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I'm currently working on a paper on natural religion in Aquinas. This amazing text from Summa theologiae IIa-IIae has given me much food for thought.
Natural
reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the
defects which he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and direction
from someone above him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to
all under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are
naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in
accordance with man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and
honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode
befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to signify
anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a
dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering
them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make
certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is
what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of
the natural law.[1]
Just think of it: the natural law prescribes the offering of (physical) sacrifices, i.e., the actual immolation of a victim (hostia) to God in recognition of our dependence on him. Since grace far from destroying the natural law perfects it, it follows that our Religion's prescription of offering the sacrifice of the Mass is actually an instance of positive (divine) law specifying the natural law.[2]
So what should we conclude of religions who for some reason or another ultimately deny man's actual need to offer sacrifice to God, such as Islam, post-Christian Judaism, and Protestantism? It seems this could be the foundation for a philosophical argument against the truth (or at least the moral adequacy?) of these religions...
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[1] ST
II-II.85.1c: [N]aturalis
ratio dictat homini quod alicui superiori subdatur, propter defectus quos in
seipso sentit, in quibus ab aliquo superiori eget adiuvari et dirigi. Et
quidquid illud sit, hoc est quod apud omnes dicitur Deus. Sicut autem in rebus
naturalibus naturaliter inferiora superioribus subduntur, ita etiam naturalis
ratio dictat homini secundum naturalem inclinationem ut ei quod est supra
hominem subiectionem et honorem exhibeat secundum suum modum. Est autem modus
conveniens homini ut sensibilibus signis utatur ad aliqua exprimenda, quia ex
sensibilibus cognitionem accipit. Et ideo ex naturali ratione procedit quod
homo quibusdam sensibilibus rebus utatur offerens eas Deo, in signum debitae
subiectionis et honoris, secundum similitudinem eorum qui dominis suis aliqua
offerunt in recognitionem dominii. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem sacrificii.
Et ideo oblatio sacrificii pertinet ad ius naturale.
[2] Cf. ST I-II.95.2c: [S]ciendum est quod a lege naturali dupliciter potest aliquid derivari, uno modo, sicut conclusiones ex principiis; alio modo, sicut determinationes quaedam aliquorum communium. Primus quidem modus est similis ei quo in scientiis ex principiis conclusiones demonstrativae producuntur. Secundo vero modo simile est quod in artibus formae communes determinantur ad aliquid speciale, sicut artifex formam communem domus necesse est quod determinet ad hanc vel illam domus figuram. Derivantur ergo quaedam a principiis communibus legis naturae per modum conclusionum, sicut hoc quod est non esse occidendum, ut conclusio quaedam derivari potest ab eo quod est nulli esse malum faciendum. Quaedam vero per modum determinationis, sicut lex naturae habet quod ille qui peccat, puniatur; sed quod tali poena puniatur, hoc est quaedam determinatio legis naturae. Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege humana posita. Sed ea quae sunt primi modi, continentur lege humana non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid vigoris ex lege naturali. Sed ea quae sunt secundi modi, ex sola lege humana vigorem habent.
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