Sunday, October 04, 2009

Gratia est semen gloriae


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From Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Ch. 1:

All tradition declares that the life of grace on earth is in reality the seed of glory. St. Thomas delights also in saying: "For grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us." Bossuet often expresses himself in the same terms.

This explains why St. Thomas likes to say: "The good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe." The slightest degree of sanctifying grace contained in the soul of an infant after baptism is more precious than the natural good of the entire universe, all angelic natures taken together included therein; for the least degree of sanctifying grace belongs to an enormously superior order, to the order of the inner life of God, which is superior to all miracles and to all the outward signs of divine revelation.  The same supernatural life, the same sanctifying grace, is in the just on earth and in the saints in heaven. This is likewise true of infused charity...

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Ex Martyrologio


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In Béthlehem Judæ deposítio sancti Hierónymi Presbyteri, Confessóris et Ecclésiæ Doctóris, qui, ómnium stúdia litterárum adéptus ac probatórum Monachórum imitátor factus, multa hæresum monstra gládio suæ doctrínæ confódit; demum, cum ad decrépitam usque vixísset ætátem, in pace quiévit, sepultúsque est ad Præsépe Dómini.  Ejus corpus, póstea Romam delátum, in Basílica sanctæ Maríæ Majóris cónditum fuit.
In Bethlehem of Juda, the death of St. Jerome, priest and doctor of the Church.  Excelling in all kinds of learning, he imitated the life of the most approved monks, and disposed of many monstrous heresies with the sword of his doctrine.  Having at length reached a very advanced age, he rested in peace and was buried near the manger of our Lord.  His body was afterwards transferred to Rome, and placed in the basilica of St. Mary Major.

Sunday, September 27, 2009

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Cantus Proprii


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Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Homilía S. Joánnis Chrysóstomi


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Lesson vii
Léctio sancti Evangélii secúndum Matthæum
The Lesson is taken from the Holy Gospel according to Matthew
Chap. 22, 34-46
In illo témpore : Accessérunt ad Jesum pharisæi, et interrogávit eum unus ex eis legis doctor tentans eum : Magíster, quod est mandátum magnum in lege?  Et réliqua.
At that time : The Pharisees came unto Jesus, and one of them, which was a lawyer, asked him a question, tempting him, saying : Master, which is the great commandment in the Law?  And so on, and that which followeth.
Homilía sancti Joánnis Chrysóstomi
A Homily by St. John Chrysostom
Homilia 72 in Matthæum
Sadducæis confúsis, pharisæi rursus aggrediúntur ; cumque quiéscere oportéret, decertáre voluérunt : et legis perítiam profiténtem præmíttunt, non díscere, sed tentáre cupiéntes ; ac ita intérrogant : Quodnam primum mandátum in lege sit.  Nam cum primum illud sit, Díliges Dóminum Deum tuum : putántes causas sibi allatúrum ad mandátum hoc corrigéndum, áliquid addéndo, quóniam Deum se faciebat, hoc modo intérrogant.  Quid ígitur Christus?  Ut osténdat idcírco ad hæc eos devenísse, quia nulla in eis esset cáritas, sed invídiæ livóre tabéscerent : Díliges, inquit, Dóminum Deum tuum : hoc primum et magnum mandátum est.  Secúndum autem símile huic : Díliges próximum tuum sicut teípsum.
When the Pharisees had heard that Christ had put the Sadducees to silence, they gathered themselves together for a fresh attack ; just when it behoved them to be quiet, they willed to contend ; and so they put forward one of themselves who professed skill in the law, not wishing to learn, but to lay a snare.  This person therefore proposed the question : Which is the great commandment in the law?  The first and great commandment is : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, but they expected that he would make some exception or addition to this in his own case, since he made himself God.  With this expectation they asked him the question ; but what said Christ?  To shew that they had adopted this course, because they were loveless, and sick with envy, he answered : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.  This is the first and great commandment.  And the second is like unto it : Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis.
R.  Deo grátias.
V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us.
R.  Thanks be to God.
Respond vii as in the Proper

V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.
V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 8: Divínum auxílium máneat semper nobíscum.
R.  Amen.

Benediction 8: May help divine be with us all, for ever abiding.
R.  Amen.

Lesson viii
Quam ob rem símile est huic?  Quóniam hoc illud indúcit, et ab illo rursus munítur.  Quicúmque enim male agit, ódio habet lucem, et non venit ad lucem.  Et rursus : Dixit insípiens in corde suo, Non est Deus.  Deínde séquitur : Corrúpti sunt, et abominábiles facti sunt in stúdiis suis.  Et íterum : Radix ómnium malórum avarítia est ; quam quidam appeténtes, erravérunt a fide.  Et, Qui díligit me, mandáta mea servábit : quorum caput et radix est : Díliges Dóminum Deum tuum, et próximum tuum sicut teípsum.
Why is this second commandment like unto the first?  Because the first is the second's source and sanction.  For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light.  And again : The fool hath said in his heart : There is no God.  And there followeth : They are corrupt, and become abominable in their works.  And yet again : The love of money is the root of all evil ; which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith.  And yet once more : If ye love me, keep my commandments―of which commandments the head and root is : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God ; and thy neighbour as thyself.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis.
R.  Deo grátias.
V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us.
R.  Thanks be to God.
R.  Duo Séraphim clamábant alter ad álterum : *Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus Dóminus Deus Sábaoth :* Plena est omnis terra glória ejus.
V.  Tres sunt qui testimónium dant in cælo : Pater, Verbum, et Spíritus Sanctus : et hi tres unum sunt.
R.  Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus Dóminus Deus Sábaoth.
V.  Glória Patri, et Fílio, et Spirítui Sancto.
R.  Plena est omnis terra glória ejus.
R.  The two Seraphim did cry the One to the Other: * Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts : *The whole earth is full of his glory.
V.  For there are Three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost : and these Three are One.
R.  Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts.
V.  Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost.
R.  The whole earth is full of his glory.

V.  Jube domne, (Dómine) benedícere.
V.  Vouchsafe, Reverend Father (O Lord), thy blessing.
Benedíctio 9: Ad societátem cívium supernórum perdúcat nos Rex Angelórum.
R.  Amen.

Benediction 9: May the King of Angels give us fellowship with all the citizens of heaven.
R.  Amen.

Lesson ix
Si ergo dilígere Deum, dilígere próximum est : (nam si díligis me, o Petre, inquit, pasce oves meas) si étiam diléctio próximi facit ut mandáta custódias : mérito ait in his totam legem et prophétas pendére.  Et quemádmodum in superióribus, cum de resurrectióne interrogarétur, plus dócuit quam tentántes petébant ; sic in hoc loco de primo interrogátus mandáto, secúndum étiam non valde quam primum inférius, sponte áttulit ; secúndum enim est primo símile.  Ita occúlte insinuávit, ódio illos ad quæréndum incitári.  Cáritas enim, inquit, non æmulátur.
If, therefore, to love God is to love our neighbour also, (as it appeareth where it is written : Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?  And he said unto him : Lord, thou knowest all things ; thou knowest that I love thee.  Jesus saith unto him : Feed my sheep)―and if love is the fulfilling of the law, justly doth the Lord say that on these two commandments hang all the law and the Prophets.  And even as when, before this, being intérrogated about the Resurrection, he answered them more than they asked, so, now, being intérrogated concerning the first and great commandment, he answereth them, of his own accord, touching that second one also, which is little lower than the first, for the second is like unto it.  Herein he would have them understand that it was hatred stirred them up to question him.  For Charity, saith the Apostle, envieth not.
V.  Tu autem, Dómine, miserére nobis.
R.  Deo grátias.
V.  But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us.
R.  Thanks be to God.

Dominica XVII post Pentecosten: Evangelium (Textus Graece)


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Mt. 22: 34-46
Περὶ τῆς μεγαλυτέρας ἐντολῆς


34 Οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι ἀκούσαντες ὅτι ἐφίμωσε τοὺς Σαδδουκαίους, συνήχθησαν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, 35 καὶ ἐπηρώτησεν εἷς ἐξ αὐτῶν, νομικός, πειράζων αὐτὸν καὶ λέγων· 36 διδάσκαλε, ποία ἐντολὴ μεγάλη ἐν τῷ νόμῳ; 37 ὁ δὲ ᾿Ιησοῦς ἔφη αὐτῷ· ἀγαπήσεις Κύριον τὸν Θεόν σου ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ σου. 38 αὕτη ἐστὶ πρώτη καὶ μεγάλη ἐντολή. 39 δευτέρα δὲ ὁμοία αὐτῇ· ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν. 40 ἐν ταύταις ταῖς δυσὶν ἐντολαῖς ὅλος ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται κρέμανται.
Περὶ τοῦ Μεσσίου


41 Συνηγμένων δὲ τῶν Φαρισαίων ἐπηρώτησεν αὐτοὺς ὁ ᾿Ιησοῦς 42 λέγων· τί ὑμῖν δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τίνος υἱός ἐστι; λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· τοῦ Δαυῒδ. 43 λέγει αὐτοῖς· πῶς οὖν Δαυῒδ ἐν Πνεύματι Κύριον αὐτὸν καλεῖ λέγων, 44 εἶπεν ὁ Κύριος τῷ Κυρίῳ μου, κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου; 45 εἰ οὖν Δαυῒδ καλεῖ αὐτὸν Κύριον, πῶς υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστι;
46 καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο αὐτῷ ἀποκριθῆναι λόγον, οὐδὲ ἐτόλμησέ τις ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπερωτῆσαι αὐτὸν οὐκέτι.

Wednesday, August 26, 2009

The Relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas (link)


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Thursday, June 25, 2009

Sacred Theology is a Science


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From St. Thomas's Summa Theologiae, I.1.2c and ad 2:

Objection 2. Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

Reply to Objection 2. Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.


Praeterea, scientia non est singularium. Sed sacra doctrina tractat de singularibus, puta de gestis Abrahae, Isaac et Iacob, et similibus. Ergo sacra doctrina non est scientia.

Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.

Ad secundum dicendum quod singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principaliter tractetur, sed introducuntur tum in exemplum vitae, sicut in scientiis moralibus; tum etiam ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit, super quam fundatur sacra Scriptura seu doctrina.


From Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, Ch. 6: The Nature of Theological Work:

Article One: The Proper Object Of Theology

Theology is a science made possible by the light of revelation. Theology, therefore, presupposes faith in revealed truths. Hence the proper object of theology is the inner life of God as knowable by revelation and faith. By this object theology rises above metaphysics, which sees in God the first and supreme being, the author of nature, whereas theology attains God as God (sub ratione Deitatis). [246].

How does theology differ from faith? The object of theology, in the theologian who is still viator, is not the Deity clearly seen, [247] as in the beatific vision, but the Deity known obscurely by faith. [248] Theology, then, is distinguished from faith, which is its root, because theology is the science of the truths of faith, which truths it explains, defends, and compares. Comparing these truths with one another, theology sees their mutual relations, and the consequences which they virtually contain. But to use this method for attaining its proper object, the inner life of God as God, theology must presuppose metaphysics which sees God as the Supreme Being. That this is the object of metaphysics is clear, we may note, from revelation itself. When God says to Moses: "I am who am," [249] we recognize in those words the equivalent statement: God alone is subsistent existence. [250].

Theology, therefore, though here below it proceeds from principles which are believed, not seen as evident in themselves, is nevertheless a branch of knowledge, a science in the proper sense of the word. The characteristic of science is to show "the reason why this thing has just these properties." Theology does just that. It determines the nature and properties of sanctifying grace, of infused virtue, of faith, of hope, of charity. St. Thomas, in defining theology, uses the Aristotelian definition of science which he had explained in his commentary on the Later Analytics. [251] To know scientifically, he says, is to know this thing as what it is and why it cannot be otherwise. Theology then is a science, not merely in the broad sense of certain knowledge, but also in the strict sense of conclusions known by principles. [252].

Such is theology here below. But when the theologian is no longer viator, when he has received the beatific vision, then, without medium, in the Word, he will behold the inner life of God, the divine essence. Then he will know, with fullest light, what before he knew by faith. And beyond that, extra Verbum, he will see the conclusions derivable from faith. In heaven, theology will be perfect, its principles evident. But here below, theology is in an imperfect state. It has not, so to speak, become adult.

Hence theology, as attainable here below, while it is a science, and is a sub-alternate science, resting on the mind of God and the blessed in heaven, is nevertheless, when compared with all merely human knowledge, a wisdom specifically higher than metaphysics, though not as high as the infused faith which is its source. Theology then, generated by the theological labor, is by its root essentially supernatural. [253] If, consequently, the theologian loses faith (by grave sin against that virtue): there remains in him only the corpse of theology, a body without soul, since he no longer adheres, formally and infallibly, to revealed truths, the sources of the theological habit. And this is true, even if, following his own will and judgment, he still holds materially one or the other of these truths.

So much on the nature of theology. We must now consider the different steps, the different procedures, to be followed by the theologian, if he would avoid opposed and exaggerated extremes.


ARTICLE I. - L'objet propre de la théologie.

Nous supposons ici - ce qu'expose saint Thomas dans la q. I de la Somme théologique - que la théologie est à proprement parler une science qui procède sous la lumière de la Révélation divine, qui suppose donc la foi infuse aux vérités révélées, et qui a pour objet propre Dieu considéré en sa vie intime, comme auteur de la grâce, Dieu tel que la révélation et la foi nous le font connaître, et non pas seulement Dieu auteur de la nature, accessible aux forces naturelles de notre raison. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de Dieu sub ratione entis et primi entis, auquel parvient la métaphysique, science de l'être en tant qu'être, mais de Dieu sub ratione Deitatis, comme il est dit Ia, q. I, a. 6 :

Sacra doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo, secun dum quod est altissima causa : quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile (quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom., I, 19 : Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis), sed etiam quantum ad id, quod notum est sibi soli de seipso et aliis per revelationem communicatum.

La théologie, chez le théologien encore viator, ne porte pas sur la Déité clare visa, comme la vision béatifique, mais sur la Déité obscure per fidem cognita; et elle se distingue pourtant de la foi, qui est comme sa racine, parce qu'elle est une science des vérités de la foi qu'elle doit expliquer et défendre par la méthode d'analogie. Elle cherche à découvrir leur subordination en un corps de doctrine et à déduire les vérités qu'elles contiennent virtuellement.

En ce travail la théologie ne peut se servir de la méthode d'analogie dans l'explication des vérités relatives à la vie intime de Dieu, ad ipsam Deitatem ut sic, sans recourir à ce que la métaphysique nous dit de Dieu comme premier être, sub ration entis. Du reste cela même est révélé, en particulier lorsque Dieu dit à Moïse : Ego sum qui sum, vérité qui est l'équivalent de cette formule : Solus Deus est ipsum Esse subsistens.

Bien qu'ici-bas la théologie procède de principes non évidents, des principes de foi, elle est pourtant une science au sens propre de ce mot, car elle déter mine « la cause pour laquelle telle chose a telles pro priétés et non pas telles autres » ; c'est ainsi qu'elle détermine la nature et les propriétés de la grâce sanctifiante, des vertus infuses en général, de la foi, de l'espérance, de la charité, etc. Saint Thomas en somme applique à la théologie la définition aristoté licienne de la science, qu'il a expliquée dans son commentaire des Posteriora Analytica, 1. I, lect. 4: Scire est cognoscere causam propter quam res est et non potest aliter se habere. La science se dit au sens large de toute connaissance certaine ; elle se dit au sens propre de la connaissance des conclusions par les principes. Cf. R. Gagnebet, O. P., La nature de la théologie spéculative, dans Rev. thom., 1938, n. 1 et 2 (extrait, p. 78), et 1939, p. 108-147.

Lorsque le théologien ne sera plus viator, lorsqu'il aura reçu la vision béatifique, il verra immédiatement in Verbo, la vie intime de Dieu, la Déité ou essence divine ; il atteindra en pleine lumière les vérités qu'il connaissait d'abord par la foi, et il pourra encore voir extra Verbum les conclusions qui peuvent s'en déduire. Au ciel la théologie existera à l'état parfait avec l'évidence des principes, in via elle existe à l'état imparfait, elle n'a pas encore l'âge adulte pour ainsi parler.

Il suit de là pour saint Thomas et son école que la théologie est une science subalternée à celle de Dieu et des bienheureux, qu'elle est aussi une sagesse, spécifiquement supérieure à la métaphysique, mais inférieure à la foi infuse ; elle est un habitus acquis par le travail, mais dont la racine est essentiellement surnaturelle, radix ejus est ipsa fides infusa. De la sorte, si le théologien vient à perdre la foi infuse par une faute grave contre cette vertu théologale, il ne reste plus en lui que le cadavre de la théologie, un corps sans âme, car il n'adhère plus formellement et infailliblement aux vérités révélées, principes de la théologie, il adhère tout au plus matériellement à celles de ces vérités qu'il veut garder ex proprio judicio et propria voluntate.

Si telle est selon saint Thomas et l'ensemble de ses interprètes la nature de la théologie, quels sont les divers procédés qui concourent au travail théologique et le constituent. Il importe de les bien distinguer les uns des autres, pour éviter les exagérations en sens opposés.


Notes:

246 This paragraph summarizes the first question in the Summa. See Ia, q. 1, a. 6.

247 Clare visa248 Obscure per fidem cognita249 Ego sum qui sum250 Deus solus est ipsum esse subsistens251 Bk. 1, lect. 4; Scire est cognoscere causam propter quam res est et non potest aliter se habere

252 Cf. R. Gagnebet, O. P.: "La nature de la theologie speculative" in Rev. thom.: 1938, nos. 1 and 2, p. 78; 1939, pp. 108-47

253 Radix ejus est ipsa fides infusa

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

The Division and Order of Philosophical Sciences


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Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics Book I, lecture 1, nos. 1-2 (On the Objective Division of Sciences):

1. As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it is the business of the wise man to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the most powerful perfection of reason whose characteristic is to know order. Even if the sensitive powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to know the order of one thing to another is exclusively the work of intellect or reason. Now a twofold order is found in things. One kind is that of parts of a totality, that is, a group, among themselves, as the parts of a house are mutually ordered to each other. The second order is that of things to an end. This order is of greater importance than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics, the order of the parts of an army among themselves exists because of the order of the whole army to the commander. Now order is related to reason in a fourfold way. There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds, such is the order of things in nature. There is a second order that reason establishes in its own act of consideration, for example, when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of concepts as well, because words express the meanings of the concepts. There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operations of the will. There is a fourth order that reason in planning establishes in the external things which it causes, such as a chest and a house.

2. Because the operation of reason is perfected by habit, according to the different modes of order that reason considers in particular, a differentiation of sciences arises. The function of 1) natural philosophy is to consider the order of things that human reason considers but does not establish--understand that with natural philosophy here we also include metaphysics. The order that reason makes in its own act of consideration pertains to 2) rational philosophy [or logic], which properly considers the order of the parts of verbal expression with one another and the order of principles to one another and to their conclusions. The order of voluntary actions pertains to the consideration of 3) moral philosophy. The order that reason in planning establishes in external things arranged by human reason pertains to the 4) mechanical arts. Accordingly it is proper to moral philosophy, to which our attention is at present directed, to consider human operations insofar as they are ordered to one another and to an end.

Sicut philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis. Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem partium alicuius totius seu alicuius multitudinis adinvicem, sicut partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic ordo est principalior, quam primus. Nam, ut philosophus dicit in XI metaphysicae, ordo partium exercitus adinvicem, est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur. Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae; tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo.

Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae. Nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones; ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, pertinet ad artes mechanicas. Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae adinvicem et ad finem.



From Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, Book VI, lecture 7 (On the Order of Learning the Sciences):

So the proper order of learning will be the following. First, boys should be instructed in logical matters, because logic teaches the method of the whole of philosophy. Second, they are to be instructed in mathematics, which does not require experience and does not transcend the imagination. Third, they should be trained in the natural sciences which, thought not transcending sense and imagination, nevertheless require experience. Fourth, they are to be instructed in the moral sciences, which require experience and a soul free from passion, as is said in the first book [of Aristotle’s Ethics]. Fifth, they should be taught matters concerning wisdom and divine science, which go beyond the imagination and require a vigorous mind.

Erit ergo hic congruus ordo addiscendi, ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae. Secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturalibus, quae, etsi non excedant sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam; quarto autem in moralibus, quae requirunt et experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. Quinto autem in sapientialibus et divinis quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum.


From Aquinas' Commentary on the Book of Causes, Lecture 1 (On the Order of Learning the Sciences):

The principal aim of the philosophers was that, through all their investigations of things, they might come to know the first causes. That is why they placed the science concerned with first causes last, and allotted the final period of their lives to its consideration. They began first of all with logic, which teaches the method of the sciences. Second, they went on to mathematics, which even boys are capable of learning. Third, they advanced to the philosophy of nature, which requires time because of the needed experience. Fourth, they proceeded to moral philosophy, of which a young person cannot be a suitable student. And finally they applied themselves to the divine science, whose object is the first causes of things.

Et inde est quod philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut, per omnia quae in rebus considerabant, ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent: primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium causas.

Saturday, June 20, 2009

Whether God's Existence is Self-Evident


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From St. Anselm, Proslogion, Chs. 3-4:

"[T]he fool has said in his heart, there is no God" (Ps 13:1; 52:1)....

Even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist;. and this being you are, O Lord, our God.


"[D]ixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus" (Ps 13:1; 52:1)....

Convincitur ... etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, quia hoc, cum audit, intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est.

Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.

Quod utique sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod maius est quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: id ipsum quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitari nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster.


From St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I.2.1c:

Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (Posterior Analytics I.3) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (De Hebdomadibus), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (ST I.3.4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.

Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.



Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest, maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.

Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.


From Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, Ch. 7:

St. Thomas does not admit that an a priori proof of God's existence can be given. [269] He grants indeed that the proposition, God exists, is in itself evident, and would therefore be self-evident to us if we had a priori face-to-face knowledge of God; then we would see that His essence includes existence, not merely as an object of abstract thought, but as a reality objectively present. [270] But in point of fact we have no such a priori knowledge of God. [271] We must begin with a nominal definition of God, conceiving Him only confusedly, as the first source of all that is real and good in the world. From this abstract knowledge, so far removed from direct intuition of God's essence, we cannot deduce a priori His existence as a concrete fact.

It is true we can know a priori the truth of this proposition: If God exists in fact, then He exists of Himself. But in order to know that He exists in fact, we must begin with existences which we know by sense experience, and then proceed to see if these concrete existences necessitate the actual objective existence of a First Cause, corresponding to our abstract concept, our nominal definition of God. [272].

This position, the position of moderate realism, is intermediary, between the agnosticism of Hume on the one hand, and, on the other, that excessive realism, which in varying degree we find in Parmenides, Plato, and the Neoplatonists, and which in a certain sense reappears in St. Anselm, and later, much accentuated, in Spinoza, in Malebranche and the Ontologists, who believe that they have an intuition and not merely an abstract concept of God's nature.


Saint Thomas n'admet pas qu'on puisse prouver a priori l'existence de Dieu, Ia, q. II, a. I, bien que la proposition Deus est soit per se nota quoad se, ou évidente par elle-même en soi et pour celui qui saurait ce qu'est Dieu : l'Être même subsistant dont l'essence implique l'existence actuelle ou de fait : existentiam non solum signalant aut conceptam, sed exercitam in re extra animam. Mais, dit-il, nous ne savons pas a priori ce qu'est Dieu, nescimus de Deo quid est; nous n'avons d'abord qu'une définition nominale de Dieu, conçu confusément comme cause première du monde, de tout ce qu'il y a de réel et de bon en lui. De cette notion abstraite de Dieu, fort différente de l'intuition immédiate de l'essence divine, nous ne pouvons pas déduire a priori son existence concrète ou de fait.

Nous voyons sans doute a priori, que Dieu existe par soi, s'il existe de fait. Mais pour affirmer qu'il existe de fait (existentia exercita), il faut partir de l'existence de fait des réalités contingentes que notre expérience constate, et voir si elles exigent nécessai rement une cause première qui corresponde réelle ment en dehors de notre esprit à notre notion abstraite ou définition nominale de Dieu. Cf. Ia, q. II, a. I, ad 2um ; et a. 2, ad 2um.

Cette position est celle du réalisme modéré, inter médiaire entre le nominalisme qui conduit à l'agnos ticisme (on le verra chez Hume), et le réalisme excessif de l'intelligence, qui se trouve à des degrés divers chez Parménide, Platon, les néoplatoniciens, qui reparaît en un sens dans l'argument de saint Anselme, plus tard sous une forme très accentuée chez Spinoza, et aussi chez Malebranche et les onto logistes, qui croient avoir une intuition immédiate confuse, et non pas seulement une idée abstraite, de la nature de Dieu.



Notes:

269 ST I.2.1.

270 Existentiam non solum signatam aut conceptam, sed exercitam in re extra animam.

271 Nescimus de Deo quid est.

272 ST I.2.1 ad 2; 2 ad 2.

Thursday, May 28, 2009

Four Conditions for Obtaining What We Pray For


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ST II-II.83.15. Whether prayer is meritorious?

Objection 2. Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above (A. 6, 7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated above (I-II.114.6), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (7, ad 2, 3). Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to ask: "(a) for ourselves, (b) things necessary for salvation, (c) piously, (d) perseveringly"; when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.


Ad quintumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio non sit meritoria.

2. Praeterea, si oratio aliquid meretur, maxime videtur mereri illud quod orando petitur. Sed hoc non semper meretur, quia multoties etiam sanctorum orationes non exaudiuntur; sicut paulus non est exauditus petens removeri a se stimulum carnis. Ergo oratio non est actus meritorius.

Ad secundum dicendum quod ad aliud principaliter respicit meritum orationis quandoque quam ad id quod petitur, meritum enim praecipue ordinatur ad beatitudinem; sed petitio orationis directe se extendit quandoque ad aliqua alia, ut ex dictis patet. Si ergo illud aliud quod petit aliquis pro seipso, non sit ei ad beatitudinem utile, non meretur illud, sed quandoque hoc petendo et desiderando meritum amittit, puta si petat a Deo complementum alicuius peccati, quod est non pie orare. Quandoque vero non est necessarium ad salutem, nec manifeste saluti contrarium. Et tunc, licet orans possit orando mereri vitam aeternam, non tamen meretur illud obtinere quod petit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro sententiarum prosperi, fideliter supplicans Deo pro necessitatibus huius vitae, et misericorditer auditur, et misericorditer non auditur. Quid enim infirmo sit utile magis novit medicus quam aegrotus. Et propter hoc etiam paulus non est exauditus petens amoveri stimulum carnis, quia non expediebat. Si vero id quod petitur sit utile ad beatitudinem hominis, quasi pertinens ad eius salutem, meretur illud non solum orando, sed etiam alia bona opera faciendo. Et ideo indubitanter accipit quod petit, sed quando debet accipere, quaedam enim non negantur, sed ut congruo dentur tempore, differuntur, ut Augustinus dicit, super ioan.. Quod tamen potest impediri, si in petendo non perseveret. Et propter hoc dicit Basilius, ideo quandoque petis et non accipis, quia perperam postulasti, vel infideliter vel leviter, vel non conferentia tibi, vel destitisti. Quia vero homo non potest alii mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno, ut supra dictum est; ideo per consequens nec ea quae ad vitam aeternam pertinent potest aliquando aliquis ex condigno alteri mereri. Et propter hoc non semper ille auditur qui pro alio orat, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo ponuntur quatuor conditiones, quibus concurrentibus, semper aliquis impetrat quod petit, ut scilicet pro se petat, necessaria ad salutem, pie et perseveranter.

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Garrigou on Love of Concupiscence & of Friendship


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From Garrigou-Lagrange, The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus, pp. 116-7:


(Click on image to englarge.)






Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Announcement of Public Doctoral Dissertation Defense


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Author:
Francisco Romero Carrasquillo, PhD Cand.

Title: The Finality of the Religion in Aquinas’ Theory of Human Acts

Defense Location:
Alumni Memorial Union, 254
Marquette University
1442 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-1881

Date/Time: Fri., May 22, 2009 @ 9:30 a.m.

Dissertation Committee:
Director: David B. Twetten (Philosophy Department)
Readers: Fr. Roland Teske (Philosophy Dept.), Richard Taylor (Philosophy Dept), Mark Johnson (Theology Dept).

Dissertation Abstract: The study examines the end or purpose of the acts of the virtue of religion within Thomas Aquinas’ ethics of human action. What is the end of religious worship? Is it God, or is it the worshippers themselves? On the one hand, one would presume that God cannot be the end of religion because, from the perspective of Classical Theism (of which Aquinas is a main proponent), God cannot benefit from the activity of creatures. But on the other hand, if the worshipper is the end of religious acts, would not worship be a self-centered or an egotistic act? The standard Thomistic account of the problem, first laid out by Cajetan and later adopted by countless followers, is that God is the finis cuius (‘the aim toward which’) of the acts of the virtue of religion, whereas the religious worshipper is the finis quo (the beneficiary) of the acts. I argue that this solution, which is based on a single text of Aquinas (ST II-II.81.7c), is insufficient. After examining Aquinas' theory of action (the doctrine of object, end, and circumstances presented in ST I-II.18), I show how the object of a particular human act can be interpreted as the finis operis (the end of the agent’s act). Utilizing this principle of the identity between the object and the finis operis, I argue that the finis operis of religion can be summed up as a threefold sequence of ends: the honor, reverence, and glory of God. As a result, the ultimate beneficiary of acts of religious worship is neither God nor the individual worshipper, but rather the totality of the universe, encapsulated by Aquinas in his notion of divine ‘glory’, i.e., the extrinsic manifestation of God’s intrinsic goodness within the universe.


Note: Event is open to the general public.

Tuesday, May 19, 2009

Aquinas on Abiogenesis (Spontaneous Generation)


Share/Bookmark From ST I.105.1 ad 1: Whether God can Move Matter Immediately to the Form.

Reply to Objection 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (14.2; 44.2); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualem continentiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis. Virtus autem Dei se extendit ad formam et materiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.

Saturday, May 16, 2009

A Sin May be Mortal Due to its Object or its End


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From ST I-II.88.2c
:
Whether Mortal and Venial Sin Differ in Genus.


[O]ne sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.

Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of the agent, as stated above (I-II.18.4 & 6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery.

[A]liquod peccatum dicatur veniale ex genere, et aliquod mortale ex genere, secundum quod genus vel species actus determinantur ex obiecto. Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se repugnat caritati, per quam homo ordinatur in ultimum finem, peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale. Unde est mortale ex genere, sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia, periurium, et huiusmodi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Unde huiusmodi sunt peccata mortalia ex suo genere. Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi, sicut verbum otiosum, risus superfluus, et alia huiusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex suo genere. Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali non solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis, ut supra habitum est; contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum veniale ex genere ratione sui obiecti, fit mortale ex parte agentis, vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum, vel quia ordinat ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum.

Friday, May 15, 2009

Aquinas on the Principle of Double Effect


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From ST II-II.64.7c: Whether it is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-Defense?

Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (43, 3; I-II, 12, 1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (Article 3), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Thursday, May 14, 2009

The Three Moral Determinants of a Human Act: Object, End & Circumstances


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ST I-II.18.1c:

Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?

We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in ST I.5.1 and 3.... We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.


ST I-II.18.4c:

[A] fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above (Article 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.


ST I-II.18.2c:

Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?

I answer that, as stated above (Article 1), the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of being or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, "to take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing for species, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species.


ST I-II.18.4c:

Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?


I answer that the disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.


ST I-II.18.3c:

Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?


I answer that, in natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fullness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.


Tuesday, May 12, 2009

Is the Separate Soul a Person?


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From ST I.29.1 ad 5:

Objection 5. Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly defined as ["an individual substance of a rational nature."].

Reply to Objection 5. The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility [i.e., ability to be united], it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it.


From ST I.75.2 ad 1:

Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent....

Reply to Objection 1. "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing."


From ST I.75.4 ad 2:

Objection 2. Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man....

Reply to Objection 2. Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.


From ST II-II.85.1 ad 5:

Objection 5. Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection....

Reply to Objection 5. It is because the saints while living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the saying of Exodus 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.

Monday, May 11, 2009

The Principles of the Natural Law, In a Nutshell


Share/Bookmark From ST I-II.94.2:

Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?

On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 91, Article 3), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Saturday, February 07, 2009

Cajetan on the Three Kinds of Analogy


Share/Bookmark Ex Thoma de Vio Cajetano, De nominum analogia.

3. Ad tres ergo modos analogiæ omnia analoga reducuntur: scilicet ad analogiam inaequalitatis, et analogiam attributionis, et analogiam proportionalitatis. Quamvis secundum veram vocabuli proprietatem et usum Aristotelis, ultimus modus tantum analogiam constituat, primus autem alienus ab analogia omnino sit.

4. Analoga secundum inæqualitatem vocantur, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est omnino eadem, inaequaliter tamen participata. Et loquimur de inæqualitate perfectionis: ut corpus nomen commune est corporibus inferioribus et superioribus, et ratio omnium corporum (in quantum corpora sunt) eadem est. Quærenti enim quid est ignis in quantum corpus, dicetur: substantia trinæ dimensioni subiecta. Et similiter quærenti: quid est cælum in quantum corpus, etc. Non tamen secundum æqualem perfectionem ratio corporeitatis est in inferioribus et superioribus corporibus.

8. Analoga autem secundum attributionem sunt, quorum nomen commune est, ratio autem secundum illud nomen est eadem secundum terminum, et diversa secundum habitudines ad illum: ut sanum commune nomen est medicinæ, urinæ et animali; et ratio omnium in quantum sana sunt, ad unum terminum (sanitatem scilicet), diversas dicit habitudines. Si quis enim assignet quid est animal in quantum sanum, subiectum dicet sanitatis; urinam vero in quantum sanam, signum sanitatis; medicinam autem in quantum sanam, causam sanitatis proferet. Ubi clare patet, rationem sani esse nec omnino eamdem, nec omnino diversam; sed eamdem secundum quid, et diversam secundum quid. Est enim diversitas habitudinum, et identitas termini illarum habitudinum.

23. Ex abusive igitur analogis ad proprie analogiam ascendendo, dicimus: analoga secundum proportionalitatem dici, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est proportionaliter eadem. Vel sic: Analoga secundum proportionalitatem dicuntur, quorum nomen commune est, et ratio secundum illud nomen est similis secundum proportionem: ut videre corporali visione, et videre intellectualiter, communi nomine vocantur videre; quia sicut intelligere, rem animae offert, ita videre corpori animato.