because Gilson does not see it this way, he is inclined to regard the Summa theologiae as the most important source for Aquinas' philosophy. Yet the philosophy that he finds in the Summa is not a philosophy that is sought for its own sake; it is not pure philosophy. Rather, it is what Gilson calls "Christian philosophy," philosophy as being exercized within the science of theology. This is why Gilson organizes his entire The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (original French, Le Thomisme) according to the theological order in which philosophical topics are discussed in the Summa theologiae, instead of organizing them in the philosophical order in which St. Thomas himself thinks they should be treated.  Gilson,  therefore, and hence most modern Thomists (who are, whether knowingly or not, influenced by his thought), are abandoning the philosophical methodology of St. Thomas and bringing in his theological methodology into philosophy.***

------------

Notes:

* For an example of this traditional Dominican Thomistic approach to interpreting St. Thomas, see H.D. Gardeil, An Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas 4 vols. available through ITOPL (only vols. 2-4 are in English translation; all four vols. are available in the original French).  See also Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, ch. 1 (also available thorugh ITOPL).

** See especially his prooemium to the Posterior Analytics.  There, he performs an ambitious  division of the whole art of logic into its integral parts, and simultaneously tells the reader which works of Aristotle correspond to which parts of logic.  He does something similar regarding the integral parts of natural science and Aristotle's books on this science in Physics I, lectio 1 (this work does not have a prooemium but simply includes its prefatory material directly in the first lectio).

*** See the prooemia to the Commentaries, as well as the various texts throughout the Commentaries on the Division and Order of the Sciences.  Some scholarly work has been done on the philosophical importance of Aquinas' divisiones textus and prooemia.  A particularly important contribution to the issue has been done  in Spanish: see Jorge R. Morán, "Tomás de Aquino, intérprete de Aristóteles" in Héctor Velázquez (ed.), Tomás de Aquino, Comentador de Aristóteles, Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Panamericana, 2010; pp. 125-154.

 

Gardeil, OP on Aristotelian Mixtures as Substances

Gardeil, OP on Aristotelian Mixtures as Substances

From H.D. Gardeil, OP - An Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 2: Cosmology, pp. 37-39 (available from ITOPL):

Parmenides' Argument against Motion, and the Aristotelian Reply -- In Scholastic Format

Parmenides' Argument against Motion, and the Aristotelian Reply -- In Scholastic Format

Taken from a scholastic disputation from my Natural Science course:

Thesis: “Motion (i.e., change) is impossible”

The Parmenidean Argument:

Major: Motion is a passage from being to non-being and vice-versa.

Minor: But non-being is impossible.

Conclusion: Therefore, motion is impossible.

In support of the premises:

Major: This is posited as the definition of motion.

Minor: Non-being cannot exist, by definition. Therefore, the passage to or from non-being is impossible.

The Aristotelian-Scholastic Reply:

I distinguish the major: that motion is a passage from being secundum quid to non-being secundum quid and vice-versa, I concede; but that motion is a passage from being simpliciter to non-being simpliciter and vice-versa, I deny. Explanation: Motion is a passage from potential being to actual being. Something in potency is being simpliciter and non-being secundum quid: that it to say, something that is in potency is in the fundamental sense of having existence, but it is not in a secondary respect, insofar as it is not yet this or that, it is not such and such. When this thing that is in potency is moved to act, it receives a new modification that it lacked before (or loses what it had before), all the while remaining in existence. Motion does not involve the existence of non-existence, but the modification of what is in existence throughout the motion. This is true not only of accidental change, but also, in its own way, of substantial change (absolute generation and corruption).

I contradistinguish the minor: that the existence of non-being simpliciter is impossible, I concede; but that the existence of non-being secundum quid is impossible, I deny. Explanation: It is certainly impossible for a substance both to exist and not to exist at the same time--this is the primary meaning of the principle of non-contradiction. But it is not impossible for a substance or subject (e.g., matter) to lack a certain form, and hence to be non-being in a certain respect; the latter is a being simpliciter, but is non-being secundum quid, i.e., insofar as it is (exists), but is not such and such.

And I deny the conclusion.

Material Logic: Quia Demonstrations vs. Propter Quid Demonstrations

Material Logic: Quia Demonstrations vs. Propter Quid Demonstrations

From St. Thomas' Summa theologiae I.2.2c:

I answer that it must be said that demonstration is twofold: One which is through the cause, and is called demonstration "propter quid" [lit., 'on account of which'] and this is [to argue] from what is prior simply speaking (simpliciter). The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "quia" [lit., 'that']; this is [to argue] from what is prior relatively only to us (quoad nos). When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us (quoad nos); because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.

From Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I.13:

"Knowledge of the fact (quia demonstration) differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact (propter quid demonstrations). [...] You might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A proximity. Then B is predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. But A is also predicable of B, since that which does not twinkle is near--we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C; so that we have demonstrated that the planets are near. This syllogism, then, proves not the reasoned fact (propter quid) but only the fact (quia); since they are not near because they do not twinkle, but, because they are near, do not twinkle...."

A (major term) = close heavenly body

B (middle term) = non-twinkling heavenly body

C (minor term) = planet

Major Premise: B is A

Minor Premise: C is B

Conclusion: C is A

=

Major Premise: Non-Twinkling heavenly bodies are close heavenly bodies.

Minor Premise: Planets are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (effect).

Conclusion: Planets are close heavenly bodies (cause).

From Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I.13 (cont'd):

"The major and middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact (propter quid). Thus: let C be the planets, B proximity, A not twinkling. Then B is an attribute of C, and A-not twinkling-of B. Consequently A is predicable of C, and the syllogism proves the reasoned fact (propter quid), since its middle term is the proximate cause...."

A (major term) = non-twinkling heavenly body

B (middle term) = close heavenly body

C (minor term) = planet

Major Premise: B is A

Minor Premise: C is B

Conclusion: C is A

=

Major Premise: Close heavenly bodies are non-twinkling heavenly bodies.

Minor Premise: Planets are close heavenly bodies (cause).

Conclusion: Planets are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (effect).