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"[W]e now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Celestial Hierarchy, Ch. 11) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation...."Division of the Treatise on Man (ST I.75-102)
I. The Nature of Man, in relation to the Soul (I.75-89)
--A. Essence of the Soul (I.75-76)
----1. The Soul Itself (I.75)
----2. The Soul's Union with the Body (I.76)
--B. Powers of the Soul (I.77-83)
--C. Operation of the Soul (I.84-89)
II. The Origin of Man (I.90-102)
9 comments:
I'm not sure if you mean to say that the "theology of the body" is not its own branch of theology, or that the "theology of the body" is in itself nonsensical and thus is not truly theology.
I would, I think, grant the former, but I would not grant the latter. The "theology of the body" (TOB) is, to my knowledge, not intended to be a separate "branch" of theology, but rather a fresh approach to a specific section of moral theology. I make this claim based on my memory that John Paul II used this term merely in passing rather than as the title for his series of lectures.
It seems to me that what he meant in using this phrase -- "theology of the body" -- was to say that the human body itself bears imprints of God's design for man and, in fact, reflects something of God. In this way, the body, as corporeal, makes visible the invisible plan of God. It is therefore not the body which is ultimately important here, but rather the divine plan revealed in the body (and, of course, in the soul, primarily by natural law I would add).
Understood in this way, there cannot be anything objectionable in what is meant by the phrase "theology of the body." Now one could argue that this phrase itself betrays a certain looseness with the term "theology," since it does not mean, by that term, the science of God and of all things with reference to God (as their Beginning or End). There is at least one possible reply to this, though: it seems that "theology" here means the uncovering of that aspect of things in which they manifest God their Creator, in other words, this "theology of the body" consists in looking at the body with reference to God as man's Beginning (Creation, the original human state) and End (that to which Christ has called us).
I'd like to leave JPII out of this, since his Wednesday audiences on this topic were something quite different (much less scandalous) from what the so-called "Theology of the Body" has become since. This does not mean that the content of those audiences is completely compatible with traditional theology, or that I accept them it any way, but simply that at present I do not wish to criticize it.
Let me clarify what I meant with this post: I'm not only saying that the so-called "theology of the body" is not its own "branch" (i.e., integral part) of the science of sacred theology, but that it is illegitimately classified as sacred theology altogether. Its dogmatic, moral, and sacramental claims, of course, can be discussed in the corresponding treatises of the science of theology (dogma, moral, sacramental theology), even though many of those dogmatic, moral and sacramental claims and practices are wrong: they would actually belong to Theology insofar as they are to refuted by Sacred Theology. But the claims regarding the meaning of the body, the sacralisation of sex, and the reinterpretation of the Faith in terms of sex, are not theological at all.
I do not wish to give examples of claims made by the proponents of the "theology of the body" because, unlike West, I believe it is inappropriate, imprudent, and scandalous (i.e., it can cause some to have evil thoughts) to speak of those subjects to the overall public. (Although of course, I do not mean to deny that it was perfectly appropriate for the traditional scholastic manuals on sexual ethics to deal with these topics in Latin, as they were aimed at priests, theologians, and the older and more mature seminarians, who could engage in theological debates on these subjects rationally and without suffering sexual temptations. But what West is doing is something entirely different from what the manuals did.)
The reasoning for my claim that this is not theology at all is this: as Aquinas explains, theology considers the body only in its relation to the soul, where the image of God lies in human nature. If we are to consider the body under any other aspect (e.g., its reproductive powers), it would no longer be sacred theology. The study of the body in itself, and of the vegetative and sense powers, including reproductive powers, is done more properly in the psychological/anthropological part of natural science. (Compare the contents of Aquinas' theological "treatise on man" in ST I.75ff with his philosophical commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima"; this difference of emphasis corresponds to and illustrates the difference of formal object under which natural science and Sacred theology study human nature.)
For a traditional Catholic critique of Christopher West's "theology of the body", see this article on the Remnant by Christopher Ferrara:
http://www.remnantnewspaper.com/Archives/2009-0630-christopher_west_show.htm
Thank you for the clarification, Francisco.
I wholeheartedly agree with the distinction between John Paul II and the popularizers of the "theology of the body."
I also agree with your criticism of these popularizers insofar as sometimes matters that are delicate and best left to private discussion among mature people are, in fact, discussed openly and publicly by these popularizers, causing scandal.
I am very much interested in what you identify as "dogmatic, moral, and sacramental claims and practices" of the "theology of the body" that are wrong. Assuming, of course, that you can elaborate upon this without having to discuss matters that should be left for private discussion, would you explain?
I understand your point about the role of the body in sacred theology according to St. Thomas. However, I don't think it quite addresses my original point in this regard, i.e., that the body can be considered in relation to both the soul and to God, precisely by considering the manner in which the divine image is "stamped" upon the soul and, consequently, upon the body itself. Does not traditional theology itself involve a consideration of the body, insofar as arguments in moral theology pertaining to the sixth and ninth commandments rest upon a certain understanding of the body, an understanding that the "theology of the body" (JPII) attempts to elaborate upon?
Lastly, I have read Christopher Ferrara's article. Still, since you made reference to it, I decided to re-read it. My re-reading confirmed my original impression: while I agree with several, if not many, of Mr. Ferrara's points, I find his article objectionable. Actually, I generally avoid reading his writings. I find him disagreeable, propagandic, ad hominem, and oftentimes downright wrong. All these characteristics are present in his article on Christopher West.
1. I would gladly discuss with you via email those topics that are not appropriate for the general public. Feel free to drop me an email if you'd like.
2. In reply to your question: "Does not traditional theology itself involve a consideration of the body, insofar as arguments in moral theology pertaining to the sixth and ninth commandments rest upon a certain understanding of the body, an understanding that the "theology of the body" (JPII) attempts to elaborate upon?" I would say this: as you well point out, moral theology does discuss those topics under the treatise "De sexto et nono" (and I might also add that it deals with the sacramental topics under the treatise "De matrimonio"). In these treatises, the body is dealt with insofar as it has to do with moral and sacramental matters, and never as something that is itself a theological topic. In the same way, any other topic that is not intrinsically theological, such as animals, food, and money, for instance, are considered by various treatises within sacred theology (e.g., animals are discussed in "De homine", food in "De temperantia", and money in "De justitia"), but there is no such thing as a "theology of animals," a "theology of food" or a "theology of money"--not even a *treatise* on animals, food, or money. And in fact it may be that animals, food, and money make manifest God's wisdom, goodness, etc. each in its own special way, but a reflection on the Christian meaning and importance of those things of itself does not deserve to be called "theology of" (or even a treatise on) any of those things.
3. Ferrara is indeed sometimes quite rash and uses arguments with more rhetorical than logical force. And I do not care so much for his resistance mentality. Yet, while I question his prudence in the way he says some things sometimes, I do find that I am on his team, ideologically speaking. His assessment of the current crisis (theologically, liturgically, etc.) is right on, in my opinion, even if his way of dealing with it is not always all that agreeable.
I would submit to you, Don Paco, that "in so far as the body has relation to the soul," is precisely the aspect under which JP2's Theology of the Body is considered. Anyone familiar with his work knows that he is always fundamentally concerned with PERSONS - persons who are embodied spirits, in this case. It is PRECISELY a question here of what the body tells us about the soul - i.e., that it is in the Imago Dei, with all of the ramifications that involves. It appears your concern for minutiae has interfered with an understanding of what the Holy Father was actually doing.
Dear Br. Timothy,
Thanks for your comment.
As I mentioned in a previous comment, I would like to leave the Holy Father out of this. I'm criticizing in particular the so-called 'theology of the body' as it is presented by other 'theologians' such as Christopher West.
It is indeed legitimate to study the body scientifically (i.e., theologically) in its relationship to the soul. I, of course, do not want to deny that. Now, whereas this might be what the Holy Father is doing, it is certainly not what Christopher West does.
In any case, what I do deny, however, is that an integral part of theological science can be rightly called a 'theology of the body'. There cannot be a theology of the body anymore than there can be a theology of bread and wine. The theologian considers bread and wine in the treatise De Sacramentis, to be sure, but such a treatise is not a 'theology of bread and wine'. The matter of the Sacrament of the Eucharist is not the formal aspect under which (ratio formalis sub qua) we study the Sacrament. Similarly, the theologian studies bones, fingers, hearts, and blood, and yet there is no 'theology of bones', 'theology of fingers', 'theology of hearts' or 'theology of blood'.
As Aquinas explains, the formal ratio of theology, God as revealing Himself, is what gives unity to the science. It for this reason that each treatise is named according to the same formality, De Deo ... etc.: e.g., De Deo Creante, De Christo Salvatore, De Deo Sanctificante, etc. It's all just theology, studied in different treatises all of which have the same formality. They are all integral parts of the same science.
"Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science." (ST I.1.3c).
PS 1. Brother Timothy, I disagree that these are all minutia. The issue of 'what is theology' is perhaps the most fundamental in all of theology! On that issue depends everything else that we do in theological science.
PS 2. On another point--and this one is definitely a less important point--it is not precise to say that we are 'embodied spirits', given the dogma that the soul is the substantial form of the body. We are not substantially spirits that have 'embodiment' as an accident, prorium, or specific difference. Rather, our bodies are integral parts of the substances that we are. We are corporeal-and-spiritual substances, as the text of Aquinas in the I-II's prooemium makes clear (quoted in the body of the post). It is, therefore, more precise to say that we are rational animals, that is, we are substantially animals who have rationality as our specific difference. In other words, the 'embodied spirits' language (like Wojtyla's statement that "I am not my body, I have my body") is, at best, imprecise and, at worst, dangerously dualistic, and certainly not Thomistic.
Thanks for your stimulating post. Prescinding from Theology of the Body, Inc., i.e., Christopher West I’d like to make a methodological observation.
(1) The couplets prime matter–substantial form and body–soul do not precisely overlap. While “soul” and “substantial form” might, “body” and “prime matter” do not. “Body” is already informed matter.
(2)(a) Metaphysically, in a more object-oriented way, through analysis of the objects of nature, we see the couplet where the soul is understood as the substantial form of the body: matter and substantial form. E.g., “Socrates is an individual of one essence composed of matter and form.” (Summa Theologica, I, 76, 1)
(b) One can also explore things existentially and psychologically, through reflection on our lives giving us: body and soul.
There is an inner, personal side to us revealed in our thinking, knowing, willing, loving, experiencing that is distinct--but not separate from--our physical, bodily side.
For example, Augustine writes: “And I turned my thoughts into myself and said, ‘Who are you?’ And I answered, ‘A man.’ For see, there is in me both a body and a soul; the one external, the other internal.” (Confessions, X, vi, 9)
Without denying (2)(a) JPII is operating mostly out of (2)(b) in his Wednesday addresses.
This is a good article from The Remnant criticizing "theology of the body" in the light of pre-Vatican II tradition.
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