Divisio librorum naturalium Aristotelis

Divisio librorum naturalium Aristotelis

Ex S. Thomae Aquinatis In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositione (ed. Marietti), L. I, l. 1:*

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*Available in ITOPL.

Banez, In Divi Thomae Prologum Iae-IIae Meditatio

Banez, In Divi Thomae Prologum Iae-IIae Meditatio

Ex S. Thomae, Summa Theologiae I-II, prooemium:

Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.

Ex Banez, De fine ultimo et actibus humanis (ST I-II.1-18),* in prologum:


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A Little-Known Gem on Natural Philosophy

A Little-Known Gem on Natural Philosophy

From Smith, The General Science of Nature, Preface, pp. vii-viii (available thru ITOPL):

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Acquire some of Vincent Smith's works thru ITOPL!

Aquinas' Division of Aristotle's Physics

Aquinas' Division of Aristotle's Physics

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book I, Lecture 2:

Having completed the preface in which it was shown that natural science ought to begin with the more universal principles, here, according to the order already stated, he begins to pursue those matters which pertain to natural science.

This discussion is divided into two parts. In the first part he treats the universal principles of natural science. In the second part he treats mobile being in common [which is the subject of the science].’ This is taken up in Book III, where he says, ‘Nature has been defined ...’ (200 b 12; L1).

The first part is divided into two parts. First he treats the principles of the subject of this science, that is, the principles of mobile being as such (Book I). Secondly he treats the principles of the science. This he does in Book II, where he says, ‘Of things that exist...’ (192 b 8; L1).

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book II, Lecture 1:

After the Philosopher has treated the principles of natural things in Book I, he here treats the principles of natural science.

Now the things which we ought to know first in any science are its subject [in this case, nature or mobile being] and the method by which it demonstrates [in this case, the four causes].

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book III, Lecture 1:

The treatment [of the subject of the science], then, is divided into two parts:

In the first he concludes with respect to motion in itself (Books III-VI);

In the second he concludes with respect to motion in relation to movers [things moving others] and things movable [things which others move] (Book VII).

The first part is divided into two:

He concludes in regard to motion itself (Books III-IV);

He concludes in regard to its parts (Books V-VI).

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book IV, Lecture 1:

After treating in Book III of motion, and the infinite, which belongs intrinsically to motion insofar as it is in the genus of continuous things, the Philosopher now intends, in Book IV, to deal with the things that are extrinsically connected with motion (place, the void, and time).

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book V, Lecture 1:

After discussing motion and the things that accompany motion in general, the Philosopher now undertakes to give various divisions of motion. And his treatment falls into two parts:

In the first he divides motion into its species [Book V];

In the second he divides motion into quantitative parts in Book VI.

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book VI, Lecture 1:

After the Philosopher has finished dividing motion into its species and discussing the unity and contrariety of motions and of states of rest, he proposes in this Sixth Book to discuss the things that pertain to the division of motion precisely as it is divisible into quantitative parts.

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book VII, Lecture 1:

After discussing motion in itself, and the concomitants of motion, and the division of motion into parts, in the preceding books (III-VI), the Philosopher now begins to treat of motion in its relationship to movers and things moved, i.e., the mobiles. The treatment falls into two parts:

In the first he shows that there is a first motion and a first mover (Book VII);

In the second he investigates the properties of the first motion and of the first mover, in Book VIII.

From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book VIII, Lecture 1:

After showing in the preceding book that it is necessary to posit a first mobile, and a first motion, and a first mover, the Philosopher intends in this present book to inquire after a description of the first mover, and first motion, and first mobile...

Modern Physics and Natural Philosophy

Modern Physics and Natural Philosophy

From Vincent Edward Smith, Philosophical Physics, pp. 4-5:

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Immolatio sui ipsius in Deum

Immolatio sui ipsius in Deum

Noverim me, noverim Te,
Nec aliquid cupiam nisi Te.
Oderim me et amem Te.
Omnia agam propter Te.

Humiliem me, exaltem Te.
Nihil cogitem nisi Te.
Mortificem me et vivam in Te.
Quaecumque eveniant accipiam a Te.

Persequar me, sequar Te,
Semperque optem sequi Te.
Fugiam me, confugiam ad Te,
Ut merear defendi a Te.

Timeam mihi, timeam Te,
Et sim inter electos a Te.
Diffidam mihi, fidam in Te.
Oboedire velim propter Te.

Ad nihil afficiar nisi ad Te,
Et pauper sim propter Te.
Aspice me, ut diligam Te.
Voca me, ut videam Te,
Et in aeternum fruar Te.

Amen.

(S. Augustinus Hipponensis)

Why Study Thomistic Philosophy?

Why Study Thomistic Philosophy?

From Pope Pius XII's encyclical Humani generis (1950):

It is well known how highly the Church regards human reason, for it falls to reason to demonstrate with certainty the existence of God, personal and one [cf. natural theology]; to prove beyond doubt from divine signs the very foundations of the Christian faith [cf. apologetics]; to express properly the law which the Creator has imprinted in the hearts of men [cf. ethics]; and finally to attain to some notion, indeed a very fruitful notion, of mysteries [cf. sacred theology]. (7)

But reason can perform these functions safely and well only when properly trained, that is, when imbued with that sound philosophy which has long been, as it were, a patrimony handed down by earlier Christian ages, and which moreover possesses an authority of an even higher order, since the Teaching Authority of the Church, in the light of divine revelation itself, has weighed its fundamental tenets, which have been elaborated and defined little by little by men of great genius. For this philosophy, acknowledged and accepted by the Church, safeguards the genuine validity of human knowledge, the unshakable metaphysical principles of sufficient reason, causality, and finality, and finally the mind's ability to attain certain and unchangeable truth . . .

If one considers all this well, he will easily see why the Church demands that future priests be instructed in philosophy "according to the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor," (8) since, as we well know from the experience of centuries, the method of Aquinas is singularly preeminent both of teaching students and for bringing truth to light; his doctrine is in harmony with Divine Revelation, and is most effective both for safeguarding the foundation of the faith and for reaping, safely and usefully, the fruits of sound progress.


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Notes:

7. Vatican I (Denzinger 1796).
8. CIC can. 1366, 2.

La Gloriosa Asunción de María Santísima al Cielo

La Gloriosa Asunción de María Santísima al Cielo

Lecturas litúrgicas y sermon del P. Romo, FSSP (Guadalajara)

Lectura del libro de Judit (13:22-25; 15:10)

Bendíjote el Señor, comunicándote su poder, pues por tu medio ha aniquilado a nuestros enemigos. Bendita, oh hija, eres del Dios Altísimo sobre todas las mujeres de la tierra. Bendito sea el Señor, Creador de cielos y tierra, que dirigió tu mano para cortar la cabeza del caudillo de nuestros enemigos; y hoy ha hecho tan célebre tu nombre, que te alabarán perpetuamente cuantos conservaren en los siglos venideros la memoria de los prodigios del Señor; pues no has temido exponer tu vida por tu pueblo, viendo las angustias y la tribulación de tu gente, sino que has acudido a nuestro Dios para impedir su ruina. Tú eres la gloria de Jerusalén, Tú la alegría de Israel, Tú el honor de nuestro pueblo.


Continuación del Evangelio según San Lucas (1:41-50)

En aquel tiempo Isabel fué llena del Espíritu Santo y exclamó en alta voz diciendo: Bendita Tú entre todas las mujeres, y bendito el fruto de tu vientre. ¿Y de dónde a mí que venga a visitarme la Madre de mi Señor? Porque desde el momento en que he oído tu saludo, ha saltado de gozo el infante en mi seno. Feliz Tú porque has creído, porque se cumplirá en ti cuanto te ha dicho Dios. Contestó María: Mi alma engrandece al Señor, y mi espíritu se alegra en Dios mi Salvador; porque ha mirado la humildad de su esclava; por esto, pues, me llamarán dichosa todas las generaciones. Porque ha hecho en mí cosas grandes el que es Todopoderoso y cuyo Nombre es santo; y su misericordia se extiende de generación en generación a los que le temen.

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JMJt

Hoy celebramos la gloriosa Asunción de la Santísima Virgen al cielo. Es un día de la más grande alegría al ver a nuestra amadísima Madre subiendo al cielo, para gozar la visión de Dios mismo, cara a cara; ella que sufrió tanto desde del momento de la Anunciación, sabiendo que su hijo iba a ser el Siervo sufriente, herido por nuestras rebeldías, molido por nuestras culpas, predicho en las profecías de Isaías. ¡Cuánto sufrió Nuestra divina Madre, viendo todas las acciones de la vida de Nuestro Señor en vista del rechazo del Dios hecho carne por este mundo, y su muerte ignominiosa con ladrones sobre una cruz! Y los santos dicen que sus sufrimientos eran los más dolorosos, ya que tenía un corazón más puro y sensitivo, sin haber sido tocada por el pecado original, ni siquiera por pecados veniales, durante toda su vida. Ella también vio el horror del pecado en vista de la profundidad de su conocimiento de la bondad infinita de Nuestro divino Señor, pisada y crucificada por nuestros pecados.

Así eran los dolores que ella llevó por amor de nosotros, por nuestra salvación, como nuestra Corredentora, redimiéendonos junto y subordinado a Cristo, como dijo el Papa Benedicto XV. Pero se dice que su dolor más profundo fueron sus veintitrés años sin su Divino Amor en esta tierra después de su gloriosa Ascensión. No se puede imaginar el inexpresable anhelo que ella tenía de ver a su divino Hijo engalanado en gloria. Un famoso escritor del siglo pasado dijo que su anhelo era tan ferviente que el milagro de su vida no fue su Asunción sino que ella quedó sobre la tierra sin ser consumida y elevada al cielo por causa de la llama de su divino amor. Por lo tanto, su gloriosa Asunción fue más bien una cesación de un milagro.

¿Y porqué la dejó Dios en esta tierra hasta sus setenta y dos años, cuando ha arrancado a santos menos perfectos en amor, cuando tenían solo veinte y pico años, como santa Teresa del Niño Jesús? Su santidad Pío XII nos explicó que su gloriosa Asunción es una gran esperanza para nosotros, una prueba de lo que podemos esperar también, a saber, que la corrupción de la muerte ha sido conquistada por la resurrección, y este ser mortal será revestido de inmortalidad. De la misma manera, y más intima para nosotros, es el ejemplo de sus veintitrés años aquí abajo, buscando la faz de Dios. Esto nos propone la Oración, poniendo en suma la lección de este divino misterio, “os rogamos nos concedáis que, atentos siempre a las cosas del cielo, merezcamos participar de su gloria.” Esta es la regla de la vida y del alma cristiana: buscar la faz de Dios, y no estar contento con nada más, ni con los gozos de esta tierra, ni con los gozos espirituales de la vida espiritual. Es la regla entonces para todos, para los principiantes en el camino purgativo, y para los avanzados en el camino unitivo, que nuestra beatitud no consiste en ninguna criatura, ni espiritual ni terrenal. “Nada, nada, nada, y aun en el monte nada,” dice San Juan de la Cruz sobre el camino de la perfección, y sobre la necesidad de poner nuestro corazón, nuestro tesoro, en nada salvo Dios. No nos podemos quedar contentos evitando pecados mortales, asistiendo a la misa cada día, disfrutando un sabor de recogimiento en momentos de oración, si Nuestra Señora, que era más santa en el primer momento de su Inmaculada Concepción que todos los santos y ángeles juntos en la gloria–así dice el gran teólogo, no propenso a exageración, Padre Garrigou-Lagrange, explicando los principios de la bula papal sobre la Inmaculada Concepción)—y quien creció en virtud de manera exponencial en cada momento, haciendo obras perfectas de caridad, al fin de su vida suspiró lánguidamente para apartarse de este valle de lágrimas, en que no se halla nuestro único fin, el único deseo de nuestro corazón, el único bien que nos satisfará, la visión de Dios cara a cara.

Muchos pasan su vida entera buscando el sentido de la vida. ¡Esto es! No perdamos nuestro tiempo, preguntándonos en qué dirección debemos ir. Sino más que bien, aprendámoslo de la vida de Nuestra Señora, y de pecadores como nosotros, como San Agustín descubrió, habiendo buscado su felicidad en los placeres de la carne, en la sabiduría humana, y en sí mismo. ¿Y qué dijo al fin?

Grande sois, Señor, y muy digno de toda alabanza, grande es vuestro poder, e infinita vuestra sabiduría: y no obstante eso, os quiere alabar el hombre, que es una pequeña parte de vuestras criaturas: el hombre que lleva en sí no solamente su mortalidad y la marca de su pecado, sino también la prueba y testimonio de que Vos resistís a los soberbios. Pero Vos mismo lo excitáis a ello de tal modo, que hacéis que se complazca en alabaros; porque nos criasteis para Vos, y está inquieto nuestro corazón hasta que descanse en Vos.

Reina asunta a los Cielos: ¡Ruega por nosotros!

AMDG

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Fr. Romanoski: Traditional Mass Back to Mexico

Fr. Romanoski: Traditional Mass Back to Mexico

Link / Photos.

Logic I, Lesson 12: The Categories of Relation and Quality

Logic I, Lesson 12: The Categories of Relation and Quality

From Aristotle's Categories, 7-8:

[The Category of Relation.] Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. [...]

[The Category of Quality.] By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such.

Quality is a term that is used in [four] senses. (a) One sort of quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'.

Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.

By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.

It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.

Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.

Another sort of quality is (b) that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity.

A third class within this category is that of (c) affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.

The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.

Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these.

Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.

In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.

Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.

The fourth sort of quality is (d) figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.

Domingo decimotercero después de Pentecostés

Domingo decimotercero después de Pentecostés

Lecturas litúrgicas y sermón por el P. Romo, FSSP (Guadalajara)

Lectura de la Epístola de San Pablo a los Gálatas (3:16-22)

Hermanos: Las promesas fueron dichas a Abrahán y al descendiente de él. No se dice: “Y a los descendientes de él,” cual si se tratase de muchos, sino como uno precisamente: Y al descendiente de ti, el cual es Cristo. Esto significa que, habiendo hecho Dios una alianza con Abrahán en debida forma, la Ley que fue hecha 430 años después, no la abroga, ni anula la promesa. Porque si la herencia se nos da por la ley, ya no es por la promesa. Y dios hizo por medio de la promesa la donación a Abrahán. Pues entonces diréis: ¿Para qué ha servido la ley? Púsose como freno de las transgresiones, hasta que viniese el descendiente de Abrahán, a quien había hecho la promesa, promulgada por Ángeles por medio de un mediador. Mas el mediador no es para uno solo, y Dios estaba solo cuando hizo la promesa. ¿Luego la Ley es contra las promesas de Dios? No. Porque si la Ley pudiese dar la verdadera vida, la justificación vendría verdaderamente de la Ley. Mas la Ley escrita dejó todas las cosas sujetas al pecado, para que la promesa fuese dada a los creyentes por la fe en Jesucristo.


Continuación del Santo Evangelio según San Lucas (17:11-19)

En aquel tiempo: Yendo Jesús a Jerusalén, pasaba por medio de Samaría y de Galilea. Y al entrar en una aldea, le salieron diez leprosos, los cuales se pararon lejos y alzaron la voz, diciendo: Jesús, Maestro, apiádate de nosotros. El, al verlos, dijo: Id y mostraos a los sacerdotes. Y aconteció que mientras iban, quedaron sanos. Y uno de ellos, cuando vio que había quedado limpio, volvió glorificando a Dios a grandes voces, y se postró en tierra a los pies de Jesús, dándole gracias; y éste era samaritano. Jesús dijo entonces: ¿Pero no son diez los curados? ¿Y los otros nueve dónde están? No ha habido quien volviese a dar gloria a Dios, sino este extranjero. Y le dijo: “Levántate, vete, porque tu fe te ha salvado.”

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“y se postró en tierra a los pies de Jesús, dándole gracias”

El evangelio de hoy nos propone que consideremos el gran deber de dar gracias. Muchas veces usamos la palabra “gracias” con nuestro prójimo que nos ayuda, y con razón, porque Santo Tomás nos explica que es un deber y no una cosa gratuita. El explica además que la virtud de la gratitud es parte de la justicia, a través de la cual le damos a alguien lo que le debemos. Pero dirán Uds. ¿como una mera palabra de “gracias” corresponde a una obra de un bienhechor que nos da algo precioso? Por esa misma razón se exige algo más que una mera palabra. Se exige un espíritu y una expresión de honor. Honor es un bien espiritual, que vale más que una cosa material. Es un reconocimiento y profesión del valor y de la excelencia de otra persona. Esta se ve en ellos que están bien listos de separarse de su dinero por causa de honor, por motivos honestos o vanos. Honesto si es para recibir el honor de Dios, y vano si es para recibir el honor de los hombres, por una bondad que no existe en una persona realmente o si es para recibir el honor de hombre como un fin ultimo, que es tan veleidoso como aquel de la muchedumbre que estaba alabando a Nuestro Señor durante su entrada a Jerusalén, quienes unos días después, reclamaron el derramamiento de su divina sangre. Sin embargo, el honor es algo justo, y debido a una persona por otras en reconocimiento de su bondad, de obras o de carácter. Y si no damos gracias de palabra y espíritu, pecamos contra esta virtud.

¿De donde viene entonces la tentación de ingratitud? Hay un dicho, “lo que se tiene no se aprecia,” o quizá mejor explicado en el dicho inglés “familiaridad engendra desprecio,” que es decir que lo que se tiene en una forma permanente, no se aprecia como un regalo, sino como algo que se nos debe. Así los pecados contra esta virtud se encuentran con más frecuencia entre nuestros familiares. Santo Tomás dice que, luego de Dios, la gratitud se le debe más a nuestros padres que nos dieron vida, y nos educaron. Pero cuantas veces nos olvidamos de dar gracias a nuestros padres, dando por sentado las obras que hicieron. Y luego al ser padres se dan cuenta cuánto les costó dar su vida y casí todo su tiempo para criar bien a sus hijos. Cuántas comidas, cuántas horas de trabajo, cuántas noches pasadas tan preocupados por el bienestar de sus hijos, y sin que les dieran las “gracias.” Ellos van a darse cuenta un día, los padres dicen. Pero ahora démonos cuenta a nosotros de lo que siente Dios, al ver quien con ninguna obligación El creó el mundo sin obligación alguna, nos dio nuestra sustancia, proveyendo un universo entero a nuestro servicio, sosteniéndonos a todos nosotros en existencia cada instante. Es verdad que si él no nos considerara por un momento dejaríamos de existir. ¿Y nuestra respuesta? se lee en el Viernes Santo, “por tu amor castigué a Egipto con sus primogénitos; y tu me entregaste, después de azotarme...Yo abrí ante ti los mares, y tú has abierto mi costado con la lanza...Yo te alimenté con el maná en el desierto; y tú me has herido con bofetadas y azotes... Yo te ensalcé con gran poder; y tú me colgaste del árbol de la Cruz... Pueblo mío, ¿qué te he hecho, o en qué te he contristado? Respóndeme.”

¿Que hacemos? Dios se ha vuelto loco de amor para cautivar nuestro corazón, ¿y cómo respondemos? San Francisco pasó muchas noches preguntándose, “¿porqué el amor no se ama?” Y continúa ebrio de amor, sometiéndose y ofreciéndose a nosotros, sus asesinos, por medio de su cuerpo celestial y su divina sangre, como nuestro pan y bebida. ¡Pero cuántas hay las comuniones sacrílegas! En mi país casí todos reciben sin confesarse, y muchos ni tan siquiera creer en Jesús Sacramentado. Así recibe El el beso de Judas de nuevo. Pero Dios, previendo todo eso, quiso entregarse así sin embargo, para ser amado y glorificado en nuestra alma. ¿Y qué dijo 1600 años después de entregarse a nosotros en el Santísimo Sacramento? Le dijo a Santa Margarita María “He aquí el Corazón que tanto ha amado a los hombres y que no ha ahorrado nada hasta el extremo de agotarse y consumirse para testimoniarles su amor. Y, en compensación, sólo recibe, de la mayoría de ellos, ingratitudes por medio de sus irreverencias y sacrilegios, así como por las frialdades y menosprecios que tienen para conmigo en este Sacramento de amor.”

Seamos los amigos de Nuestro Señor entonces, y démosle la acción de gracias debida cuando lo recibimos en el Sacramento de Sí mismo. Y qué precioso para nosotros también es este tiempo después de comulgar, cuando el Rey del cielo delante del cual todos los ángeles gloriosos tiemblan, habita en nosotros, ofreciéndole a nuestra flaqueza su omnipotencia, a nuestra ceguera su omnisciencia, a nuestro corazón tan frío, su divino amor y bondad infinita. ¡Como debemos apreciar este momento cuando tenemos nuestro Señor Sacramentado en nosotros, un momento en que aunque los serafines nos envidian, un momento que no dura siempre.

San Alfonso dijo “No hay oración más agradable a Dios o más provechosa para el alma que aquella que se hace durante la acción de gracias después de comulgar. Es la opinión de muchos serios escritores que el Santísimo Sacramento, mientras la especie sacramental está presente, produce constantemente gracias más y más grandes en el alma, siempre y cuando el alma sea constante en disponerse por medio de nuevos actos de virtudes.” Santa María Magdalena de Pazzi, dijo, “los minutos que siguen después de comulgar son los más preciosos de nuestra vida.” Y San Luís de Montfort dijo, “no dejaría esta hora de acción de gracias ni siquiera por una hora de paraíso.”

No les diré que hay un límite de tiempo, aunque dicen por lo general que la especie sacramental continúa presente por 15-30 minutos, hasta que los accidentes se corrompen y Nuestro Señor ya no está presente sacramentalmente, porque hay tiempos en nuestra vida cuando tenemos que irnos para cumplir con los deberes de nuestra vida, y por eso debemos pensar lo mejor de nuestro prójimo, si alguien necesita irse. Pero no nos encontremos como la mujer que por ninguna razón, sino mas por su indiferencia se iba inmediatamente después de comulgar. San Felipe Neri mandó a sus acólitos que la acompañaran en procesión con sus velas y todo, para hacerla recordar que Nuestro Señor estaba presente todavía en su cuerpo, tal y como lo está en la custodia. Es una cuestión de prioridad entonces, y daremos cuenta a Dios que lo sabe todo, y que no se engaña. No busquemos el mínimo, sino amar a Dios, “con todo tu corazón, y con toda tu alma, y todas tus fuerzas, y todo tu entendimiento.” Y que Dios nos libre de oír las palabras apártate de mí porque no te conozco, aunque lo hayamos recibido muchas veces. Mas bien, que nos encontremos como Nuestra Señora dando gracias a Dios, en cada momento, teniendo la Palabra de Dios en su corazón inmaculado, diciendo siempre después de sus comuniones, como San Luís de Montfort nos dice, “mi alma engrandece al Señor. Y mi espíritu rebosa de gozo en Dios, mi Salvador.”

Animémonos también a cumplir no sólo con el deber de la justicia sino también con el deber de la caridad según lo que nos enseña Santo Tomas, que el débito de la gratitud no sólo se deriva de la justicia sino también, “se deriva de la caridad, la que cuanto más se paga más es debida, según aquello (Rom 13:8): ‘No debáis nada a nadie, sino que os améis los unos a los otros.’ Y, por tanto, no resulta inconveniente que la obligación de la gratitud sea interminable.” (2-2 q.106 a.6 ad 2)

Así vemos que la gratitud cristiana nunca se cumple, sino que queda como el vínculo interminable que nos junta en amistad el uno al otro y a Dios por toda una eternidad. Así preparémonos en cada comunión, porque después de la última misa así será la eternidad, postrandonos en el cielo a los pies de Jesús, dándole gracias.

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AMDG

Logic I, Lesson 11: The Category of Quantity

Logic I, Lesson 11: The Category of Quantity

From Aristotle's Categories, 6:

Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.

Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place.

In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.

The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.

A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.

Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common boundary.

Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not.

Logic I, Lesson 10: The Category of Substance, Pt. 3

Logic I, Lesson 10: The Category of Substance, Pt. 3

From Aristotle's Categories, 5:

[Substance is not present in a subject.] It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.

[Difference is not present in a subject.] Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.

[Substances and Parts of Substances.] The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole' [cf. Lesson 7].

From Aquinas' Summa theologiae I.75.2 ad 1:

[Substances and Parts of Substances.] "This something" (Lat., hoc aliquid; Gr., tode ti) [i.e., primary substance] can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this something" in the first sense, but not in the second.

Logic I, Lesson 9: The Category of Substance, Pt. 2

Logic I, Lesson 9: The Category of Substance, Pt. 2

From Aristotle's Categories, 5:

[Primary & Secondary Substance, cont'd.] Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was 'man' than by stating that he was 'animal', for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox.

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances.

Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.

Logic I, Lesson 8: The Category of Substance, Pt. 1

Logic I, Lesson 8: The Category of Substance, Pt. 1

From Aristotle's Categories, 5:

[Primary & Secondary Substances, Revisited.] Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore--that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal--are termed secondary substances.

[Predication with Regard to Substances and Accidents.] It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject [i.e., accidents], it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called 'white': the definition, however, of the colour white is never predicable of the body.

[The Primacy of Primary Substances.] Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', and therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

Logic I, Lesson 7: Substances & Accidents

Logic I, Lesson 7: Substances & Accidents

Summary: A substance is something that exists in itself and not in another. It can be an individual reality, such as the individual man Socrates, or a universal concept, such as "man" in general. An accident is something that exists, not in itself, but in a substance. It can be an individual reality, such as the particular fact that I am 6'1', or a universal concept, such as "height" in general.

From Aristotle's Categories 2 (notes added in brackets):

[Secondary or Universal Substances.] Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.

(By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject [e.g., as whiteness cannot exist apart from a white thing].)

[Primary or Individual Accidents.] Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.

[Secondary or Universal Accidents.] Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, ["knowledge"] is predicable of grammar [i.e., one can both say "grammar is knowledge" and "knowledge is in the mind"].

[Primary or Individual Substances.] There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject [i.e., because it is the subject], such as the individual man or the individual horse.

[Rejoinder.] But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit [i.e., whether substance or accident] is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such [i.e., the individual accident] being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

From Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categories, Pt. 1, Ch. 2:

[Secondary or Universal Substances.] He said: some beings are predicated of a subject and are not in a subject. That is, some make known the substance and quiddity of everything of which they are predicated and in no way make anything external [i.e., accidental] to the substance of a subject known. This is the general [i.e., universal] substance, like animal and man. For if they are both predicated of something, they make known its substance and essence--nothing external to its essence.

[Primary or Individual Accidents.] Some are in a subject [...] and cannot be [...] in any way predicated of a subject [...]. This is the designated individual accident--like this designated blackness and this designated whiteness existing in this designated body, since every color is in a body.

[Secondary or Universal Accidents.] Some are predicated of a subject and are also in a subject [...]. This is the general [or universal] accident--like our predicating knowledge of the soul and of writing, for we say "writing is knowledge" and "knowledge is in the soul." So, when we predicate it of writing, it makes its substance known, since it is its genus and may appropriately be given in response to "what is writing?" When it is predicated of the soul and it is said "in the soul there is knowledge," it makes known something external to the soul's essence.

[Primary or Individual Substances.] Some are neither predicated of a subject--that is, as predicates that make its substance known--nor in a subject--that is, predicated of a subject so as to make anything external [i.e., accidental] to its substance known. And this is the designated individual substance, like Zayd and ‘Amr.* It is not predicated of anything in a natural manner, neither as a predicate which makes the substance of the subject known nor as a predicate that does not make it known.

[Rejoinder.] On the whole, substance, whether it be general or individual, is that which is not in a subject at all. And on the whole, accident, whether it be general or individual, is that which is in a subject. And on the whole, the general [i.e., universal], whether it be a substance or an accident, is that which is said of a subject [i.e., as a predicate]. On the whole, the individual, whether it be an accident or a substance, is that which is not said of a subject.

Thus universal substance is distinguished from individual substance in that universal substance is said of a subject and individual substance is not. And individual accident is distinguished from universal accident in that universal accident is said of a subject and individual accident is not.

[*NB. Whereas Aristotle typically uses the name "Socrates" as his example of an individual man, Averroes uses the names "Zayd" and "‘Amr," which are rather common names in Arabic.]

Domingo duodécimo después de Pentecostés

Domingo duodécimo después de Pentecostés

Lecturas liturgicas con sermón por el P. Romo, FSSP (Guadalajara)

Lectura de la 2a Epístola de San Pablo a los Corintios (3:4-9):

Hermanos: Tal confianza tenemos en Dios por Cristo, no porque podamos pensar algo bueno como propio nuestro, sino que nuestra suficiencia nos viene de Dios; el cual nos ha hecho idóneos ministros del Nuevo Testamento, no de la letra, sino del espíritu; porque la letra mata, mas el espíritu vivífica. Pues si el ministerio de muerte, grabado con letras sobre piedras, fue tan glorioso, que no podían los hijos de Israel fijar la vista en el rostro de Moisés, por el resplandor de su cara, que no era duradero, ¿como no ha de ser sin comparación más glorioso del ministerio del Espíritu? Porque si el ministerio de la Ley de condenación fue acompañado de tanta gloria, mucho más glorioso es el ministerio de justicia.


Continuación del Santo Evangelio según San Lucas (10:23-37):

En aquel tiempo: Dijo Jesús a sus discípulos: Dichosos los ojos que ven lo que vosotros veis. Porque os digo, que muchos Profetas y Reyes quisieron ver los que vosotros veis, y no lo vieron, oír lo que vosotros oís, y no lo oyeron. Levantóse en esto un doctor de la Ley, y le dijo por tentarle: Maestro, ¿qué haré para poseer la vida eterna? Y él le dijo: ¿Qué es lo que se halla escrito en la Ley? ¿qué es lo que en ella lees? Respondió él: Amarás al Señor tu Dios con todo tu corazón, y con toda tu alma, y todas tus fuerzas, y todo tu entendimiento; y a tu prójimo como a ti mismo. Bien has respondido, díjole Jesús, haz eso y vivirás. Mas él, queriendo pasar por justo, dijo a Jesús: Y ¿quién es mi prójimo? Entonces Jesús, tomando la palabra, dijo: Un hombre bajaba de Jerusalén a Jericó, y cayó en manos de unos ladrones, los cuales le despojaron, y después de haberlo herido, lo dejaron medio muerto, y se fueron. Llegó a pasar por el mismo camino un sacerdote; y aunque le vio, pasó de largo. Asimismo un levita, y llegando cerca de aquel lugar, y viéndole, pasó también de largo. Mas un viajero samaritano se llegó cerca de él; y cuando le vio, movióse a compasión. Y acercándose, le vendó las heridas, echando en ellas aceite y vino; y montándole en su jumento, lo llevó a una venta, y le cuidó. Y al día siguiente sacó dos denarios, y diólos al posadero, diciéndole: Cuídamelo, y cuanto gastares de más, yo te lo abonaré cuando vuelva. ¿Cuál de estos tres te parece que fue el prójimo de aquél, que cayó en manos de los ladrones? Respondió el doctor: El que usó con él de misericordia. Díjole Jesús: pues vete, y haz tú otro tanto.

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Sermón del P. Romo, FSSP

Hoy celebramos el duodécimo domingo después de Pentecostés, y nuestra Santa Madre Iglesia nos propone, delante de nuestros ojos, el gran don de la caridad.

Muchos hablan, y cantan de amor, pero pocos lo conocen, y menos lo practican. Es preciso pues tener un entendimiento correcto de la caridad, ya que las Escrituras nos dicen que la caridad es la cosa más importante en nuestra alma, y de hecho dicen además que Dios es caridad.

Primero hacemos una distinción entre mero amor y la divina caridad. Muchos hablan de un amor sensitivo, un amor que se puede tener hacia la comida, las películas, la música, los placeres de este mundo, y entre seres humanos, pero estos amores muchas veces son amores más corporales, los cuales podemos encontrar también en los animales, o en la gente que vive como paganos, fuera de la Iglesia, el cuerpo místico de Cristo. Estos placeres son, de veras, esenciales a nuestra vida, como seres humanos, animales-racionales, pero no es lo mismo que el amor divino, la caridad.

La caridad sólo entra en el alma por la gracia santificante, cuando Dios justifica al alma y la hace una morada de Sí mismo, un sagrario de la Santísima Trinidad, que hace al alma más gloriosa y resplendente que el santo rostro de San Moisés, quien habló con Dios cara a cara. Es un don gratuito entonces, y un don sin comparación.

Santo Tomas nos dice que la gota más pequeña de la gracia de Dios, que podemos recibir por una pequeña obra de caridad, sea levantando un alfiler del piso o diciendo una palabra amable por el amor de Dios, vale más que todas las riquezas del universo entero. Pues, ¿cómo podemos cambiar la Bondad infinita por un placer que pasa? Es una ofensa infinita, a la cual aun los eternos fuegos del infierno no corresponden, dice Santo Tomás.

Animémosnos entonces a preservar y aumentar este gran tesoro. Pero, ¿cómo? Santo Tomas nos propone una dificultad, notando que, si el objeto o propósito de esta virtud es el amor de Dios mismo, ¿cómo podemos tener caridad a nuestro prójimo, nosotros que somos meras criaturas? Él contesta explicando que, aun cuando amamos a nuestro prójimo, lo amamos por el amor de Dios, a saber, para aumentar la imagen y semejanza de Dios en su alma, a la mayor gloria de Dios. ¡Qué diferente es la virtud de la caridad, de la caridad de los socialistas, humanistas, masones, secularistas, y liberales, que aunque a veces concuerdan con las obras exteriores de caridad, no tienen ningún motivo de dirigir su obra hacia Dios, Quien le daría a sus obras un valor eterno y sobrenatural! Pues, el motivo de cada uno debe ser siempre teocéntrico, según el cual daremos cuenta a Dios en el juicio final: el padre de la familia, más que nadie, según su apoyo a la familia como su modelo de santidad, y su cabeza espiritual; la madre según la educación que le da a los hijos en la fe y disciplina en la virtud; el hijo según su obediencia a sus padres, como a Dios, de quien toda la autoridad viene; los gobernadores de estados según sus esfuerzos de proveer una cultura en la cual la gente pueda salvar sus almas con más facilidad, teniendo familias grandes, evitando las ocasiones de pecado, practicando virtudes sobrenaturales, divulgando la única fe, y no permitiendo la divulgación de la herejía. Así era en la edad de Cristiandad, cuando el gobierno cumplió con su tarea de proveer por el bienestar de sus sujetos, prohibiendo la práctica externa de las sectas y religiones falsas, y la vista de cosas impuras. Pero ahora vemos a la Iglesia, y a Dios incluso, subordinados al hombre y al estado, y para ser caritativo en el sentido masónico, se exige tolerancia, que es nada más que un pretexto de pecar y abusar la libertad, y exterminar la imagen y semejanza de Dios sobre la tierra. Así es el error de modernidad al cual no podemos nunca conformarnos. ¡Ay de él, que aparecerá delante del Dios verdadero, habiéndolo llamado una “opinión”!

Una verdadera tolerancia no echa hacia el lado el deber de dirigir todo a Dios. Es nada más que una aplicación de la prudencia, tener paciencia con la flaqueza de otras personas o esperar la oportunidad más provechosa para decirle o hacerle algo a nuestro prójimo, evitando un peor mal que podríamos causar por apresurarnos.

La caridad implica entonces la prudencia y todas demás las virtudes, si es verdadera caridad. De hecho, es la forma de todas las virtudes, que les da a cada una su valor sobrenatural. Pues San Agustín dijo, “ama a Dios y haz lo que quieras,” que es decir que si amas a Dios con todo tu corazón y toda tu alma, vas a hacer lo que es agradable a Dios, y en esto se ve la virtud real, cuando hacemos el bien con mucho gusto. Esa es la libertad de los hijos de Dios. Y al revés, la caridad no puede existir sin las otras virtudes, que le sirven como su material. Y no existirá jamás si pecamos contra las otras virtudes. Así fue condenada la teoría moral, de la “opción fundamental,” que decía que no podemos cometer un pecado grave, si tenemos una disposición general de amar a Dios e ir al cielo. Pero es una mentira contra lo que nos dijo Jesús, a quien ellos fingen amar, “si me amáis, guardaréis mis mandamientos y vosotros sois mis amigos, si hacéis lo que yo os mando.” Si no cumplimos con los diez mandamientos explicados por nuestro Señor como una aplicación del amar a Dios con todo el corazón, mentimos. Si no queremos lo que Él quiere, no lo amamos. Y también, si no aborrecemos lo que Dios aborrece, no tenemos caridad tampoco. La caridad real, entonces, exige un gran odio del mal. No podemos ser indiferentes a lo que ofende a Dios, al pecado y a la pérdida de tantas almas. Eso no sería divina caridad, sino la falsa caridad del liberalismo. Dios nos ha dado el ejemplo de los Levitas, los elegidos del Señor, ya que estaban listos de ejecutar a sus parientes que ofendieron a Dios gravemente, cuando Dios se lo pidió de ellos. ¡Primero Dios!

Pero aquí también, aunque la caridad es teocéntrica, implica un amor de todas las cosas por el amor de Dios, como las Escrituras dicen, “el que no ama a su hermano, a quien ve, no es posible que ame a Dios, a quien no ve.” Es una regla para examinar el progreso de la caridad. Cuando las hermanas le preguntaron a Sta. Teresa de Ávila, si estaban creciendo en la santidad, ella no les refirió a un examen de su oración, sino a su paciencia y mansedumbre, sus obras de caridad para con sus hermanas, y especialmente el gozo con que ellas sufren insultos o malentendidos. Es una piedad superficial ser muy devoto a las oraciones y a la Iglesia, pero luego muy corajudo o deshonesto en el trabajo o impaciente con los miembros de nuestra familia o indiferente a los más pobres del Señor. Es la misma regla que nuestro divino Señor le dio a una monjita que estaba profesando su amor por Él, y le preguntaba si fuera posible que hubiera alguien en el mundo con más amor por Él que ella. Él le dijo, “¿quieres saber cuánto me amas?” “Sí, mi Señor, decidme,” respondiole ella. Y el Señor le dijo, “me amas tanto como a la persona que menos amas.” Así es en realidad, ya que el motivo de caridad con cada persona es lo mismo, aunque hay una jerarquía de deberes de mostrar la caridad a nuestro país, familia, amigos, etc., pero en cada caso no depende de su personalidad, ni amabilidad, mas sólo del amor de Dios, para que Dios sea todo en todos. Así era el amor de Santa María Goretti por su asesino, obteniéndole flores del cielo por su conversión; así era el amor de la Madre de Dios, que pidió la conversión de esta tierra pagana, tan digna de exterminación que hasta ofrecía sacrificios humanos. Así fue su amor al pié de la cruz, cuando rogaba por nosotros pecadores. “Pues vete, y haz tú otro tanto.”

Madre del amor puro: ruega por nosotros.
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AMDG

Logic I, Lesson 6: The Ten Categories (in general)

Logic I, Lesson 6: The Ten Categories (in general)

Introduction: The ten "categories" or "predicaments" (praedicamenta)--to be distinguished from the predicables (praedicabilia)--are the ten ultimate genera (genera generalissima) into which terms may be classified. They are "ultimate" because they are not themselves part of a more universal genus "being." Hence every term that signifies a real being* is reducible to one of these ten; e.g., "horse" is reducible to substance, "swimming" to action, "science" to quality, etc.

*NB. As we will see in the science of metaphysics, two exceptions must be made: God and the transcendentals ("being," "good," "truth," "oneness"--terms which refer to beings existing throughout all the categories and hence "transcend" the categories) cannot be classified as belonging to any one of the categories. It must also be noted that privations (a lack of something that should be there, e.g., deafness) and negations (a pure absence of something, e.g., nothingness) cannot be categorized.

From Aristotle's Categories, 4:

Expressions which are in no way composite signify (1) substance, (2) quantity, (3) quality, (4) relation, (5) place, (6) time, (7) position, (8) state [or 'habit'], (9) action, or (10) affection [or 'passion'].

To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of (1) substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of (2) quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long'; of (3) quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of (4) relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of (5) place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of (6) time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating (7) position; 'shod', 'armed', (8) state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', (9) action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', (10) affection [i.e., 'passion'].

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.

From Simmons' The Scientific Art of Logic, p. 90:

To illustrate: [...] of the ten ultimate types of being [i.e., the categories] mathematics fits into the category of quality. Then it is significant to note that of the four species of quality mathematics falls under the first as a habit. Habits are either entitative or operational, and mathematics is of the second type. Operational habits are either good or bad. Good habits are virtues, and mathematics is a virtue. Virtues in turn are either moral or intellectual, depending on whether they perfect the will or the intellect. Mathematics is an intellectual virtue, and that special kind of intellectual virtue which we call science. Science itself is either practical or speculative, depending on whether its end is action or truth. Mathematics aims at truth, and so is a speculative science. Speculative science, finally, is either ordered to a knowledge of physical being, quantified being, or being as such. Mathematics is the second type, namely speculative science of quantified being.

Logic I, Lesson 5: The Five Predicables, Pt. 3: Property & Accident

Logic I, Lesson 5: The Five Predicables, Pt. 3: Property & Accident

From Porphyry's Isagoge to Aristotle's Categories, 4-6:

[Property.] Property they divide in four ways: a) for it is that which happens to some one species alone, though not to every [individual of that species], as to a man to heal, or to geometrize; b) that also which happens to a whole species, though not to that alone, as to man to be a biped: c) that again, which happens to a species alone, and to every [individual of the species], and at a certain time, as to every man to become grey in old age: d) in the fourth place, it is that in which it concurs [to happen] to one species alone, and to every [individual of the species], and always, as risibility [i.e., the ability to laugh] to a man; for though he does not always laugh, yet he is said to be risible, not from his always laughing, but from being naturally adapted to laugh, and this is always inherent in him, in the same way as neighing in a horse.

They say also that [the latter] are properties in the strict sense, because they reciprocate, since if any thing be a horse it is capable of neighing, and if any thing be capable of neighing it is a horse.

[Accident.] Accident is that which is present and absent without the destruction of its subject. It receives a two-fold division, for one kind of it is separable, but the other inseparable, e.g., "to sleep" is a separable accident, but "to be black" happens inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian; we may possibly indeed conceive a white crow, and an Ethiopian casting his colour, without destruction of the subject.

They also define it thus: "accident is that which may be present and not present to the same thing"; [they] also [define it as] "that which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor property, yet is always inherent in a subject."

[Predication and the Predicables.] Having discussed all that were proposed, I mean, genus, species, difference, property, accident, we must declare what things are common, and what peculiar to them. Now it is common to them all to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, but genus (is predicated) of the species and individuals under it, and difference in like manner; but species, of the individuals under it; and property, both of the species, of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; again, accident (is predicated) both of species, and individuals. For "animal" is predicated of "horse" and "ox," which are species, and also of this particular horse and ox, which are individuals, but "irrational" is predicated of "horse" and "ox," and of individuals. Species however, as "man," is predicated of individuals alone, but property both of the species of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; as "risible" both of "man," and of individual men, but "black" of the species of crows, and of individuals, being an inseparable accident; and "moving," of "man" and "horse," being a separable accident. Notwithstanding, it is pre-eminently [predicated] of individuals, but secondarily of those things which comprehend individuals.

Logic I, Lesson 4: The Five Predicables, Pt. 2: Difference and the Porphyrian Tree

Logic I, Lesson 4: The Five Predicables, Pt. 2: Difference and the Porphyrian Tree

From Aristotle's Categories, 3:

If genera are different and co-ordinate [i.e., at the same level, and not subordinate to one another], their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'.

But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.

From Porphyry's Isagoge to Aristotle's Categories, 3:

[Difference.] [O]ne is most properly said to differ from another, when it varies by specific difference, as man differs from horse by specific difference, i. e. by the quality "rational." Hence, those [differences] which render [a member of a genus] another thing [from the other species within the genus] are called specific differences, [...] for the difference "rational" being added to "animal," makes it [another a species of the genus "animal"] [...] so that [it] renders it another thing [...]. According then, to the differences which produce another thing do the divisions of genera into species arise, and the definitions arising from genus and such differences are assigned. [...]

They also define it thus, "difference is what is naturally adapted to separate things which are under the same genus," as "rational" and "irrational" separate "man" and "horse," which are under the same genus, "animal." Again, they give it in this way: "difference is that by which each singular thing differs," for "man" and "horse" do not differ as to genus, for both we and horses are animals, but the addition of "rational" separates us from them; again, both we and the gods are "rational," but the addition of "mortal" separates us from them. [...] Wherefore specific differences will be such as produce another species, and which are assumed in explaining the very nature of a thing: and concerning difference this is sufficient.