Quaestio Disputata on the Soul

Quaestio Disputata on the Soul

Quaestio Disputata on the Soul


ARTICLE 1: Whether the soul exists?

CONCLUSION: "Living material things possess a soul that makes their matter be actually alive."

NOTIONS.  Soul is defined as the substantial form of a living body, or that in a living body which makes the matter (which of itself is only potentially alive) be actually alive.  Organic unity is the unity that is proper to organisms, that is, to living things.  Plants and animals, including man, possess a unity that is very distinct from the unity of inanimate objects, such as a rock, the air, or a computer: the parts of inanimate objects are merely juxtaposed, that is, placed locally next to each other; if they work together toward some end, it is only because their harmony has been imposed by some extrinsic agent.  Unlike living things, inanimate objects do not possess a natural, intrinsic unity that orders all their parts toward the same end.  Organic unity is ultimately explained by the presence of a soul.  An organ is any part of a living body that is unified (with partial or relative organic unity) for the sake of one function.  Hence, for example, all the parts of the heart are ordered to the function of circulating blood in the body; all the parts of the stomach are ordered to the function of digesting food; etc.  But it should be noted here that "organ" is not said strictly, as biologists and anatomists use the term, i.e., as distinguished from cells and tissues (which are the components of organs) on the one hand, and from systems (which are composed of organs) on the other.  Rather, it is meant more broadly, to refer to any part of the body that is in some way unified: thus, any part of the body, no matter how simple or complex, that has some degree of relative organic unity--e.g., cells, tissues, and systems--could be termed an "organ."

POSITIVE PROOF.  1st Argument: From the Proper Theological Sources (loci theologici).  It is clear from the explicit testimony of the sources of revelation (both Sacred Scripture and the witnesses and monuments of Sacred Tradition, including the consensus of the Fathers, the consensus of Theologians, and the consensus of the Faithful) that human beings have souls.  This teaching is, therefore, de fide and its denial would amount to heresy.  Refer to a dogmatic manual (e.g., Tanquerey or Ott, which have been translated into English) for the positive sources.  The Council of Vienna further defined the dogma that the soul is essentially and per se the form of the body (Dz 481).  It should be noted, however, that the existence of souls in brutes (i.e., irrational animals and plants) is not de fide; it is, rather, a sententia communis, that is, a teaching that is unanimous among theologians who discuss the subject.

2nd Argument: From the Extraneous Theological Sources: Practically all thinkers of the philosophia perennis, in particular all of its major exponents, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, as well as all scholastic philosophers, are unanimous in upholding the existence of a soul--that is, of an immaterial principle of life--in all living things, including brutes.  This tradition generally distinguishes between three genera of souls: vegetative souls, sensitive souls, and rational souls.  The mechanist trend of denying the existence of the souls of brutes began in modern times and was popularized with Descartes.

SCHOLASTIC PROOF.  1st Argument.  If all that is necessary for something to be alive is that it has matter, then all material things would be alive.  But not all material things are alive.  Therefore the conclusion follows.  Confirmation of the Major Premise.  If matter were a necessary and sufficient condition for life to occur in a body (i.e., a corporeal substance), then the inevitable result would be that all things that satisfy that condition--that is to say, all things that possess matter--would be alive.  Confirmation of the Minor Premise.  This is directly verifiable through experience: there are things like chairs and pencils, which are material but are not alive.  A Difficulty.  The argument proves that the antecedent of the major premise is false; that is to say, it proves that it is false that "all that is necessary for something to be alive is that it has matter."  But it does not prove the conclusion of the article, namely, that "living material things possess a soul that makes their matter be actually alive."  Resolution of the Difficulty.  If matter is not sufficient for something to be alive, this means that some immaterial principle is required to make something potentially endowed with life be actually alive.  For the sake of brevity, we give the term "soul" to this immaterial principle that is required to make a body potentially endowed with life be actually alive.

2nd Argument.  If every material organ in the body of a living thing receives its organic unity from outside itself, then there must ultimately be something that is not a material organ that imparts organic unity to all the organs.  But every material organ in the body receives its organic unity from outside itself.  Therefore, the conclusion follows.  Confirmation of the Major Premise.  Every material organ in the body has a relative organic unity: although it is subordinated to the end of the whole body, it is one entity insofar as all its parts are ordered to the same function in the body.  Now, the question is whence does the organic unity come.  It cannot come from the organ itself, as shall be shown below.  Hence, it must come from outside the organ.  Now, if it comes from outside the organ, it can either come from another organ, or from something that is not an organ.  If it comes from an organ, then the question arises again concerning the organic unity of that organ, and so we end up with an infinite regress. Therefore, ultimately we must reach a source of organic unity that is not a material organ.  Confirmation of the Minor Premise.  The minor must be true, because its contradictory ("every material organ in the body of a living thing receives its organic unity from within itself") is absurd.  If every material organ in the body of a living thing received its organic unity from within itself, then it would have to give itself organic unity before it possessed organic unity, which would mean that it would have to exist as a unified organ before it becomes a unified organ.  But this would be absurd.  Therefore, the contradictory antecedent results: every material organ in the body of a living thing receives organic unity from outside itself.  A Difficulty.  This argument proves only the ultimate source of organic unity is not a material organ; but it does not prove that the ultimate source of organic unity is immaterial.  The source of organic unity could be something that is not an organ, but that is nonetheless material.  Resolution of the Difficulty.  If the source of organic unity is not a material organ, then that leaves only three logical possibilities: it is either (a) an immaterial organor, or (b) a material non-organ, that is to say, a body that is not an organ, or or (c) an immaterial non-organ.  Now, (a) cannot be, for it is a contradiction: "organ" signifies a material entity, as defined above, and hence there cannot be an immaterial organ.  Also, (b) cannot be an ultimate source of organic unity, because insofar as it is a material entity that has some unity, it itself requires a source of unity--and it cannot give itself unity, for the reason that we discussed above.  So only the third logical possibility (c) is a real possibility.  Therefore, the ultimate source of organic unity is an immaterial non-organ: that is to say, an immaterial principle.

OBJECTIONS.  1st Objection.  If a simpler explanation is available, then one ought to prefer it over all other explanations.  Now, a simpler explanation is available for the life of living things--namely, that matter and the laws of physics conspire to form life, without the aid of any immaterial principle.  Therefore, one ought to prefer this explanation to all others.  Reply to the 1st Objection.  Distinction of the Major Premise.  I concede that if a simpler explanation is available that satisfactorily explains a phenomenon through its first causes, then one ought to prefer it over all others.  But I deny that if a simpler explanation is available simply speaking, then one ought to prefer it over all others.  Contradistinction of the Minor Premise.  I concede that a simpler explanation, simply speaking, is available for the life of living things--one that has recourse only to the laws of physics and appeals to no immaterial principle.  But I deny that this explanation satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of life through its first causes, for it ignores the issue of whence organic unity arises, and even the existence itself of organic unity.  And I deny the objector's conclusion.

2nd Objection.  Regarding natural things one ought not to reach conclusions that are not empirically verifiable.  But the conclusion of the article is not empirically verifiable.  Therefore, one ought not to accept such a conclusion.  Reply to the 2nd Objection.  Distinction of the Major Premise.  I concede that concerning natural things one ought not to reach conclusions that are not empirically verifiable in any way whatsoever.  But I deny that regarding natural things one ought not to reach conclusions that are not directly empirically verifiable.  As a matter of fact, the major premise itself is not directly empirically verifiable.  Hence, if the premise pretends to affirm that we ought not to reach conclusions that are not directly empirically verifiable, then the premise is self-refuting.  Contradistinction of the Minor Premise.  I concede that the conclusion of the article, that the soul exists, is not directly empirically verifiable, for the soul is neither visible, nor tangible, nor can be perceived directly through any of the exterior senses.  But I deny that the conclusion of the article is not empirically verifiable in any way whatsoever, for the existence of the soul is indirectly empirically verifiable, that is, through its effects, namely life and all its properties, such as organic unity, nutrition, reproduction, self-guided locomotion, sensation, the appetites, reason, and will, which are themselves directly empirically verifiable.  And I deny the objector's conclusion.

3rd Objection: One ought not unnecessarily multiply principles. But positing an immaterial act/form (i.e., soul) to explain living things unnecessarily multiplies principles. Therefore, etc.  Explanation of the minor: One can satisfactorily account for the difference between living things and nonliving things in terms of the complexity of living things: living things are more complex arrangements of the same matter of which nonliving things are composed. Therefore, living things can be explained in purely material terms. Therefore appealing to an immaterial principle is superfluous.  Reply to the 3rd Objection.  I concede the major, but I deny the minor.  If one cannot satisfactorily explain life without an immaterial principle, then positing such an immaterial principle is not unnecessary.  But, as was shown above in the first argument, one cannot satisfactorily explain life without an immaterial principle.  Therefore, positing an immaterial principle of life is not unnecessary.

ARTICLE 2: Whether the souls of brutes are immaterial?

CONCLUSION: "The souls of brutes are immaterial, i.e., they are not made out of matter."

NOTIONS. 'Immaterial' and 'spiritual' are not synonymous. 'Immaterial' can have two meanings: (a) not made out of matter, and (b) having an act that is completely independent from matter. Only the second sense can be said to be synonymous with 'spiritual'.  Now, whatever is 'immaterial' in the second sense (i.e., spiritual) is also 'immaterial' in the first sense, but not vice versa. In other words, whatever has an act that is completely independent from matter must not be made out of matter. But there can be something that is (a) made out of matter, but that is not (b) independent from matter (or 'spiritual'). Such is the case with the souls of brutes--indeed, all forms, not only souls, are immaterial in this sense, insofar as they are not the matter that they inform. But human souls, angels, and God, in addition to being 'immaterial' in this first sense, are also 'immaterial' in the second sense, that is, having an act that is completely independent from matter (= 'spiritual') and for this reason they alone are said to be 'subsistent'.

ARGUMENTS. 1st Argument.  Whatever is not made out of matter is immaterial. But the souls of brutes are not made out of matter. Therefore.  Proof of the Major: Being material means being made out of matter. Being immaterial means not being made out of matter. These two are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive species, such that given an entity, it must be either immaterial or material.  Proof of the Minor: The souls of brutes cannot possibly be made out of matter, because living matter cannot of itself live; rather, matter requires a formal principle outside of itself that makes the matter live actually. Now, if that formal principle is itself material, then it would require some formal principle outside of itself to live. And then we would have an infinite regress. Therefore, the process must have an end: a first principle of life that is not itself material.

OBJECTION. If the souls of brutes are immaterial, then they are subsistent, i.e., that they do not survive death. But, as St. Thomas teaches, the souls of brutes are not subsistent. Therefore, the souls of brutes are not immaterial.  Reply. I concede the minor. I distinguish the major. I concede that if the souls of brutes were immaterial, or "spiritual," in the sense that they have an immaterial act that is completely independent from matter, then they would be subsistent. But I deny that if the souls of brutes are immaterial, in the sense that they are not made out of matter, then it follows that they are subsistent. And I deny the objection's conclusion.

Only the rational soul has an act that is completely independent of matter, for the acts of the intellectual power are not the acts of any bodily organ.  For this reason the rational soul is both material (i.e., not made out of matter) and spiritual or subsistent .  All the acts of the souls of brutes, however, are acts of bodily organs, and therefore depend upon matter.  For this reason the souls of brutes are not spiritual or subsistent, even though they are immaterial.  Both souls are immaterial but only the rational soul is spiritual and subsistent.

Article 3: Whether the soul and the body are substances

ARGUMENT.  If the soul and the body were each a substance, then each could exist independently of the other.  But the body cannot exist independently of the soul.  Therefore.

Proof of the Major.
Proof of the Minor.


(Please help us continue to develop this disputatio.  Make your suggestion in the comments section below.)

Copyright © 2009 Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo, PhD.  All rights reserved.

Dominica 1a in Quadragesima (1st Sunday in Lent)

Dominica 1a in Quadragesima (1st Sunday in Lent)

A Homily by Rev. Jonathan Romanoski, FSSP

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JMJt

“And when He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry.”

Today we celebrate the first Sunday of Lent, yet today we do not fast. The Church rather began her fast this past Wednesday, so as to imitate most faithfully the life of our Lord in a fast for exactly 40 days, 6 days being taken off for the Sundays of the 6 weeks of Lent. Notice the care with which the Church has observed this fast from most ancient times. We read of the apostles fasting and enjoining it in turn on others. The third Roman Pontiff, St. Clement, who is mentioned in the Scriptures, ordained that Catholics should fast every Wednesday and Friday of the year. In the days of our Holy Fathers, the Church was fervent and her members not only fasted but abstained from all meat, eggs, cheese and milk throughout Lent, and ate but once at sundown.

But the hearts of men grew cold and their wills weak, and the discipline was gradually mitigated. Abstinence was dropped, collations were added and dispensations were sought with much frequency. To such a point that Pope Benedict XIV, who was pope from 1740-1758, and “whose spirit of moderation,” Dom Gueranger tells us, “has never been called into question, had no sooner ascended the papal throne, than he addressed an encyclical letter to the bishops of the Catholic world, expressing his heartfelt grief at seeing the great relaxation that was introduced among the faithful by indiscreet and unnecessary dispensations.” In his letter he hearkens us back to the desert, and the divine dignity found therein as he writes, “The observance of Lent is the very badge of the Christian warfare. By it we prove ourselves not to be enemies of the cross of Christ. By it we avert the scourges of divine justice. By it we gain strength against the princes of darkness, for it shields us with heavenly help. Should mankind grow remiss in their observance of Lent, it would be a detriment to God’s glory, a disgrace to the Catholic religion, and a danger to Christian souls. Neither can it be doubted that such negligence would become the source of misery to the world, of public calamity, and of private woe.” Strong words indeed. Did they prove true? Dom Gueranger a hundred years later comments on this “ever-growing spirit of immortification,” which cannot but result in “a general effeminacy of character, which will lead, at last, to frightful social disorders.” He writes, “The sad predictions of Pope Benedict XIV, are but too truly verified. Those nations, among whose people the spirit and practice of penance are extinct, are heaping against themselves the wrath of God, and provoking His justice to destroy them by one or other of these scourges- civil discord, or conquest...[this] is one of the worst presages of the future. The word of God is unmistakable: unless we do penance we shall perish (St. Luke 13:3).” “But,” he continues “if our ease-loving and sensual generation were to return, like the Ninivites, to the long-neglected way of penance and expiation, who knows but that the arm of God, which is already raised to strike us, may give us blessing and not chastisement?” And what would they say 150 yrs. later, in our day.

Perhaps you are still unconvinced, of the great evils that come from not fasting. Let us step back therefore and consider what evils have come from such a lack of mortification. St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, St. Jerome, and St. Gregory the Great, 4 of the greatest doctors of the Church, make the remark that the only negative commandment put upon our first parents in the earthly paradise was one of abstinence from a certain fruit; and that it was by their not exercising this virtue, that they brought every kind of evil upon themselves and upon their children. The whole human race therefore fell through a want of fasting. Esau lost his birthright, trading the blessings of the firstborn for a bowl of lentils, while Jacob by his detachment won it for himself and all of Israel. The chosen people, on their way to the Promised Land, because they ate and drank immoderately, rose up to play, and traded the image of God in their souls, for the image of a beast, while Moses fasting upon the mount, spoke face to face with God. The tale goes on and on. How about in our own lives? Consider the evils that you’ve seen. How many spouses who have cheated on each other were fasting, how many alcoholics and drug abusers; how many parents who simply neglect the care of their children, or waste their family savings, are fasting? How many broken families were fasting? How many involved in the occult, fast? Probably very few if any, for all these sins are most often rooted in a selfish pursuit of pleasure. And fasting is the remedy. I was once told of a holy priest, whose only advice to young ladies who came to him seeking advice on who to marry, was that they should seek a man that fasts. For if he cannot deny his passions, he will not be able to direct a family. When your beauty fades, and the kids begin to make noise, the husband who will not fast will simply prefer football and beer, and will never love you as Christ loves the Church. And you will not have a happy family.

Now fasting is not the sum of virtue, nor by any means the highest one. Quite the contrary it is amidst the lower ones, but yet a first rung by which we ascend to the higher. For he who fails in little things, will fail in great things. If we think we have excelled in virtue we should consider whether we have even taken the first step. As St. Gregory the Great says, “unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat.” Gluttony which, St. Thomas tells us, consists us not only in eating to much, but too frequently, of too costly quality, greedily, that is without manners, or too daintily or finicky, as well.

Fasting is the first step in our “Christian warfare” against the ancient enemy of “the flesh” as St. Paul tells us. “For the flesh lusteth against the spirit: and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary one to another: so that you do not the things that you would.” By fasting our wills grow strong as we tame our sensual desires, which are interconnected as St. Thomas notes. A holy confessor once told me: many who are struggling with sins of sensuality, do so because of a failure to mortify their taste. For if every time we eat, our principle is: this feels good, this tastes good, therefore do it, how do you think we are going to respond when other temptations come that “feel good?” And as St. Augustine notes, “He that deprives his body of nothing that is lawful, will soon allow it what is unlawful.”

Yet an even higher motive is found in the imitation of Christ who stands before us today in the desert, fasting. He, who did not need to do any penance, who though tempted externally, was not in anyway inclined to sin, as he was absolutely impeccable, incapable of sinning, fasts. Why? To give us an example, an example which he first preaches by his actions before he begins his public ministry. And what are the first words of Incarnate Wisdom? What are the first words that God addresses to us in the fullness of time, in the fullness of revelation in His own Incarnate Word? “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.”

Now as I remarked, the unbroken tradition of the Church since earliest times, has been that the adult Christian fasted for forty days. Yet in our very dark times of apostasy, full of so much murder, sin, and hatred of God, and thus so deserving of divine punishment, this 2000-year discipline has all but disappeared. You can read of the current minimal requirements of fasting and abstinence for the Lenten season in last Sunday’s bulletin, which are the only ones, which oblige you under pain of sin.* There has always been of course reason for just dispensations, due to poor health, frailty, taxing physical labor, and other circumstances, which would make such a fast contrary to reason. And unfortunately our society does not respect Lent as in times past, and does not adjust itself to the Church’s sacred mysteries, as it should. But all of this does not excuse us from penance, as we can always practice self-denial. With regard to food, if not in quantity then in quality. And besides food, the Church bids us to practice mortification in almsgiving, acts of charity and more time in prayer, which of course are the ends of fasting, being as they are the greater spiritual goods. But we must first subdue our flesh if we wish to live according to the spirit. And if we are to be numbered amongst those “traditionalists,” whom St. Pius X said we have such need of today, we will certainly strive to holdfast to the constant tradition of the Church’s fast.

And what will be the fruits of fasting? St. Basil tell us “it is fasting which gives the wings to prayer that it may rise to heaven; it is the solidifying element in family life, the health of the mother and the teacher of the children...fasting nor merely frees you from future condemnation; it also preserves you from many evils and brings the flesh, otherwise untamable into subjection.” It leads us in victory over Satan, as we read in the gospel today, as there are certain demons, which are only cast out through prayer and fasting. Happy and holy will the family be in which there is practiced such self-denial.

Finally, I wish to emphasize one last point, the most important point. As I mentioned, fasting so as to subdue our flesh and make reparation for sin is not the highest virtue. And it is quite possible that if we approach Lent with the wrong spirit, we will accomplish nothing more than 40 days of worthless pride, admiring our accomplishments as we flex in the mirror of self-love, leaving us with much more to make reparation for. To act thus, would be to miss the deepest meaning of every fast, which is found in that ever-uncomfortable experience of hunger. That hunger in which we taste our nothingness, and savor our dependency. That hunger in which is heard the most important truth that St. Catherine of Siena said our Lord ever taught her, amidst her innumerable sublime revelations, which summed up all that he taught he, when he said “known daughter that I am He who Is, and you are that which is not.” 40 days of hunger will be the daily proof of our nothingness of our insufficiency, which must be our boast. For when we are weak then we are strong. For then we will finally forsake and despair of ourselves, and truly hope in God’s help, crying out in union with Christ forsaken, “I thirst.” That unquenchable thirst...that thirst for God alone. This is the meaning of Lent. May God grant us the grace to truly learn it throughout this holy season.

“And when He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry.”

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AMDG

*Which are for those between 18 and 59 to fast on Ash Wednesday and Good Friday, eating not more than one full meal, and 2 collations which would not together equal a full meal; and for all over 14 to abstain from meat on the above and the Fridays of Lent. The faithful are still obliged to do some penance throughout all of Lent.

Valde mane una sabbatorum

Valde mane una sabbatorum

Estimado Francisco,

Estoy enseñando a mis alumnos lo referente al "valde mane una sabbatorum" (las santas mujeres y la Resurrecion de Cristo) y creeme que no puedo hallar una explicacion clara sobre ese punto, mientras mas lo quiero explicar me parece que mas lo complico. El problema en concreto que tengo es el siguiente: ¿"valde mane una sabbatorum" es nuestro sábado bien tarde (y así parece que las Santas mujeres no cumplen con el sabbath) o es nuestro domingo a la madrugada (y entonces por qué dice "sabbatorum")? Todo esto teniendo en cuenta que los judíos (por lo que leí) comienzan el día en la víspera (por ejemplo viernes a las 6 pm ya es sabbath para ellos y por lo mismo, sábado a las 6 pm ya es domingo).

Una vez resuelto el problema anterior, con mis alumnos queremos saber a qué hora y en que día (según NUESTRA manera de contar las horas y los días) las santas mujeres salieron hacia el sepulcro y llegaron a él. Espero que esto te haya sido de ayuda. Sí, ningún problema, podés mandarme textos en latín referente al tema y con esto ya me habrás ayudado muchísimo. Me parece que sí, que tiene algo que ver con esa aparente discrepancia entre San Marcos y San Mateo.

In Xto,

Padre F.

Estimado Padre F.,

Me parece que la solución más clara es que, según dice San Marcos, era tempranísimo (= valde mane) el primer día después del sabbath (= una sabbatorum), es decir, el domingo. Esto corresponde con San Lucas, quien dice que era muy de madrugada (= valde diluculo). El que San Juan diga que estaba todavía oscuro (= adhuc tenebrae essent) no es contradictorio, pues cuando es muy temprano en la madrugada, todavía esta oscuro.

No soy exegeta y por lo tanto no tengo la habilidad de resolver todos los matices de la cuestión. Pero veo que hay muchísimo escrito sobre el tema, especialmente por los Santos Padres. Por eso le doy los textos aquí abajo para que Ud. mismo los vea y pueda encontrar los detalles. En cuanto a textos patrísticos me limité a los que se encuentran en la Catena Aurea de Santo Tomás de Aquino, que es una antología excelente de las fuentes clásicas relevantes a la interpretación bíblica. También añadí dos textos de los comentarios bíblicos del mismo Santo y varios más del comentario del Padre Haydock, que es uno de los más populares en el mundo tradicionalista anglosajón.

-Francisco.

PD. Si le interesa tener una fuente moderna además del P. Haydock, avíseme y buscaré también en el famoso comentario de Cornelius a Lapide, que es uno de los mejores que ha producido la Iglesia en toda su historia--y lo tengo disponible en archivos PDF.


I. Catena Aurea sobre Mt. 28:1:

Augustinus, De Consensu Evangelistarum.: De hora vero qua mulieres venerunt ad monumentum, non contemnenda exoritur quaestio. Cum enim Matthaeus hic dicat vespere autem sabbati quae lucescit in prima sabbati: quid est quod dicit Marcus: et valde mane una sabbatorum venit Maria Magdalene et altera Maria videre sepulcrum? Aperte quippe prima noctis, quod est vespere, ipsam noctem voluit significare Matthaeus, cuius noctis fine venerunt ad monumentum; ergo quoniam sabbato impediebantur ut non ante facerent, ab eo tempore nominavit noctem ex quo eis licere coepit ut facerent quodcumque vellent tempore eiusdem noctis. Sic itaque dictum est vespere sabbati, ac si diceretur, nocte sabbati, idest nocte quae sequitur diem sabbati: quod ipsa verba eius satis indicant; sic enim ait quae lucescit in prima sabbati: quod fieri non potest nisi tantummodo primam noctis particulam, idest solum initium noctis, intellexerimus dicto vespere significatum. Neque enim ipsum initium noctis lucescit in prima sabbati; sed ipsa nox quae in luce incipit terminari; et usitatus modus loquendi est divinae Scripturae a parte totum significare. Vespere ergo noctem significavit, cuius extremum est diluculum: diluculo enim venerunt ad monumentum.

Rabanus. Quod dictum est, quia sanctae mulieres vespere sabbati quae lucescit in prima sabbati, venerunt videre sepulcrum, ita intelligendum: quia vespere quidem venire coeperint; sed lucescente mane in prima sabbati ad sepulcrum pervenerunt; idest, vespere aromata paraverunt, quibus corpus domini ungere desiderabant, sed aromata vespere praeparata, mane ad sepulcrum detulerunt; quod Matthaeus quidem brevitatis causa obscurius posuit; sed Evangelistae alii quo ordine factum sit evidentius ostendunt. Sepulto namque sexta feria domino, reversae a monumento mulieres praeparaverunt aromata et unguenta, quamdiu operari licebat; et sabbato quidem siluerunt secundum legis mandatum, sicut Lucas aperte designat; cum autem transisset sabbatum, vesperaque adveniente, tempus operandi rediisset, prompte ad devotionem emerunt quae minus praeparaverant aromata, sicut Marcus commemorat: ut venientes ungerent Iesum; et valde mane veniunt ad monumentum.

Hieronymus: Vel aliter. Quod diversa tempora istarum mulierum in Evangeliis describuntur, non mendacii signum est, ut impii obiciunt, sed sedulae visitationis officia, dum crebro abeunt et redeunt, et non patiuntur a sepulcro domini diu abesse vel longius.

Remigius. Sciendum autem quia Matthaeus mystice loquens studuit nobis insinuare, illa sacratissima nox quantam dignitatem ex honore devictae mortis et dominicae resurrectionis accepit; ideo dixit vespere autem sabbati quae lucescit in prima sabbati. Cum consuetus ordo temporum habeat ut vesperae non lucescant in diem, sed potius obtenebrescant in noctem; ostenditur his verbis quod dominus totam hanc noctem luce suae resurrectionis festivam et coruscam reddidit.

Beda In Homelia in vigilia Paschae: Ab exordio etiam mundanae creationis usque huc ita temporum cursus distinguebatur, ut dies noctem praecederet: quia homo a luce Paradisi peccando lapsus, in huius saeculi tenebras aerumnasque decidit. Aptissime autem nunc dies sequitur noctem, quando per fidem resurrectionis a peccati tenebris et umbra mortis ad lucem vitae, Christo largiente, reducimur.


II. Catena Aurea sobre Mc. 16:1-2:

Glossa. Religiosae enim mulieres sepulto domino, cum licuit operari, idest usque ad solis occasum, unguenta paraverunt, ut Lucas dicit. Et quia prae angustia temporis non poterant explere, mox transacto sabbato, idest occidente sole, ut operandi licentia redit, festinaverunt emere aromata, sicut Marcus dicit hic, ut venientes mane ungerent corpus Iesu; neque vespere sabbati, praeoccupante iam noctis articulo, monumentum adire valuerunt; unde sequitur et valde mane una sabbatorum veniunt ad monumentum, orto iam sole.

Augustinus, De Consensu Evangelistarum.: Quod Lucas dicit: valde diluculo, et Ioannes: mane cum adhuc tenebrae essent, hoc intelligitur Marcus dicere valde mane oriente iam sole, idest cum caelum ab orientis parte albesceret, quod fit utique solis orientis vicinitate. Eius enim est ille fulgor, qui nomine aurorae appellari solet; ideo non repugnat ei qui ait: cum adhuc tenebrae essent. Die quippe surgente aliquae reliquiae tenebrarum tanto minus sunt quanto magis oritur lux; nec accipiendum est quod ait valde mane orto iam sole, tamquam sol ipse iam videretur super terram; sed de proximo adveniente in has partes sole, idest ortu suo iam caelum illuminare incipiente.

Hieronymus: Valde ergo mane dicit, quod alius Evangelista dicit diluculo. Diluculum autem est inter tenebras noctis et diei claritatem; in qua salus humani generis provenit, felici vicinitate in Ecclesia declaranda, more solis, qui proxima luce consurgens roseam praemittit auroram, ut gratiam praeclari splendoris praeparatis oculis possit intueri quando tempus dominicae resurrectionis illuxit, ut tunc laudes Christi tota caneret, secundum exemplum feminarum, Ecclesia, quando genus humanum exemplo suae resurrectionis animavit, quando vitam praestitit, et lumen credulitatis infudit.

Theophylactus. Dicit autem una sabbatorum, idest prima dierum hebdomadae: sabbata namque dies hebdomadae nuncupantur, una vero dicitur prima.

Beda. Vel prima sabbatorum prima dies est a die sabbatorum, idest requietionum, quae in sabbatis custodiebantur. Sequitur et dicebant ad invicem: quis revolvet nobis lapidem ab ostio monumenti?


III. Catena Aurea sobre Lc. 24:1:

Beda. Religiosae mulieres non solum in die parasceve, sed etiam sabbato transacto, idest sole occidente, mox ut operandi licentia remeavit, emerunt aromata, ut venientes ungerent corpus Iesu, sicut Marcus testatur; praeoccupante tamen iam noctis articulo, monumentum adire non valuerunt; et ideo dicitur una autem sabbati valde diluculo venerunt ad monumentum, portantes quae paraverant aromata. Una sabbati, sive prima sabbati, prima est a sabbato, quam diem dominicam propter domini resurrectionem mos Christianus appellat. Quod autem valde diluculo mulieres venere ad monumentum, magnus quaerendi et inveniendi dominum fervor caritatis ostenditur.

Ambrosius. Sed magna oritur hoc loco plerisque dubitatio: siquidem hic valde diluculo, Matthaeus vespere sabbati mulieres ad monumentum venisse dixerunt. Sed Evangelistas de diversis putes dixisse temporibus, ut personas alias mulierum, et alias conicias visiones. Quod autem scriptum est vespere sabbati, quae lucescit in prima sabbati, resurrexisse dominum, sic temperandum est: ut neque mane dominica, quae est prima post sabbatum, neque sabbato resurrectio facta credatur: nam quomodo triduum completur? Non ergo vesperascente die, sed vespere noctis resurrexit. Denique Graecus sero dixit. Sero autem horam significat in occasu diei, et rei cuiuslibet tarditatem; si dicas: sero mihi suggestum est. Est ergo et sero tempus noctis profundum: unde et mulieres ad monumentum accedendi habent facultatem, custodibus quiescentibus. Et ut scias nocte factum, mulieres aliae sciunt, aliae nesciunt: sciunt quae observant noctibus et diebus, nesciunt quae recesserunt. Nescit una Maria Magdalene, secundum Ioannem: nam eadem et ante scire et postea nescire non potuit. Ergo si plures Mariae, plures etiam fortasse Mariae Magdalenae; cum illud nomen personae sit, hoc sumatur a loco.

Augustinus de Cons. Evang. Vel Matthaeus a prima parte noctis, quod est vespere, ipsam voluit noctem significare; cuius noctis fine venerunt ad monumentum: et hoc ea de causa, quia iam a vespere paraverant, et licebat afferre aromata transacto sabbato.


IV. Catena Aurea sobre Jn. 20:1:

Chrysostomus in Ioannem. Quia iam transierat sabbatum in quo impediebatur a lege, non potuit Maria Magdalene quiescere, sed venit profundo diluculo, consolationem quamdam a loco sepulturae invenire volens; unde dicitur una autem sabbati Maria Magdalene venit mane, cum adhuc tenebrae essent, ad monumentum.

Augustinus in Ioannem. Una autem sabbati est, quem iam diem dominicum propter domini resurrectionem mos Christianus appellat, quem Matthaeus primam sabbati nominavit.

Beda. Dicitur ergo una sabbati, hoc est altera sive prima die post sabbatum.

Theophylactus. Vel aliter. Hebdomadae dies Iudaei sabbatum nominabant, unam autem ex sabbati diebus primam. Futuri autem saeculi exemplar est haec dies, quoniam futuri saeculi una dies est nequaquam nocte interpolata: Deus enim ibi sol est, qui numquam occidit. In hac igitur die dominus resurrexit, incorruptibilitatem corporis assumens, sicut nos in futuro saeculo incorruptione induemur.

Augustinus de Cons. Evang. Quod autem Marcus dicit: valde mane oriente iam sole, non repugnat ei quod hic dicitur: cum adhuc tenebrae essent: die quippe surgente aliquae reliquiae tenebrarum tanto magis extenuantur, quanto magis oritur lux. Nec sic accipiendum est quod ait Marcus: valde mane orto iam sole, tamquam sol ipse iam videretur super terram; sed potius, sicut dicere solemus eis quibus volumus significare temporius aliquid faciendum, orto iam sole dicitur, idest de proximo adveniente in has partes.


V. Sto. Tomás de Aquino, Super Matthaeum Cap. 28, v. 1:

Tempus vespere autem sabbati. Et circa hoc duplex est dubitatio. Prima de hoc quod dicit vespere; secunda de hoc quod dicit lucescit. Circa primum est dubitatio, quia videntur contrariari Matthaeus et Ioannes, quia Ioannes dicit quod adhuc tenebrae erant. Quid ergo dicit hic vespere autem sabbati? Hic est triplex solutio.

Prima Hieronymi, quod venerunt vespere et mane. Et quod hic dicit vespere, ille autem mane, non est dissonantia, sed sedulitas sanctarum mulierum.

Beda solvit sic, quod inceperunt venire in vespere, sed pervenerunt in mane. Sed numquid erat tantum spatium? Dicit quod non; sed tunc dicitur aliquis facere, quando praeparat se ad faciendum. Et hoc habetur in Lc. XXIII, 55 quod videntes monumentum et quemadmodum positum erat corpus eius, revertentes paraverunt aromata. In parasceve emerunt aromata, et in sabbato quieverunt, et in vespere paraverunt se ad eundum.

Tertia solutio est Augustini, qui dicit quod modus consuetus in sacra Scriptura est quod sumitur pars pro toto, unde intelligitur vespere pro tota nocte sabbati; unde vespere autem sabbati, idest quae est post sabbatum, unde vespere quae est initium primae sabbati. Simile habetur Gen. c. I, 5 in commemoratione operum Dei: et factum est vespere et mane dies unus. Unde venerunt vespere, quia in ultima parte noctis. Et haec est quae lucescit in prima sabbati. Vespere non lucescit, quia vespere tenebrescit. Unde venerunt quando lucescit, idest in prima hora diei. Notate quod Iudaei omnes ferias incipiunt a sabbato; unde prima sabbati dicitur dies dominica.

Et si quaeras ab Augustino, quare Marcus utitur tali modo loquendi, dicet quod vespere paraverunt aromata, et mane venerunt; unde redit in idem quod Beda dicit. Sed secundum Hieronymum quomodo intelligendum quod dicit quae lucescit? Quia vespere tenebrescit. Sciendum quod Iudaeis dies incipit esse a vespere. Et ratio est, quia a luna observabant dies; luna autem incipit lucere a sero; ideo illa dies incipit a vespere, sed lucescit in prima sabbati. Similis modus loquendi Lc. XXIII, 54: erat autem parasceves, et sabbatum illucescebat.

Et iste modus loquendi mysterio competit, primo, ad solemnitatem dominicae resurrectionis, quia nox illa fuit lucida; Ps. CXXXVIII, 12: et nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Item competit humanae restaurationi, quae facta est per Christum: in primo enim homine fuit processus a die in noctem, scilicet peccati; et mutatus est status, scilicet a nocte in diem; ad Eph. V, 8: eratis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino. Item signatur, quod quicquid erat tenebrosum in lege et prophetis, totum per resurrectionem Christi lucescit. Tenebrosa aqua in nubibus aeris, Ps. XVII, 12. Hoc autem in resurrectione illuminatur, ut habetur Lc. ult., 27: incipiens a Moyse et omnibus prophetis interpretabatur illis in omnibus Scripturis, quae de ipso erant.


VI. Sto. Tomás de Aquino, Super Ioannem Cap. 20, v. 1:

Enarratis mysteriis passionis Christi, hic Evangelista manifestat eius resurrectionem, et primo manifestat quomodo resurrectio Christi manifestata est mulieribus; secundo quomodo manifestata est discipulis, ibi cum ergo sero esset die illo et cetera. Manifestata est resurrectio Christi mulieribus quodam ordine. Primo quantum ad monumenti apertionem; secundo quantum ad Angeli apparitionem, ibi abierunt ergo iterum etc.; tertio quantum ad Christi visionem, ibi haec cum dixisset, conversa est retrorsum, et vidit Iesum. Circa primum primo ponitur mulieris visio; secundo rei visae denuntiatio, ibi cucurrit ergo etc.; tertio rei denuntiatae inquisitio, ibi exiit ergo Petrus et cetera.

Circa primum quatuor consideranda occurrunt.

Primo scilicet visionis tempus, quia una sabbati, scilicet prima feria. Nam apud Iudaeos dies sabbati solemnior habebatur, et ideo ab eo omnis alius dies denominabatur: unde dicebant prima sabbati, secunda sabbati et cetera. Unde et Matth. XXVIII, v. 1, dicit prima sabbati. Sed Ioannes dicit: una sabbati, propter mysterium, quia in hac die, in qua resurrectio facta est, inchoavit quasi quaedam nova creatura; Ps. CIII, 30: emitte spiritum tuum, et creabuntur, et renovabis faciem terrae; Gal. VI, 15: in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque praeputium, sed nova creatura. Moyses autem in principio Gen. de prima die non dicit factus est dies primus, sed unus. Ideo Evangelista ad ipsam renovationem insinuandam utitur verbo Moysi. Item quia in hac die inchoabatur dies aeternitatis, quae est una non habens interpolationem noctis; quia sol qui eam facit, non occidit. Apoc. XXI, 23: civitas illa non eget sole neque luna ut luceant in ea: nam claritas Dei illuminabit illam, et lucerna eius est agnus; Zach. ult., 7: erit dies una, quae nota est domino, non dies neque nox: et in tempore vesperi erit lux.

Secundo ponitur persona videns [. . .].

Tertio ponitur hora, seu qualitas temporis, quia mane, cum adhuc tenebrae essent; Lc. XXIII, 55 s. dicitur, quod mulieres quae cum Iesu venerunt de Galilaea viderunt monumentum, et quemadmodum positum erat corpus Iesu, et revertentes paraverunt aromata et unguenta, et sabbato quidem siluerunt secundum mandatum. Et ideo statim transacto sabbato ante lucem primae sabbati venit ad monumentum: nam nimius ardor amoris eam sollicitabat; Cant. VIII, 6: lampades eius lampades ignis atque flammarum, scilicet caritatis. Sed hic est quaestio litteralis: quia, ut dicitur Mc. ult., 2, valde mane orto iam sole, quid igitur dicit Evangelista cum adhuc tenebrae essent? Responsio. Dicendum quod hoc quod dicit Marcus intelligitur de aurora: unde orto iam sole, non quod supra terram appareret, sed appropinquaret ad nostras regiones.

Quarto [. . . ].


VII. El Comentario Bíblico del Padre Haydock (1859):

Sobre Mt. 28:1: [1] And in the end of the sabbath, when it began to dawn towards the first day of the week. According to the letter, in the evening of the sabbath, which began to dawn on the first of the sabbath; (or of the sabbaths in the common Greek copies.) This latter translation, which is that of the Rheims Testament, is certainly more according to the letter, and more obscure than it need to be. First, by translating, on the first of the sabbath, where sabbath is taken for a week, as in other places, Luke xviii. 12.; Acts xx. 7.; and 1 Corinthians xvi. 2. It may therefore here be literally translated, on the first day of the week. Secondly, By the evening, is here meant the night: for in the Scriptures, both the Latin and Greek word, which we find in this place, not only signifies that time which we commonly call the evening, but is also put for the whole night itself, and for the time from sunset to sunrise next morning. Thus it is taken in the first chapter of Genesis, where, in the computation of natural days of 24 hours, all the hours in which it was dark, are called vespere, in the Septuagint. And all the hours in which it was light, are called mane, Greek: proi. et factum est vespere & mane dies unus, i.e. primus. And from the fourth day, on which were created sun and moon, by vespere was understood all the time from the sun setting on such parts of the earth, to its rising to them again: and mane signified all the day, or the hours that the sun appeared to the like parts of the earth. Therefore, the literal and proper sense of the verse is: in the night, i.e. in the latter part of the night of the sabbath, or after the sabbath, towards the morning of the first day of the week. And that in this place is signified the latter part of the night, and not what is commonly called the evening, appears first by the following words, when it began to dawn, or to be light. Secondly, It appears by the other evangelists. St. Mark (xvi. 1.) says, when the sabbath was past ... very early in the morning. St. Luke says, (xxiv. 1,) very early in the morning. St. John (xx. 1.) says of Mary Magdalene, that she came in the morning, when it was yet dark. From all which it is plain, that Mary Magdalene, and the other pious women, came to the sepulchre at the end of the night after the sabbath-day, or when it began to be light, and about sunrise on the first day of the week, on our Sunday. --- There may indeed be some doubt whether the Latin word vespere be not an adverb, corresponding to the Greek opse, sero. And then it may be translated with Dr. Wells: late in the night after the sabbath, as it began to dawn towards the first day of the week. But this makes no difference at all as to the sense. And the other Mary, &c. St. Mark says, Mary, the mother of James and Salome. St. Luke also names Joanna, who was wife to Chusa, Herod's steward. These women had rested the sabbath, and as soon as it was over, i.e. after sunset, they bought spices, and prepared them in the night, in order to embalm the body next morning. (Witham)

Sobre Mc 16:1. Saturday evening, after the sun was set, for the sabbath began and ended with the setting sun.

Sobre Mc 16:2. St. Marks says very early, the sun being now risen, whereas St. John tells us that it was yet dark. But when St. Mark says the sun was risen, he means that it began, by its approach to the horizon, to enlighten the heavens, at which time there is still darkness remaining, (according to St. John) which decreases as light approaches the earth. (St. Augustine)
Sobre Juan 20: 1. This was on the first day of the week, the morrow of the sabbath. (Bible de Vence)

Apparent Contradiction in the Trinitarian Faith

Apparent Contradiction in the Trinitarian Faith

The following is quoted from the blog called "Three Anachronisms":

"Disproof of Catholic doctrine?

No, I'm not going Protestant. :P I simply thought of this last night and can't get it out of my mind. I got this while reading Surprised by Joy, by C. S. Lewis, interestingly enough.

So, Jesus is fully human and fully divine, i.e. he's a divine person with both human and divine natures. Ok, got that. Now the question. If he has divine nature (Creator) and human nature (created) wouldn't he, in a sense, have to have created himself? And if so, isn't that a contradiction (as one cannot both be creator and created at the same time). The answer to the question that arrises immediately is that he was God before he was man, but God is above time and thus that is irrelevant. I suppose that since he created his human nature and not his own human person that he wouldn't have created himself, but rather just his nature...but that to me does not make much sense. I suppose also that some might think that the person of the Father was the creator, and not the Son, but John 1:3 "All things were made by him [the Word i.e. Jesus]: and without him was made nothing that was made." All persons of the Trinity were directly involved in all the steps of salvation, creation, redemption, and sanctification.

I suppose I may have disproved it, but I'm altogether not sure enough. If any of you would like to help, please do!

~Ambrose

posted by Immortal Philosopher at Thursday, January 31, 2008 "

Dear Ambrose,

A few points:

1) It is true that the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity do operate together when they operate ad extra through their Divine Nature. Therefore, the acts of creation and conservation of the universe, the general and specific motions of Divine Providence, etc., are caused ad extra by all three Persons of the Blessed Trinity. (NB.: This is not true of ad intra operations; and it is not true when the Second Person operates through his Human Nature only.)

2) The Incarnation of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity was caused ad extra by the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, acting together. That is, they (together) created the Human Nature--both body and soul--inside the womb of the Blessed Virgin AND they (also together) caused this nature to be hypostatically united to the Second Person. (NB.: These two events happened simultaneously.)

3) Therefore, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity did not create Himself. Rather, the Second Person created his Human Nature only and caused it to be hypostatically united to Himself.

4) Here is the the battle-song of the Trinitarian faith, the "Athanasian Creed" (aka, Quicumque vult), one of the Four Official Creeds of the Church, which is traditionally recited during Matins of Sundays within Trinitytide, and which marvelously summarizes our Faith in the Trinity and in the Hypostatic Union:

Whoever wishes to be saved must before all else adhere to the Catholic Faith. He must preserve this Faith whole and untarnished; otherwise he will most certainly perish forever.

Now this is the Catholic Faith: that we worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity; neither confusing the persons nor distinguishing the nature. The Person of the Father is distinct; the Person of the Son is distinct; the Person of the Holy Spirit is distinct. Yet the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit possess one Godhead, equal glory, and coeternal majesty.

As the Father is, so is the Son, so is the Holy Spirit. The Father is uncreated, the Son is uncreated, the Holy Spirit is uncreated. The Father is infinite, the Son is infinite, the Holy Spirit is infinite. The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal. Nevertheless, they are not three eternals, but one Eternal. Even as they are not three uncreateds, or three infinites, but one Uncreated, and one Infinite. So likewise the Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty. And yet they are not three almighties, but one Almighty. So also the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. And yet they are not three Gods, but only one God. So too the Father is Lord, the Son is Lord, the Holy Spirit is Lord. And still there are not three Lords, but only one Lord. For just as we are compelled by Christian truth to profess that each Person is individually God, so also are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to hold there are three Gods or Lords.

The Father was made by no one, being neither created nor begotten. The Son is from the Father alone, though not created or made, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, though neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding. Consequently, there is one Father, not Three Fathers; there is one Son, not three Sons; there is one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits. Furthermore, in this Trinity there is no “before” or “after,” no “greater” or “less”; for all three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal. In every respect, therefore, as has already been stated, Unity must be worshipped in Trinity and Trinity in Unity.

This is what everyone who wishes to be saved must hold regarding the Blessed Trinity. But for his eternal salvation, he must also believe according to the true Faith in the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Now the true Faith requires us to believe and acknowledge that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is both God and Man. He is God, begotten of the substance of the Father before the world began; He is Man, born in the world of the substance of His Mother. Perfect God, perfect Man, a substance composed of a rational soul and a human body. Equal to the Father in divinity, less than the Father with respect to His humanity. And although He is God and man, still He is only one Christ, not two. One, not by any turning of the divinity into flesh, but by the taking up of humanity into God. One only, not by any confusion of substance, but by the unity of His Person. For just as the rational soul and the body form one man, so God and Man form one Christ.

He suffered for our salvation, descended into hell, rose from the dead on the third day, ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God the Father all-powerful, and whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead. At His coming, all men must rise with their bodies and must give an account of their own deeds. And those who have done good shall go into eternal life, while those who have done evil shall go into eternal fire.

This is the Catholic Faith, and anyone who does not believe it fully and firmly cannot be saved.

5) Ergo, there is no contradiction in the truths that God revealed. If you ever find a contradiction within the Truths revealed by God, that should be an indication, not of any deficiencies in the Revealed Truth, but of the deficiencies in your own reasoning. Here's what Holy Mother the Church teaches infallibly on this subject:

"[A]lthough faith is above reason, nevertheless, between faith and reason no true dissension can ever exist, since the same God, who reveals mysteries and infuses faith, has bestowed on the human soul the light of reason; moreover, God cannot deny Himself, nor ever contradict truth with truth. But, a vain appearance of such a contradiction arises chiefly from this, that either the dogmas of faith have not been understood and interpreted according to the mind of the Church, or deceitful opinions are considered as the determinations of reason. Therefore, "every assertion contrary to the truth illuminated by faith, we define to be altogether false" [Lateran Council V, see Denzinger n. 738 ]." (Vatican I, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, Denzinger n. 1797.)

6) I suggest you take a look at one of the traditional manuals of scholastic Theology that go into these issues, the most basic, popular, and widely-circulated in the English-speaking world being Ludwig Ott's Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma (reprint availabe through TAN Books). (Another popular one in English is the two-volume set by Adolphe Tanquerey, Manual of Dogmatic Theology; it is out of print, but if budget is not a problem you can easily buy a used copy off the internet.) Ott is by no means the best--it sometimes errs on the finer points due to its overly-simplistic approach--but it is a good starting point and it is very-readily available. I read it when I was in my junior year in high school and, through it, I discovered my vocation to study theology (and, therefore, philosophy). I hope you enjoy it as well.

What can we Infer from a Condemned Proposition?

What can we Infer from a Condemned Proposition?

Dear Professor,

I was hoping you could take some time out of your schedule and help me with a question.

1) How does one interpret those long lists propositions censured by Rome, usually in the form of a negative or affirmative proposition? Does one understand the contrary or the contradictory as the orthodox doctrine? Are there any dogmatic principles laid out in one of your manuals in dealing with the interpretation of these propositions?

2) For example, what would be the contrary and/or contradictory of the proposition?

Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.

Or, what more specifically would be the contrary and/or contradictory of this [condemned] proposition of Quanta Cura:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

What do you make of this supposed contradictory formulation?

The best constitution of public society and civil progress DO NOT require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist, or at least without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones. [...]

It seems that this actually makes the proposition state the very thing the Pope was condemning as an actual possibility. It seems borderline nonsensical even. Would not the contradictory be posited in replacing "without" with the word "with"?

3) Could you take some time to break down the above proposition into it's constituent parts i.e. the subjects, objects, predicates, and so on.

4) And finally, how would you respond to this supposed exposition of logic:

This is why the condemnation of a proposition as false necessarily implies that the contradictory is true, but does not necessarily imply that the contrary is true. For example, from the condemnation of the proposition that human arguments opposed to the Catholic faith should always be allowed free room for discussion, it follows that at least sometimes they shouldn't, but not that they never should, nor even that they shouldn't as a rule with limited exceptions. From the condemnation of the proposition that no offenders against the Catholic religion should be penalized to a greater extent than public peace may require, it follows that at least some of them should, but not that all of them should, nor that any of them must be punished to a far greater extent than public peace may require.

To claim that the condemnation of a proposition establishes that the contrary of the proposition is true, rather than merely that the contradictory is true--like this: "Rather the contrary of the condemned doctrine would state [...]" [emphasis added]--is to perpetrate a fraud that will deceive only those who are not accustomed to employ even the rudiments of logic in comparing the teachings of Vatican II to prior teachings.

I would greatly appreciate your thoughtful response in this matter. Please let me know if you are still accepting donations as I know your time is valuable.

Thanks,
M.S.

--------------------

Dear M.,

1) I checked my best manual on Fundamental Theology (the Spanish Jesuit manual published by BAC in the 50's) and, although it does give an impressive treatment of the different notae theologicae, it does not seem to address the issue of deriving or inferring true propositions from condemned propositions. I am assuming that there must be many, much-more extensive, traditional monographs on Fundamental Theology that do go into the issue (after all, manuals are just summaries for seminarians), but I am not familiar with any (yet).

2) However, traditional logic does provide (almost) all the the tools that we need to make these inferences. The principles of making these inferences are not properly theological (that's why they are not likely to be found in theological textbooks) but philosophical. They belong to the discipline of logic.

The only distinction we need to import from theology is the obvious fact that there are different levels of condemned propositions (cf. the notae theologiae). Sometimes propositions are condemned as false. When a proposition is condemned as false, then we can utilize traditional logic to infer the truth of its contradictory. Sometimes, however, they are condemned in a "weaker" form, as doctrines that must not be taught or that sound offensive, or rash, etc., but not as doctrines that are necessarily "false" (the Magisterium will actually term them as doctrines that are "offensive to pious ears," or "rash," or something of the sort). When a proposition is condemned in one of these weaker ways, one cannot logically infer that its contradictory (or its "contrary" or whatever) is true. So let us find out how to derive the truth of the contradictory of a proposition that is condemned in the "stronger" way (i.e., as false).

[If you are not familiar with the traditional Square of Opposition, you might want to read this page before proceeding. You may ignore the last parragraph, as it pertains to "non-existent entities" (such are the trivial concerns of modern logic) and does not matter for our issue.]

It is ALWAYS the case that, if a proposition is false, its contradictory (not the same thing as its "opposite" or its "contrary" or its "sub-contrary" or its "sub-alternate") must be true. The question is what exactly is the contradictory of a given proposition. It ultimately depends on how the proposition is formulated. For simple categorical propositions of universal and particular quantity, it's quite easy: just refer to the Square of Opposition. However, not all propositions are simple (some are compound) and not all are universal or particular (some are singular and others indefinite); in these cases, the Square of Opposition does not apply. In fact, neither of the condemned propositions you gave me are simple universal or particular propositions and, therefore, we cannot use the Square of Opposition to derive the truth of their contradictories.

The first condemned proposition you cited is an example of a compound proposition:

It is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.

This proposition starts with the words "It is false that..." For this reason, it is not a simple proposition, but a compound one. It is one proposition inside another. For the sake of clarity and economy of words, we'll abbreviate it as "~P." ("~" = "it is false that"; "P" = "the civil liberty... indifferentism." I hope you don't mind my using symbols to demonstrate the principle.) Now, this whole, complex proposition "~P" is condemned as false; therefore, we can say that ~P is false. Remember that if a proposition is false, then its contradictory is true. The contradictory of ~P is ~(~P), or simply P. So, if ~P is false, then its contradictory, P, is true.

(You can look at it this way: "~P is false" is itself a compound proposition. "~P is false" can be written in the following way: ~(~P). Now, if ~(~P), then P. Therefore, P is true. Put in words, if it is false that P is false, then it must be true that P is true. Therefore, P must be true. The principle that is operative here is the Principle of the Excluded Middle: there is no middle ground between truth and falsity.)

How does this translate into? How do you formulate the truth (the contradictory of the condemned proposition) in English?

The civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.

Essentially, this means that civil liberty of worship and of opinion are conducive to the corruption of the people. This proposition (which is the contradictory of the condemned proposition) is true; we can safely derive this truth from the condemned proposition.


3) The second condemned proposition you cite is a simple proposition (not compound), but it is singular in quantity, not universal or particular, and, therefore, the Square of Opposition does not work either. It can be phrased this way (without loosing its essential meaning) so that it is clear that it is singular:

THE best constitution of public society [...] IS something that requires that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

It essentially says that a certain S is P. (S = "the best constitution of public society and civil progress"; P = "things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.") So we could formulate it logically as:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress" are "things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.

This is an affirmative singular proposition (if we interpret "the best constitution of publich society and civil progress" as forming a single, individual subject). Singular propositions follow what can be called "secondary opposition" (not primary opposition, which is what is expressed in the square of opposition). This means that they only have a contradictory, not a contrary. The contradictory of "a certain S is P" is "a certain S is not P." So, given that if a proposition is false, its contradictory must necessarily be true, this means that, since "a certain S is P" is false, "a certain S is not P" must be true.

What does this mean? It means that, because the condemned proposition,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE things that require that human society be conducted... false ones

is false, its contradictory,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE NOT things that require that human society be conducted... false ones

must be true.

If it does not make much sense it is simply because it remains in "logical form." Let us translate it to normal English:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress DOES NOT altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

In other words, the best constitution of society does not require indifferentism. This is the truth that we can logically infer from the condemned proposition.

4) The author you cite is right in saying:

The condemnation of a proposition as false necessarily implies that the contradictory is true, but does not necessarily imply that the contrary is true.

He seems to be presuptiously asserting a principle of theological interpretation, but in fact it is simply applying a fundamental truth of the logic of categorical propositions to the particular instance of condemned propositions. The fact that one can infer, from the falsity of a proposition, the truth of its contradictory (and nothing at all of its contrary) is a basic principle of Aristotelian logic. But however basic, it is an important one to remember when interpreting the condemnations. This is perhaps best illustrated by means of an example of a condemned proposition that does follow the rules of the square of opposition, for it is in the square of opposition that the relationship between the contradictory and the contrary of a proposition is most clearly seen. Take this condemned proposition, for example (taken from Pope St. Pius X's Lamentabili):

In all the evangelical texts the name 'Son of God'' is equivalent only to that of 'Messias'. It does not in the least way signify that Christ is the true and natural Son of God.

This is a simple proposition; a universal affirmative. In terms of the square of opposition, we say it is an A-proposition. It says that all S's are P's. (S = "evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God'"; P = "texts that do not signify that Christ is God") In logical form:

ALL evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE texts that do not signify that Christ is God.

Now, the contradictory of an A-proposition (universal affirmative) is the O-proposition (particular negative). In logical form, this would be:

SOME evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE NOT texts that do not signify that Christ is God."

Therefore, since the condemned A-proposition is false, the corresponding O-proposition is necessarily true. What is extremely important here is that we must not confuse the contradictory of a proposition with its contrary. The contrary of an A-proposition is its corresponding E-proposition. So the contrary of "All S's are P's" is "No S's are P's." Whereas the principle governing the relationship betwen contradictories states that if one of two contradictories is true, then the other must be false; the principle governing the relationship betwen contraries states that they cannot both be true, but they can both be false. Therefore, if we know that one is false, we cannot conclude that the other is true; in fact, we will not be able to conclude anything from that fact. For instance, "All extraterrestrial life forms are rational" and "No extraterrestrial life forms are rational" cannot both be true, but they can both be false. Hence, if we were to find out that one of these is false, we won't be able to infer that the other is true.

Therefore, from the fact that the condemned proposition,

SOME evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE NOT texts that do not signify that Christ is God.

is false, I cannot infer that:

NO evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' ARE texts that do not signify that Christ is God." (= "All evangelical texts that use the name 'Son of God' signify that Christ is God.")

I do not mean to say that this last proposition is false (I would think it's true, though I'm no biblical scholar). All I'm saying is that its truth cannot be inferred from the falsity of its contrary. To infer the truth of a proposition from the falsity of its contrary is a fallacy.

I hope this helps. I apologize for the length of the explanation. St. Thomas could have done it a million times better in about 1% of the space.

In Domino,
-FJR.

-------------------------

Dear professor,

You stated that:

The second condemned proposition you cite is a simple proposition (not compound), but it is singular in quantity, not universal or particular, and, therefore, the Square of Opposition does not work either. It can be phrased this way (without loosing its essential meaning) so that it is clear that it is singular:

THE best constitution of public society [...] IS something that requires that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

I thought that this was a universal proposition since it seems to refer to not any society in particular, but the concept of society in the abract viz. it's "best" constitution.

[You also said that:]

Because the condemned proposition,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.

is false, its contradictory,

The best constitution of public society and civil progress ARE NOT things that require that human society be conducted... false ones.

must be true.

If it does not make much sense it is simply because it remains in "logical form." Let us translate it to normal English:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress DOES NOT altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

In other words, the best constitution of society does not require indifferentism. This is the truth that we can logically infer [from the condemned proposition.]

I thought that the contradictory of the proposition above would revolve around the word "without" in such a way that it would read:

The best constitution of public society and civil progress altogether require that human society be conducted and governed WITH regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

Does this not seem to be the contradictory of the assertion that society ought to be governed "WITHOUT" those conditions?

It seems that the contradictory that you formed would be implicitly allowing for the fact that sometimes religious indifference is the best constitution of society, but I thought this was the very thing Pius IX was censuring. As such, a liberal could theoretically glean from the above contradictory proposition that since we have evolved to a certain point in history, religious indifference of governments is always the best constitution, much like Dignitatis Humanae asserted. Would not the whole force of the condemnation be vitiated?

Yours,
M.S.

----------------------

Matthew,

A few points:

1) It seems to me that the third condemned proposition is singular (not universal) because its subject refers to a singular entity, namely, "THE best constitution." If the subject were "ALL constitutions" then it would be a universal proposition. If it were "SOME constitutions" then the proposition would be particular. The quantity of a proposition is identical to the quantity (or distribution) of the subject.

It is true that sometimes we utilize an abstract term to mean the whole class. For instance, when we say "man is rational" we mean "all men are rational." However, if we qualify the subject "man" by saying it is the "best," as in "the best man will win," then we don't mean "all men will win" but "one man will win." Usually, "the best x" refers to a single x and not to the whole class. I think that is what is going on in this (condemned) proposition. That's why I interpreted it as a singular proposition.

2) Let us suppose the condemned proposition is universal (A). At least in the case of A, E, I, and O propositions, the way you find the contradictory of a proposition is by reversing BOTH its quantity and quality, and leaving the subject and predicate terms untouched.

So, imagining it was an A proposition, I will re-write it with QUANTITY AND QUALITY INDICATORS in caps and will bold the subject and predicate terms:

ALL constitutions of public society and civil progress ARE things that altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

If that were the condemned proposition, then the only way I could find the contradictory is by changing the quantity from universal to particular (i.e., change "ALL" to "SOME") and changing the quality from affirmative to negative (i.e., change "ARE" to "ARE NOT"). Furthermore, I would absolutely have to leave the subject and predicate terms untouched. So the contradictory (O) would look like this:

SOME constitutions of public society and civil progress ARE NOT things that altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or [...] without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones.

To put it more briefly and in logical form, if the condemned proposition were:

ALL constitutions ARE things that require indifferentism" (which would be condemned, i.e., false).

Then its contradictory would be:

SOME constitutions ARE NOT things that require indifferentism" (which would be true, because it is the contradictory of a false proposition).

And that's all that you would be able to infer from the condemned A proposition. To infer anything else would be a fallacy.

3) Now, there is something extremely important that you MUST understand. When you say that "Some s are not p" you are NOT implying that "Some s are p." That would also be a fallacy. These two types of proposition (I and O) are sub-contraries. You may not infer the truth of one subcontrary from the truth of the other (although you may infer the truth of one from the falsity of the other). For example, it is certainly true that "Some Thomists are not amoebas" (I, for one, am not), you may not thereby infer that "Some Thomists are amoebas." However, knowing that "Some Thomists are amoebas" is false, you could infer that "Some Thomists are not amoebas" is true.

Now, this applies even if the condemned proposition is singular, as I had interpreted it. In the same way that one cannot infer the truth of a particular affirmative (I) from the truth of a particular negative (O), one also cannot infer the truth of a particular affirmative (I) from the truth of a singular negative. I had said that the condemned proposition was singular:

"THE best constitution IS something that requires indifferentism" (false, i.e., condemned).

Then, to get the contradictory, I merely reversed the quality to negative; the quantity, however, being singular, cannot be reversed:

"THE best constitution IS NOT something that requires indifferentism." (true, i.e., the contradictory of a false proposition).

You were alarmed that I would affirm this last proposition (the contradictory), because you thought it would imply that SOME constitutions other than the best one DO require indifferentism. But to think that way is to commit the same fallacy. From the fact that SOME constitutions (for example, the best one) DO not require indifferentism (I), one cannot infer that SOME constitutions DO NOT require indifferntism (O).

In the end, it does not matter what how you interpret the quantity of the condemned proposition:

• a. If it is universal affirmative (A), then the contradictory will be a particular negative (O), from which you cannot infer a particular affirmative (I).
• b. If it is singular affirmative, then the contradictory will be a singular negative, from which you cannot infer a particular affirmative (I).

So, either way, you will not be able to infer the I statement:

"SOME constitutions ARE things that require indifferentism" (product of a fallacy).

Let me know what your thoughts are on this.

Best,
-FJR.

---------------

Dear Professor,

You have hit the nail on the head, the fallacious inference of a particular affirmative. It's like a revelation! I was bothered by something, but I couldn't quite put my finger on it. Essentially this gentleman was trying to assert that since the contradictory of the condemned proposition didn't necessarily logically exclude all constitutions, we could infer that some constitutions require religious indifferentism. The universal call of Dignitatis Humanae for civil religious indifferentism, based upon the dignity of man, is what is under discussion. Now, if this is a practical pastoral judgment based upon historic facts, then we could merely quibble about the prudence of such an idea. But on the other hand, if it is a theoretical doctrine, universally valid, or the ideal form of government and it's relation to religion, then we have a real problem. If you have time, the discussion would be greatly enriched by your participation.

Yours,

M.S.

Manual Labor on Sunday

Manual Labor on Sunday

Is cooking forbidden on Sundays?

Canon law forbids only unnecessary manual labor. Hence, if you are a baker at a bakery, and you work five or six days per week, then you are forbidden to work there on Sunday, because it would be unnecessary. However, some necessary, daily manual chores in the home are permissible on Sunday, such as cooking, or cleaning the dinner table, etc. In fact, if your mother decides to cook a nice meal every Sunday for the family, she is not violating canon law; that is allowed. Her cooking would be ordered to a proper observance of the Lord's Day. Also, anything else that involves manual labor but is ordered to the propery observance of the Lord's day is also permissible; for example, if you decide to iron your Sunday clothes on Sunday morning because you do not want to wear wrinkly clothes to Mass; or if your car battery dies on Sunday morning before leaving for Mass, and you are allowed to "jump" the car so you can get to Mass.

However, any manual chores that need not be done every day, or need not be done on Sunday, may not be done on Sundays. For example, one should not do the weekly house cleaning on Sunday, or gardening, or washing one's car, or home improvement, other similar manual chores. (It is--or at least it used to be--a common practice among Catholics to utilize Saturday for such chores.)

Now, some public manual functions that are necessary for the proper functioning of society are also permissible on Sundays (for example, if there is a fire on Sunday, a firefigher should not wait until Monday to put it out!). Moreover, it may be that the ONLY way a man can find work is if he works on Sunday. Some jobs are such that they do not give you any other option. If that is the case, then one is exempt and may work. This situation is rather rare, but it is a possibility nonetheless.

Also, play, even of the more physical sort, such as sports, are permissible on Sundays because they are not considered labor. Hence, you may very well play baseball or football or whatever as a form of recreation.

Now, some people who have non-manual professions, such as myself as a professor, prefer also to abstain from working those days, even though the Church does not forbid it. This is a very laudable custom, although it is not mandatory. The prohibition is only with regards manual (physical) labor. Hence there are some (such as students and teachers) who customarily use Sunday afternoon to engage in their intellectual work, and this is not forbidden.

Finally, be aware that the fact that the sabbath rest must be done specifically on Sunday is from Church law, not from divine or natural law, and hence it does not apply to those who are outside the Church. Hence, a Jew or Muslim does not sin by working on Sunday (historically, it has been quite common, for example, for Jews and other non-Catholics to take up the functions that are necessary for the normal operation of society on Sundays, such as the firefighting example above).

For more, refer to the old, catechetical gem, My Catholic Faith (the section on the Third Commandment--I don't recall the page number). It has a nice, thorough explanation of all of this.

In Domino,
-FJR.

Interview: Aquinas on the Virtue of Religion

Interview: Aquinas on the Virtue of Religion

1) To what extent can one say that sacrifice to God is natural to man? Natural law prescribes that all men offer sacrifice to God. This is something that is knowable through reason, even when unaided by Divine Revelation. (Cf. ST II-II.85.1 & 4.)

2) Does the same apply to polytheistic sacrifice? No. What the natural law commands is the exercise of the virtue of religion, which is the habit that allows us to offer to God what is due to Him (Cf. ST II-II.81.2). (This, of course, presupposes that we can know the existence of the One, True God through natural reason. Cf. ST I.88.3.) Now, polytheism fails to offer due worship to God; it offers it to something other than God (Cf. ST II-II.85.2). Therefore, polytheism does not fall within the definition of religion. Rather, it falls within the definition of "superstition," the vice that opposes religion by way of excess; more precisely, it belongs to the type of superstition that we call "idolatry" (Cf. ST II-II.94.1).

3) Of the four ends of sacrifice (worship, expiation, thanksgiving, and petition), one seems to be lacking in pagan Greek religion, namely, worship. Is this due to the Greeks' lack of Divine Revelation? If they were not aware of the fact that the natural law prescribes worship, certainly this is not due to not having the means of knowing, for this can be discovered by unaided reason. I'm going off on a limb here, but perhaps it was due to their polytheism, which was simply a corruption of their natural knowledge of God--in which case it would have been directly due to their sinfulness, and thus indirectly due to their lack of Divine Revelation. The pagan Greeks seemed to have been aware of the motives for the three other forms of prayer, but perhaps not for worship. Each of the four ends of prayer has a motive (Cf. ST I-II.102.3 ad 10). The motive of petitionary prayer is the hope of benefits received; that of thanksgiving, the reception of benefits; and that of expiation, the commission of sin. The Greeks had hope of receiving benefits, received them, and sinned; so they practiced prayer of petition, and thanksgiving, and expiation. However, the motive for the prayer of worship is the Divine Majesty itself. Perhaps due to their polytheism, they were not aware of the Majesty of the One, True God (after all, their "gods" were not at all that impressive, especially as far as their moral character goes) and, therefore, found little motive for the prayer of worship.

4) How is sacrifice inherently part of latria? By reading ST II-II.85, you will already have the basics of what sacrifice is, namely, one of the exterior acts (the primary act, in fact) of the virtue of religion (i.e., latria). The context for this doctrine is ST II-II.81 (on the virtue of religion in general), which I recommend you read entirely, especially article 7 (on the exterior acts of the virtue of religion, one of which is sacrifice). Also, read SCG III.120, where Aquinas discusses latria as the worship due to God alone.

5) How is the Mass a perfect Sacrifice? Aquinas goes a bit into this in ST I-II.102.3c, with reference to the causes of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law. He also talks about the immolation of Christ in the Mass in ST III.83.1.

6) How are the rubrics (particularly orientation and tone of voice) fundamental to the perfection of this sacrifice? Technically, the natural law prescribes that we offer sacrifice to God, but not how we offer sacrifice. How we offer sacrifice is a matter of divine or human positive law (i.e., Revelation or Ecclesiastical Law): ST II-II.81.2 ad 3. Now, Revelation does not specify, at least for the New Law, that we must worship facing East or that the priest should recite his prayers in a low voice. Ecclesiastical (liturgical) law has prescribed these from time immemorial, but these laws are not immutable. Therefore, it cannot be argued that these are essential. However, one can argue in many ways that these rubrics are "fitting." In ST III.83, Aquinas discusses the various elements of the rite of the Mass and argues for their fittingness.

7) Does man rely on externals that manifest spiritual realities? Yes, because we are body-soul composites, and there is nothing in the intellect which does not first come through the senses. Already in ST II-II.81.7c you will get the essentials of this doctrine, but he also has something very interesting to say in ST II-II.84.2c. Moreover, in SCG III.119 you will get a detailed explanation of how the mind is raised to God by means of sensible things.