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Dear Professor Romero,
I need your help in understanding the faculty of the passions (affections or emotions). I was told that the passions are rooted in the body. It is the body also in which the temperaments are rooted. The souls in heaven are free from any passion. The thing that I don't understand is that is it not the soul that directs, or at least should direct, the passions. If the soul is then separated from the body, then how can the souls in heaven feel love, hate, etc. Please help this poor fellow in Scholastic Philosophy.
God bless.
-Tony.
Good question, Tony; and a very appropriate one to ask during Passiontide.
First, a little bit of background. There are three kinds of soul. First, there is the vegetative soul, which is proper to plants. This type of soul is very basic in that it only enables its bearer to operate qua vegetative being--viz., to assimilate food, to regenerate cells, and to reproduce.
Second, there is the sensitive soul, which is proper to brute animals. As such, this type of soul has two parts, a vegetative part and a sensitive part, each of which which enables the animal to operate qua vegetative being AND qua sensitive being, respectively--viz., the vegetative part enables the animal to assimilate food, to regenerate cells, and to reproduce (vegetative functions); and the sensitive part enables him to see, smell, hear, touch, and taste, as well as to imagine, to remember and to feel fear, anger, desire, and joy (sensitive functions).
Third, there is the spiritual or rational soul, which is proper to rational animals, i.e., humans. As such, this type of soul has three parts, a vegetative part, a sensitive part, and a spiritual part, each of which which enables the human being to operate qua vegetative being AND qua sensitive being AND qua rational being, respectively--viz., the vegetative part enables the human to assimilate food, to regenerate cells, and to reproduce (vegetative functions); the sensitive part enables him to see, smell, hear, touch, and taste, as well as to imagine, to remember and to feel fear, anger, desire, and joy (sensitive functions); the rational part enables man to understand intellectually and to exercise his will (which are specifically spiritual/rational functions).
So, as you see, the passions, along with the temperaments, are sensitive faculties, which means they reside in the sensitive part of the human soul, or in the sensitive part of the animal soul. In the brute animal soul, the passions (and temperaments?) rein freely and act according to nature and, ultimately, Divine Providence; that's why lions can't abstain from meat on Fridays: they are carnivores and that's what they do, every day of the year--and that's the way nature and Divine Providence intended it. But in man, the rational part must "reach down" to the sensitive part and give it a sort of rational order, so that the passions are acted upon only according to reason. So that we can subdue our cravings when it is appropriate; and also act upon them when appropriate.
As you implied, this sort of rational governing of the passions can only happen here in this life (in via). The reason is this: both the sensitive and the vegetative parts of the human soul are dependent on the body for their existence and operation; all the faculties associated with those two parts reside in the body-soul composite. Consequently, when the body-soul composite is destroyed (at death) these faculties also cease to be. So, yes, that means that the separated (disembodied) soul of St. Peter in heaven cannot assimilate food, or smell, or imagine anything--although Our Lord and Our Lady can because they have glorified bodies. Peter, however, will have to wait until the last day--and so will we--to be able to smell anything again and do other things of the sort. (But don't worry about him not being able to smell: he's in heaven and, somehow, that means he must be having a blast.)
However, the rational part of the soul and its faculties (intellect and will) are completely independent from the body* and thus they remain in the separated soul. So the separated soul of St. Peter in heaven love because love is an act of the will and, as such, it is an exclusively spiritual/rational operation. Similarly, a separated soul in hell can hate because hate is also an act of the will.
*For their existence, not their operation. For their operation, the intellect and will need either the indirect "input" of the senses (down here, in via) or the direct "input" of God's Beatific Vision (up there, in patria).
I hope this helps.
In Domino qui passus est pro nobis,
-FJR.
First, a little bit of background. There are three kinds of soul. First, there is the vegetative soul, which is proper to plants. This type of soul is very basic in that it only enables its bearer to operate qua vegetative being--viz., to assimilate food, to regenerate cells, and to reproduce.
Second, there is the sensitive soul, which is proper to brute animals. As such, this type of soul has two parts, a vegetative part and a sensitive part, each of which which enables the animal to operate qua vegetative being AND qua sensitive being, respectively--viz., the vegetative part enables the animal to assimilate food, to regenerate cells, and to reproduce (vegetative functions); and the sensitive part enables him to see, smell, hear, touch, and taste, as well as to imagine, to remember and to feel fear, anger, desire, and joy (sensitive functions).
Third, there is the spiritual or rational soul, which is proper to rational animals, i.e., humans. As such, this type of soul has three parts, a vegetative part, a sensitive part, and a spiritual part, each of which which enables the human being to operate qua vegetative being AND qua sensitive being AND qua rational being, respectively--viz., the vegetative part enables the human to assimilate food, to regenerate cells, and to reproduce (vegetative functions); the sensitive part enables him to see, smell, hear, touch, and taste, as well as to imagine, to remember and to feel fear, anger, desire, and joy (sensitive functions); the rational part enables man to understand intellectually and to exercise his will (which are specifically spiritual/rational functions).
So, as you see, the passions, along with the temperaments, are sensitive faculties, which means they reside in the sensitive part of the human soul, or in the sensitive part of the animal soul. In the brute animal soul, the passions (and temperaments?) rein freely and act according to nature and, ultimately, Divine Providence; that's why lions can't abstain from meat on Fridays: they are carnivores and that's what they do, every day of the year--and that's the way nature and Divine Providence intended it. But in man, the rational part must "reach down" to the sensitive part and give it a sort of rational order, so that the passions are acted upon only according to reason. So that we can subdue our cravings when it is appropriate; and also act upon them when appropriate.
As you implied, this sort of rational governing of the passions can only happen here in this life (in via). The reason is this: both the sensitive and the vegetative parts of the human soul are dependent on the body for their existence and operation; all the faculties associated with those two parts reside in the body-soul composite. Consequently, when the body-soul composite is destroyed (at death) these faculties also cease to be. So, yes, that means that the separated (disembodied) soul of St. Peter in heaven cannot assimilate food, or smell, or imagine anything--although Our Lord and Our Lady can because they have glorified bodies. Peter, however, will have to wait until the last day--and so will we--to be able to smell anything again and do other things of the sort. (But don't worry about him not being able to smell: he's in heaven and, somehow, that means he must be having a blast.)
However, the rational part of the soul and its faculties (intellect and will) are completely independent from the body* and thus they remain in the separated soul. So the separated soul of St. Peter in heaven love because love is an act of the will and, as such, it is an exclusively spiritual/rational operation. Similarly, a separated soul in hell can hate because hate is also an act of the will.
*For their existence, not their operation. For their operation, the intellect and will need either the indirect "input" of the senses (down here, in via) or the direct "input" of God's Beatific Vision (up there, in patria).
I hope this helps.
In Domino qui passus est pro nobis,
-FJR.
5 comments:
Sed contra
I thought the Thomistic view is that humans have one soul, which includes the vegetative, animal and rational powers.
Other scholastics taught a plurality of souls.)
Right; that's exactly what I'm saying. We have only the third kind of soul, the rational soul, which includes the perfections of the other two kinds, PLUS rational faculties.
Unlike other scholastics, Aquinas subscribed to the unity of substantial forms.
-FJR.
Francisco,
Just thought I'd make a comment. (By the way, I'm a friend of John Heitzenrater's -- I teach philosophy at a small Catholic college in Texas, the College of St. Thomas More, where John is taking classes).
Your answer regarding the passions in the separated soul bothered me somehow. I seemed to remember Thomas saying that the powers do in fact remain even in the separated soul. So I went back to the Summa to verify this -- Thomas does indeed say that the powers that are in the composite as their subject (i.e., the lower powers, since the higher powers -- intelligence and will -- are not in the composite as in their subject) do remain VIRTUALLY in the separated soul, since all the powers of soul are in the soul as in their principle. What I take Thomas to mean is that a certain potentia remains in the separated soul, so that the faculties, rather than ceasing to be simpliciter, cease to be in actu et in potentia secunda (if I may use that phrase).
- Travis Cooper
I stand corrected: they remain in the soul virtually, not actually.
That they "exist" virtually in the separated soul means that the soul, not the body, is the source of these faculties. For their actual existence they require the presence of the body. Hence, if the soul were to become embodied again (through the resurrection), the soul would be again capable of causing these faculties to exist actually again.
With a merely "virtual" existence, however, these faculties cannot operate. Hence, the separated soul undergoes no bodily passions. That was the point I wanted to make.
Here's the text of Aquinas's Summa, Ia.77.8: "I answer that, As we have said already (5,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.
So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ."
Thanks, and say hello to John for me.
-FJR.
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