From Garrigou-Lagrange, De beatitudine, p. 326-7:
"(3) In fact, an action can be simpliciter good according to the aforesaid goodnesses [i.e., object, end, and circumstances], insofar as that which is principal in them is considered, yet it simultaneously can be venially culpable insofar as it sins with respect to something secondary, e.g., on the part of the end or of the circumstances, as Billuart shows in De actibus humanis, dissertation IV, article 4, "Solution to the Objections": An act that is good from the object, the end, and the chief circumstances, such as good preaching, on which supervenes some secondary circumstance that is venially evil, e.g., a slight motion of vanity or slight impatience, is a work that is simpliciter good morally, and meritorious of eternal life, and secundum quid it is venially evil, and to it temporal punishment is due: e.g., a good thomist that defends the doctrine of his Master, but accidentally, in the ardor of discussion exceeds in one word against Molina or Scotus, or against the liberals, his act is simpliciter good, and meritorious of eternal life, but secundum quid it is venially evil, to which temporal punishment is due...."
N.B.: This passage is omitted in the only published English translation, Beatitude, by Fr. Cummings (which is rather a summary than a translation).
N.B.: This passage is omitted in the only published English translation, Beatitude, by Fr. Cummings (which is rather a summary than a translation).
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